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Abstract
THE MUSIC AND MULTIPLE IDENTITIES OF KURDISH ALEVIS FROM TURKEY IN
GERMANY
by
Ozan Emrah Aksoy
Adviser: Professor Stephen Blum
This dissertation investigates the experiences of Kurdish Alevis, currently living in
Germany, who trace their background to locations within the boundaries of the Republic of
Turkey. I argue that music has been a particularly important mode through which Kurdish Alevis
in Germany have articulated collective histories and have fashioned narratives of belonging and
multiple and sometimes contradictory identities. The subjects of my research are immigrants and
refugees who are ethnically Kurdish and whose religion is Alevi, an Anatolian religion whose
relations to both Sunni and Shi'a Islam are historically controversial. They speak Turkish along
with Kurdish, in most cases are Turkish and German citizens living in and around Cologne,
Germany, and have family members in Istanbul, Turkey.
Kurdish Alevis struggled against being labeled with certain identities, such as Turkish
and Muslim within the larger immigrant pool from Turkey. At the same time, many of them have
striven for their collective identities, namely Kurdish and Alevi, primarily in the last two
decades. Music has been an integral part of their efforts. I argue that, in the last two decades, a
new transnational field has emerged for Kurdish Alevi immigrants and refugees in Germany and
by extension in Turkey, opening spaces for realignment around various and fluctuating loyalties
with respect to ethnic, political, and social modes of belonging. This work is an investigation of
the music of this ethno-religious double minority group in their second and third homelands.
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Chapter 1. The Music and Multiple Identities of Kurdish Alevis from Turkey in Germany
1.1. Introduction
This dissertation investigates the experiences of Kurdish Alevis currently living in
Germany who trace their background to locations within the boundaries of the Turkish state.
Music has been an important mode through which Kurdish Alevis in Turkey and in Germany
have articulated collective histories and have fashioned narratives of belonging. The subjects of
my research are immigrants and refugees who are ethnically Kurdish (Kurmancî-speaking),
religiously Alevi, and who speak Turkish and in most cases are Turkish citizens living in and
around Cologne, Germany, and having family members in Istanbul, Turkey. 1
What makes this group a unique anthropological and ethnomusicological subject is that
their places of origin are the villages within a geographical triangle defined by the eastern
Turkish cities of Maraş, Malatya, and Adıyaman. Among all ethno-religious groups in Turkey,
only the Kurdish Alevi communities have followers of both Kurdish and Alevi political
movements. The Alevi awakening movement of the 1990s and the Kurdish uprisings of the
1980s and 1990s have posed among the most serious challenges to the hegemonic cultural, legal,
and economic policies of the Turkish state. Kurdish Alevis have become involved with both of
these challenging and contradictory movements. In their first homeland, where their social and
cultural identifications were denied by state authorities, this double minority group, mobilized
transnationally, has proved itself to be in opposition to the Sunni Muslim Turkish majority at all
levels.

__________________
1

All interviews were conducted in Turkish except where otherwise indicated.
1

One of the values of this ethnographic study of a small ethno-religious group’s identity
formation process through musical practices is that members of this group have conflicting and
contradictory ideas, practices, and identities regarding themselves and their fellow Kurdish
Alevis. Some “Kurdish Alevis” may even refuse to call themselves Kurdish or Alevi or both due
to many reasons, including internationalist and humanist stances of some members of the
community. Some Kurdish speaking Alevis may have problems with any kind of nationalist
labels, including “Kurdish.” Some Kurdish speaking Alevis who have already embraced Turkish
identity as their main identity marker may refuse all other labels. Some Kurdish speaking Alevis
may not believe in any religion. Therefore, it is significant for this project to state from the outset
that the idea of one “Kurdish Alevi identity” is problematic, given the cosmopolitan and
fragmented nature of many Kurdish Alevi communities in Cologne who have constant exchange
with other people via transnational networks through their multiple homelands. In claims-making
processes of Kurds or Alevis, those who are both Alevi and Kurd, both in Germany and Turkey,
might invoke a multiplicity of self-identifications
As many other ethnographers have pointed out in different contexts for migrant ethnic
groups from the Middle East (Şahin 2005, Vertovec 2010, Özyürek 2009, and Çağlar 1998,
2007), I have observed that one of the most significant factors that leads to the creation of
collective identities has been the place of origin, and for this group these villages provide a
strong basis for their collective identity. Other corollary identification criteria, not only for
Kurdish Alevis but also for many other ethno-religious communities in the world, are “tribal”
connections or the historical references given to those “tribal” connections that were transformed
into claims of place of origin.
Kurdish Alevi social life cannot be defined without reference to music, especially the saz
2

or bağlama (also known as tembur in Kurdish), a long-necked lute that holds special symbolic
significance for the Kurdish Alevi people. Each generation of Kurdish Alevi men teaches this
instrument to their sons, as my father did to me when I was a child. For Alevi families, especially
for Kurdish Alevis, family socialization with music is a central element of community cohesion.
Unlike a Sunni Muslim child raised in a different household and with a different soundscape,
many Alevi children like myself grew up with the sound of saz and the Kurdish and Alevi
repertoires that surround us. My involvement with Alevism, therefore, is deeply musical, as was
my family's.
When I was conducting research in Cologne, İbrahim, a man who had grown up in the
Turkish city of Adana, told me that his family had had to hide their Alevi religious practice in
order to prevent possible clashes in their relatively conservative and predominantly Sunnipopulated neighborhood. Ibrahim, a musician and an instructor of bağlama at a local Alevi
organization located in the Keupstrasse district in Cologne, told me that he believed that his
family managed to be seen as “regular” at their first encounters with their neighbors in Adana
thanks to the lack of a distinct accent in their Turkish. Yet that was not the family’s only
precaution. Ibrahim was also sent to a local Qur’an school in Turkey for five years by his
parents, and he recalled that when he was a child his family made a practice of keeping lights on
in their house at night during Ramadan in order to make it seem as if they were fasting like Sunni
Muslims. In our conversations, Ibrahim expressed a belief that this takiyye or dissimulation 2
with respect to the Sunni majority was forced upon him by his family solely to protect their well__________________
2

Historically many Alevis "in order to avoid persecution took refuge in inaccessible regions,
adopting dissimulation (takiyye) as their favored means of defence.” (Massicard 2013: 15)
3

being, but nonetheless he regretted that this had happened to him. Describing his families’
takiyye process, Ibrahim—who was now forty-two years old—noted that certain patterns of
speech and pronunciation, for instance, were to be closely guarded so as to avoid possible
implications about their city of origin and any other qualities that could possibly distinguish them
as “Alevi people.”
Ibrahim’s experience is not uncommon, but between the ways he articulated his
experience of dissimulation and the fact that more recently he had become a vocal advocate on
behalf of other Kurdish Alevi causes, his story was formative of his upbringing and his future
aspirations with regard to his Alevi and Kurdish activism. As a proud Alevi trying to learn and
teach his religion to the next generation, Ibrahim is an active participant in political action
organizations working to advance Alevi causes. As a proud Kurd, he also is active in Kurdish
recognition movements, an example of what philosopher Charles Taylor has called the “politics
of recognition” (Taylor and Gutmann 1992). Considering that his situation in Germany was quite
different from the one he grew up in, Ibrahim’s experiences led me to think about the current
instances of public display by Kurdish Alevis. Over the past thirty years of substantial
demographic and social transformation in Germany and Turkey, certain changes have taken
place in how Kurdish Alevis express multiple modes of belonging under the rubric of the politics
of recognition in two countries and in a transnational space. This dissertation examines the
contribution of musical practices disseminated through different media to the politics of
recognition among Kurdish Alevis in Germany.
In order to understand this twentieth-century transformation, I delved into history,
exploring Kurdish Alevis’ geographic migrations and changing relationship with an avowedly
secular Turkish state. I wanted to find out different ways people live Alevism, or the lack
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thereof, in its historical context and in multiple locations. Owing largely to masses of people who
migrated from Turkey to Germany in the twentieth century, I found a substantial body of
scholarship concerning, in turn, Kurds and Alevis who had made the same trip, yet in spite of
this emphasis I discovered that the Kurdish Alevi subgroup had not received individual attention.
In fact, the population of this subgroup—estimated at over 100,000 individuals in Germany—has
not yet been the sole subject of any ethnographic research. I set out to close this gap by
investigating the experiences of Kurdish Alevis currently living in Germany who trace their
background to locations within the boundaries of the Turkish state through an
ethnomusicological lens.
The matter of expressing Kurdish Alevi belonging involves a process of mediation that
cannot be isolated within one set of national borders. While Kurdish Alevis in Germany enjoy
greater religious freedom than their relatives have done in Turkey, they nevertheless face unique
struggles of their own as they are relegated to what I refer to as a “dual minority status” (Kurdish
and Alevi). More specifically, in Germany, Kurdish Alevis are vulnerable to the same kinds of
discrimination that they experience in Turkey in their encounters with the Turkish Sunni
immigrants who constitute the overwhelming majority of the immigrant population in Germany.
The Turkish state and its legal apparatus, which subsumes differences among its citizens beneath
the blanket categories of “Muslim” or “Turk,” deny Kurdish Alevis’ distinct Alevi religious and
Kurdish ethnic modes of belonging. This silencing of concerns and problems specific to Kurdish
Alevis living in Turkey is also a feature of the condition of Kurdish Alevis in Germany, except
that in Germany Kurdish Alevis are subjected to discrimination at two simultaneous levels:
among their Sunni Turkish immigrant peers at workplaces or cultural or social centers as Kurdish
Alevis, and among German citizens as Turkish immigrants because, as one of my informants put
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it, they “destroy the German Leitkultur (leading culture).” It is crucial to clarify that Kurdish
Alevis in Turkey and in Germany are not simply minorities but that their minority status in these
contexts translates into powerful negatives in the realm of experience. 3 Kurdish Alevis in
Germany find themselves part of two minority populations, by virtue of both their Turkish
background and their difference from “other Turks.” I realized that to account for this my
investigation into the shifting terms of belonging would necessitate my engaging both the
population of Kurdish Alevis living in Germany and the population living in Turkey.
For this dissertation, then, I engage the full extent of the German-Türkiye’li transnational
space (see below). Drawing primarily on research conducted among Kurdish Alevis in Cologne
and Istanbul, this study investigates the transnational space opened up by modern media such as
internet social networking technologies in order to analyze changes in a set of ethnic and
religious identity expressions and struggles expressed through music that is unique to Kurdish
Alevi communities with roots in contemporary Turkey.
Probably as much as anything else, however, this dissertation is about my own search and
struggle for finding and defining my family’s identity (ies). Raised as Kurdish-speaking in
Turkey, with a self-conscious Alevi upbringing, and with a left-leaning political stance
embracing secularism as one of the most significant political issues throughout my life, I share
with my informants in Germany and in Turkey many aspects of their own life experiences.
My hometown, Antakya, is one of the most culturally diverse cities in Turkey.
Predominantly populated by people of Arab descent, it is characterized in particular by the
__________________
3

I believe it is important for this study to distinguish between being a minority and suffering
negative consequences based on that minority status. In many cases in the world, minorities have
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coexistence of many religious groups. In Antakya, things were not as difficult for me as they
were for Ibrahim and other Kurdish Alevi immigrants, surviving as members of a small minority
among Sunni majority groups (Beşikçi 1997, Zürcher 2004). As many of our friends and
neighbors were Nusayris or Alawites— who all shared the same fate with other Alevis in the
sense that they were subjected to the Islamic assimilation, or Sunnification, policies of the
“secular” Turkish state—my family members did not have to fear government reprisal when they
acknowledged our Alevi identity in Antakya. Still, when my late grandmother was bidding me
farewell as I left home for the first time to attend college in Istanbul, she cautioned me to never
tell anyone that I am Alevi and/or Kurd. I was not sure what to expect when she repeatedly
warned me about keeping our family’s background a secret, but sure enough once in Istanbul I
heard that “Alevis do mum söndü,” “candle extinguishing” (implying orgies and incest), and
phrases like “en iyi Kürt ölü Kürt’tür,” “the best Kurds in the world are those who are dead.”
Thus, it is significant for the writing of this dissertation that I have struggled to find possible
explanations for my own identification since early childhood. After moving to Istanbul, I had to
hide, sometimes lie about, and sometimes ignore everything I learned from my parents,
grandparents, and other family members regarding our past, our religion, our ethnicity, and all
the social identities that I and we had embraced and had to struggle with. I have had to navigate
the place of religion, ethnic and national belonging, assimilation, integration, tolerance,
multiculturalism, solidarity, citizenship, political mobilization, and artistic expression in my own
daily life. Put simply, the issues this dissertation problematizes are the ones I have struggled to
address in my life.
__________________
exercised power over the majority, as in virtually any instance of colonialism, for example.
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Finally, my research shows that music has been a particularly important medium through
which Kurdish Alevis in Turkey and Germany have shared narratives of collective histories and
reproduced a common vocabulary of belonging. While conducting research in Germany I was
surprised by the prominence of what I call “alebesk,” a musical genre that I associated with
Kurdish Alevis along with others in Turkey. Furthermore, I was surprised when one elderly
Kurdish Alevi whom I interviewed referred to sound—and musical sound in particular—both as
the metaphor and as the means through which members of the community realized their
belonging. “Imagine a lonely orphan in the dark,” he said to me. “He hears many noises and then
suddenly he hears something familiar, something safe, reminding him of his family. That is how
we [Kurdish Alevis] found each other, via the bağlama and the songs we sing and listen to
together.” For this man, and for many Kurdish Alevis, even in spite of the pain and dispersal that
figure so prominently in that collective history, rearticulating connections through music
provided them with a source of strength.

1.2. Situation of the Research Subject: Kurdish Alevis
Who are the Kurdish Alevis? Since no official census figures account for Kurdish or
Alevi people in either Turkey or Germany, it is difficult to pinpoint the size of this population.
According to widely accepted estimates, there are around fifteen million Kurds living in Turkey
and 300,000 in Germany, of whom the majority are Sunni Muslims while approximately one
third are Alevi. On the other hand, varying estimates place the total population of Alevis in
Turkey at around twenty-five million, of whom a quarter (slightly over six million) are Kurdish
while the remaining nineteen million are of Turkish, Arab, or Albanian (who are Bektaşi) origin.
I use the term Alevi, like almost all that call themselves such, to include the people categorized
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under the larger Alevi-Bektaşi tent that has been used to label all heterodox groups in Anatolia in
the 20th century. In the current public discourse in Turkey and elsewhere, Alevis and Bektaşis
use the labels Alevi and Alevi-Bektaşi interchangeably to refer to all of those heterodox groups.
Figure 1.1 summarizes some ethno-religious groups in Turkey, categorized according to the
native language of the members in relation to the two largest linguistic groups, namely the
Turkish- and Kurdish- speaking. The Turkish-speaking Alevi groups include the Tahtacı, Çepni 4,
and Abdal, whereas the Kurdish-speaking Alevis include both Kurmancî and Zazakî speakers,
some of whom identify themselves as Kızılbaş.

__________________
4

For one of the most detailed accounts of the Çepni to this date see Gökalp 1980.
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(Alawite)
Arab

Alevi
Other
religions

TURKISH
Sunni
Muslim

“Kızılbaş”

KURDISH
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Figure 1.1. Ethno-religious breakdown of some groups in Turkey 5

Bearing this in mind, we may begin by noting that Alevism (Alevilik, Elewi, and
Kızılbaş) is an Anatolian religion whose relations to both Sunni and Shi'a Islam are historically
controversial. Markus Dressler defines Alevis as "a number of heterogeneous socio-religious
communities in Turkey and the Balkans, historically referred to as Kızılbaş, who in the twentieth
century began to share in a common trans-regional Alevi identity called Alevism" (2008: 93).
According to Zeidan (1999), Turkish Alevis, mainly from Central and Eastern Anatolia,
constitute the majority of Alevis in Turkey. A quarter of Alevis are ethnic Kurds speaking
__________________
5

For a detailed map of ethnic groups in Turkey see Andrews and Benninghaus (1989).
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Kurmancî or Zazakî (Dimîlî). Kurmancî is the most commonly spoken Kurdish language among
some thirty million Kurds in the world, the majority of whom live within the borders of Turkey.
Most Kurmancî speakers are Sunni Muslim while a small minority (approximately 20%) is
Alevi. Zazakî is the language, sometimes categorized as one of the dialects of Kurdish by
Kurdish nationalists, spoken by the residents of cities in Turkish Kurdistan 6 including Tunceli,
Elazığ, and Diyarbakır. More than half of Zazakî speakers are Alevi though not all of these
identify as Kurds (Kaya 2011). Thomas Solomon (2011), in discussing the diversity of the
immigrant population from Turkey in Germany, eloquently summarizes the “dizzying array of
multiple identities” among the larger “Turkish community” as:

Even the category “Kurd” is not transparent, as it also includes significant overlapping
sub-groups based on linguistic or sectarian identities, including Kurmancî speakers and
Zazakî speakers (Kurmancî and Zazakî are not mutually intelligible languages); speakers
of both of these languages may be Sunni Muslim or Alevi, and the latter of these may
privilege their Alevi identity over their “Kurdishness,” feeling they have more in
common with Turkish-speaking Alevis than with Kurmancî or Zazakî-speaking Sunnis.

Throughout the decades following the establishment of the Turkish republic in 1923, the
environment of hostility in Turkey led many Alevis to reify as Alevi religious/cultural symbols
and memories of the pogroms of Maraş (1978), Çorum (1980), Sivas (1993), and Gazi (1995)
__________________
6

Although Kurdistan has been known for centuries as the geographical location populated
mostly by Kurds (along with Turkmens and Arabs among others), it is still a politically charged
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among others, in which hundreds of Alevis were massacred by mobs or state troopers. During
my research, I heard about those events in almost all of my conversations, a testament to how the
stories have come to form a significant part of Alevi cultural memory. The Alevi reverence of
martyrdom, part of the Alevi cultural memory that can also be observed in other Shi'a groups,
exemplifies the use of historical narrative to create a common past as part of a community. The
notion of martyrdom continues to dominate Alevi and Kurdish personal and collective narratives,
resembling those of Jews, Shias, Palestinians, and Sikhs, among many other ethno-religious
groups. Alevis have been reminding their children and grandchildren about their ancestors who
suffered for centuries under Sunni rule, from Sultan Selim II of the Ottoman Empire up through
the Sivas massacre in 1993 and the Gazi events in Istanbul 1995. In his recent work Bir Siyeset
Tarzı Olarak Alevi Katliamları (Alevi Massacres as Political Strategy, 2011), Mehmet Bayrak
summarizes the Alevi massacres committed, directed, or allowed to be committed by the Sunni
citizens of the Republic of Turkey and the Ottoman Empire. Although it is impossible to find
actual state documents that will reveal that those were part of an official state policy, the long
sequence of massacres reinforces the inherent distrust that Alevis feel against any form of the
Sunni state apparatus. Those massacres suggest that either by ordering or allowing a certain
group of people to harm Alevis, the state managed to exert power over its “dangerous” citizens.
This sequence also reinforces the Alevi narrative around martyrdom and the problems that stem
from a Sunni-controlled state.
Thus, a historical narrative filled with the atrocities committed against Alevis has been
used to remind Alevis, especially Kurdish Alevis, to never trust the Turkish Sunni state, as
__________________
label and term in Turkey.
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almost all of the atrocities committed against Alevis targeted Kurdish Alevis in Maraş, Gazi,
Malatya, and Sivas. As Kurds, Kurdish Alevis have been subjected to constant assimilation and
forced migration policies by the Turkish state coupled with a constant denial of their ethnic and
linguistic rights. Massacres and other forms of atrocities committed against Kurds and Alevis
were used to create local heroes in Kurdish Alevi narratives, which have been transmitted from
generation to generation. Kurmancî Alevis from Maraş and Malatya, for instance, have many
heroic songs and laments written for Mehmet Ali, who was sentenced to death in 1915 after he
allegedly helped Armenian fighters. In practice, the dominant Sunni Muslim jurisprudence in
Turkey does not accept Alevism as a legitimate religious denomination, within Islam or separate
from it (Dressler 2013, Tambar 2010).
During my fieldwork, Kurdish Alevis mentioned the Sivas Massacre more than any other
event that they have talked about both publicly and privately. One of the main reasons has been
that it was one of the most tragic events that happened to public figures, including musicians and
novelists. The victims, most whom were famous Alevi musicians such as Hasret Gültekin,
Nesimi Çimen, and Muhlis Akarsu, along with dancers, poets, scholars and intellectuals, were in
Sivas to attend a cultural/religious festival on July 3, 1993. The attendees were trapped inside a
hotel called Madımak and mobs of Sunni residents and lay people burned the hotel down. The
massacre has made its way through the most indispensable moments of Alevi social memory (see
Özyürek 2001 for social memory in Turkey). Alevi identification became more visible especially
after the Sivas Massacre. It became a political and organizational milestone for Alevis to
organize and remember the massacre on all occasions. Today, the commemorations of
anniversary of the massacre are among the most significant events that the Alevis I interviewed
attend regularly in order to protest. Especially after this event, one could see a change in the tone
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of Alevi activism, which led to a change in hometown organization titles to include Alevi,
Bektaşi or other titles associated with Alevi religiosity. Almost identical with what the 1984 Sikh
massacre in Punjab, located in the imagined Sikh homeland of “Khalistan,” did to organize Sikhs
around a unified objective (Axel 2001); the Sivas Massacre was instrumental in unifying a
political message for Alevis. The reaction was much stronger among Alevis in Germany than
among those living in Turkey, which in a sense helped galvanize all Alevi organizations to
mobilize, creating a transnational social field that strategically located Alevis, especially Kurdish
Alevis, in opposition to the Turkish state.
A reliable December 2012 poll commissioned by the main opposition party (CHP, the
secularist Republican People's Party) among Alevis in Turkey clearly describes the state of living
for Alevis in Turkey (Akkiraz 2012). The poll reveals that even in the year 2012, the majority of
Alevis in Turkey claim they have no freedom of religion or freedom to worship. Commissioned
by the CHP Istanbul deputy Sabahat Akkiraz (a famous Alevi singer-turned politician), the poll
indicates that the plurality of Alevi communities in Turkey cite the lack of legal status for
cemevis (Alevi religious centers for prayer and communal gathering) as the most important
problem for their community's religious practice (Hürriyet Daily News, December 17th, 2012). In
the same poll, 67 percent of self-identified Alevis say they must hide their Alevi identity. One of
the most pertinent questions for this study arose when Alevis were asked about their religious
identity. Informants identified themselves as the following:
60 percent Alevi
18 percent Kurdish Alevi
10 percent Turkmen Alevi
9 percent Muslim
3 percent Atheist
14

One revealing aspect of this study is that about one in five Alevis identify their religion as
“Kurdish Alevi,” with the implication that “Alevi” does not express their identification enough
so that they express the need for being identified with their ethnic belonging along with their
religion. Categories of “Kurdish Alevi” and “Alevi”, among others, may well be selected by
Kurmancî and Zazakî speakers. There is little doubt that some Kurdish Alevis reply to the same
questions with other options such as “Alevi” or “atheist”; however, this point is significant as it
highlights a clear public articulation by Kurdish Alevis of their differences from other Alevis.
When asked their views of the most important problem facing Alevis, 42 percent
responded with the absence of legal status or protection for cemevis, while 27 percent cited
compulsory religion courses (teaching solely the foundations of Sunni Islam) and 16 percent
cited assimilation to Islam. The issue of the lack of legal status for cemevis has recently become
more visible. On July 7, 2012, the CHP's Tunceli deputy, Hüseyin Aygün, appealed to the
Speaker of the House for a cemevi to be established in the Turkish Parliament. Speaker Cemil
Çiçek refused the deputy’s request by referring to the Diyanet İşleri Başkanlığı (DİB,
Department of Religious Affairs governed by the Prime Minister), which says that the sole house
of worship for Islam is the mosque and that "Alevism is not a separate religion." In another
recent incident, Turkey's Supreme Court of Appeals ruled on July 25, 2012 that only mosques
and masjids (prayer rooms) could legally be considered defined places of worship for citizens of
Turkey, overruling a request to register a cemevi in Ankara as a house of worship. These two
incidents emphasize once again the extreme difficultly for Alevis to obtain official recognition
and constitutional protection of their religious rights in Turkey today.

15

1.3. Migration History of Kurdish Alevis in Turkey and Germany
There are approximately four million people in Germany with roots in Turkey, but of
those, the vast majority initially migrated from their villages to Istanbul or other Turkish
metropoles, where they settled briefly before finally moving beyond the national boundaries.
This migration process began as part of a larger movement of Kurds along with Turks in the
early twentieth century (Ammann 2001). In many cases, migration meant moving to make a
living in different locations where one could find jobs and economic security, but it is inaccurate
to assume that migration is voluntary, and this is especially true in the case of Kurdish Alevis. In
the early years of the Turkish Republic, repressive state policies also prompted dramatic shifts in
the geographical distribution of the population and forced many Kurdish Alevis to leave their
homes and resettle in predominantly Sunni Muslim cities. The Turkish nation-state physically
deported people and in some cases they were otherwise coerced. Nevertheless, despite moving
west and south throughout the 1940s and 1950s, many retained contact with their relatives and
searched out fellow Kurdish Alevis to create new bonds of community in their homeland. In the
1960s and 1970s, a second migration movement was underway to search for social, economic,
and political security. Kurdish Alevis began moving from small towns where they had resettled
in western and southern Turkey, heading toward urban centers in the north.
By the time of my research in the early twenty-first century, my informants, Kurdish
Alevi migrants in Istanbul and Cologne, predominantly traced their origins to the towns of
Maraş, Malatya, and Adıyaman. Those living in the European part of Istanbul concentrate in the
Bağcılar, Bahçelievler, and Yenibosna neighborhoods, and those living on the Asian side of the
city live in districts such us Kadıköy, Maltepe, and Ümraniye. In most cases, Kurdish Alevis in
Istanbul live in neighborhoods also populated by Sunni Turks as well as other (non-Alevi) Kurds.
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The three figures below (Figure 1.2, 1.3, and 1.4) show the locations of the three homelands that
I talk about throughout this dissertation. The first location is in the middle of the three cities that
constitute a triangle in southeastern Turkey, where most of the Kurdish Alevis used to live. Now
almost all Kurdish Alevis live either in their second or third homelands.

Figure 1.2. First Homeland of Kurdish Alevis

The second homeland they settled in is the city of Istanbul, in which they established
networks based on kinship and prior relationships.
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Figure 1.3. From the First Homeland to the Second
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Figure 1.4. From Second Homeland to the Third

The force of discrimination and the occasional outright violence exerted by the Turkish
state against its Kurdish Alevi citizens have resulted in a continuing and significant exodus, and
the majority of these refugees have fled to Germany. The first wave of Kurdish Alevis to settle in
Germany (along with other guest workers from Turkey) began arriving in the early 1960s as part
of the immigrant labor agreement signed between German and Turkish governments. As migrant
laborers, they were expected to revitalize Germany's manufacturing industry and rebuild its postWWII war-torn cities, and then afterward simply to leave. Germany and Turkey signed an
agreement for temporary foreign workers, also known as Gastarbeiter (guestworkers), on 31
October 1961. In the first year of the agreement, 7000 workers were settled in Germany to work
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in mainly low-skilled jobs. Many workers from Turkey (including Kurdish Alevis among others)
who came to Germany as guestworkers did not leave as they earned much better social security
and economic advantages in their new homeland. To the contrary, many stayed legally or
illegally. Even though the agreement between Germany and Turkey ended in 1973, the German
government could not stop the migration of workers from Turkey. In the years after the
immigration agreement ended, some Kurdish Alevis left Turkey and entered Germany illegally.
The late 1970s and early 1980s were a tumultuous time in Turkey and with their security
jeopardized by political clashes, a second major wave of Kurdish Alevis--especially those
politically active members of Marxist and Leninist parties in Turkey--migrated to Germany as
well. The second wave arrived in the late 1970s due to the political tensions that preceded the
military coup d'état of 1980 in Turkey. While the first group was admitted as temporary
guestworkers, the second group comprised refugees or asylum seekers.
Kurdish Alevis have settled in cities such as Hamburg, Berlin, Stuttgart, and Cologne,
where they have relied on established family networks. As Martin Sökefeld documents in his
important work on Alevis, the first Alevi organization was established in Hamburg and more
followed suit (Sökefeld 2008). The Kurdish Alevis I studied have set up enclaves in the Cologne
area such as those in Bergish Gladbach, downtown Cologne, Wuppertal, and Essen. There are
Kurdish Alevi communities in different districts in Cologne and in other parts of the country as
well. The scope of this study was limited to the Kurdish Alevis living in or near Cologne in order
to narrow the sample to get a cohesive picture of their music. Studies of the communities living
near other large cities such as Berlin would provide different opportunities, perhaps resulting in
different findings. Berlin's special situation with its historical division (East-West), reunification,
and subsequent anti-immigrant sentiment in the post-unification period, along with the
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establishment of large enclaves of Kurds and Turks, would make this kind of study too difficult
to conduct. By all accounts, with its manageable size, Cologne provided a microcosm for
investigating all of my research questions. The presence of all Alevi and Kurdish organizations in
Cologne provided a full picture more accurate than in any other location in Germany. Another
reason I studied the Kurdish Alevis in the vicinity of Cologne is that Cologne is regarded by
many as the most multicultural city in Germany, an opinion shared by many of my informants.
For this whole community in Cologne, the older generation of guestworkers were
mostly male, and then they gradually brought their families or intermarried with Germans
establishing families in Germany. Among the older generation, there are a lot more men. Almost
all immigrant households I have been to for this study shared similar demographic features with
their fellow Kurdish Alevis in Istanbul. Most members of the Kurdish Alevi immigrant groups
are employed at full-time jobs. Musicians and other artists I met generally have college or higher
degrees as opposed to the median education level of high school diploma among all Alevi
groups.
Municipalities and other local governmental organizations help immigrants to learn
German and find jobs in various sectors. Cultural centers, including Alevi cultural centers, are
providing job placement workshops, vocational training, and other supportive activities for
community members. Since the stigma about the immigrants among Germans has been that those
immigrants have been draining federal welfare funds instead of working at jobs to support their
families, most Alevi and Kurdish organizations have been working to improve the employment
conditions of their community members. Kurdish Alevis I met own or run diners, cafes,
restaurants, bars, and mobile phone shops, while some have high-paying jobs at private
companies or governmental institutions. Some Kurdish Alevi women also own or manage
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businesses, like Meryem, who helped for this study tremendously and is managing a türkü bar
and a restaurant.
Compared to immigrants, the majority of whom are German citizens, Kurdish Alevi
refugees are the most vulnerable and the most dependent to the governmental support among all
foreigner groups in Germany. That is why the federal government and local institutions have
initiated job placement programs to reduce their level of dependency on government funds. For
the refugees, due to the placement conditions and logistical and political reasons, there has been
more gender segregation in their relationships with people from Turkey. For example, my cousin
Evrim, a refugee settled in Wuppertal by the German local immigration authorities, has almost
no close male friends among the Kurdish Alevis she has contacts with.

1.4. Situation of the Agents in the Field
In pursuit of identifying the newly established Türkiye’li (people from Turkey)
transnational social field 7 and its principal actors, this dissertation tracks changes in the major
agents within Kurdish Alevi life in the 20th century. Formerly those agents were Ağa (tribal
leader and/or landowner), Dede (religious leader of Alevis), and State, modifying the
formulation of Martin van Bruinessen whose classic study of Kurdistan is entitled Ağa, Sheikh,
and State (1978). Who are the new agents in the modem contexts of the three homelands? What
kinds of agencies have emerged in this new era? In what ways are musicians benefiting from this
__________________
7

Levitt and Glick Schiller (2004) remind us that “social fields are multi-dimensional and
encompass structured interactions of differing forms, depth, and breadth that are differentiated in
social theory by terms like “organization,” “institution,” “networks,” and “social movement.”

22

environment and from the transnational space? The new agents that affect the socio-political and
cultural lives of Kurdish Alevis emerged in the last hundred years or so and include the nation
state, agents of the neoliberal system, and the religio-political parties which include hometown
associations (HTAs) as well as all forms of religious, political, and cultural organizations with
political agendas.
Below is a table (Table 1) based on my research and on theoretical writings regarding
societal shifts among Kurdish Alevis. I narrowed down the list of possible agents to identify
major old and new agents by drawing on social theory in conjunction with critical theory. The
field, as I understand Bourdieu's term (1984), is a meaningful heuristic in social sciences in
understanding the constructed modalities in human interactions regarding the control of power
through the use of different kinds of capital: social, political, and cultural. Sometimes agents are
significant, but the most important issue is the question of what makes a field a field. I answer
these questions by seeking to understand which agencies exert power with respect to those types
of capital within this community. The old agents could, and in some instances would, exert
influence in the new system. I start with the initial agents of ağas, Sufi lodges, ocaks and dedes,
and the nation-states as the institutions that exercise authority over members of Kurdish Alevi
communities in their first homelands. The historical significance of dedes in Alevi social life
stems from not only their religious authority and guidance but also their legal and social
functions in the communities they engage with. Four major new agents are involved in the
livelihoods of Kurdish Alevis in the multiple locales they now inhabit. These new agents have
affected each other in multiple ways and to varying degrees. The religio-political party agents,
cultural entrepreneurs (i.e. musicians and artists), nation-states, and neoliberal system agents
such as multinational corporations and suprationational institutions such as IMF, World Bank,
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and European Commission along with EU-affiliated interest groups shape the new transnational
social field of Kurdish Alevi life.

Old Agents

New Agents

(First Homeland)

(Second and Third Homelands)

Ottoman Empire then Republic of Turkey

Republic of Turkey and Germany

Ağas (The landowners or the tribal leaders)

Religio-Political Parties

Sufi Lodges

Neoliberal System Agents

Ocaks and Dedes (Religious leaders)

Cultural Entrepreneurs

Figure 1.5. A Typology of Agents in Kurdish Alevi Life

Among Kurdish Alevis, I have observed that parties and organizations that coalesce
around Alevi causes, including the hometown associations, are actively involved in accruing
political capital that they could use to further their political and economic interests while
claiming that they act on a religious basis. Although the Alevi organizations' political capital
might not have been as strong as that of other groups, such as that of Sunnis constituting
overwhelming majorities in both Turkey and among immigrants from Turkey in Germany, many
Alevi organizations and parties attempt to use Alevi voting power in elections in Turkey and
Germany in order to further their political interests. Thus, I argue that in the Alevi context, the
religious is identical with the cultural as well as with the political. In the current situation, there
are no clear-cut differences between the political and religious spheres, especially when it comes
to the domains where Kurdish Alevis have been active in the politics of recognition. That is why
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I intentionally hyphenate the religious and political parties to call them religio-political parties. I
could not precisely track the differences between political alignment and loyalty building
organizations among Alevis around "religious" organizations and among Kurds around
"political" parties. The Kurdish political claim and Alevi religious claim are both made in a
political sphere where both religious and political parties have to compete in the same ways, with
the same tools, and in my study’s case, by mobilizing the same group of people.
The political nature of religiosity in the Alevi case is a significant example of what Talal
Asad has suggested with respect to the distinction between the secular, as a Eurocentric
understanding of religion, and the religious that is defined as its opposite (Asad 1993, 2003).
Building on Asad's assertion, I argue that the ambiguity in defining Alevism stems from
Muslims’ and non-Muslims’ adoption of Protestant or Western European approaches to defining
non-Christian religions and beliefs from the perspectives of the old actors in power, most
significantly nation-states. In the case of Alevism, the Turkish state apparatus adapted this notion
to the extent that it created the boundaries of Alevism by defining religion (a Turkish version of
Sunni Islam) and its own secularism.
Most Kurdish Alevis treat “religious” organizations such as Almanya Alevi Birlikleri
Federasyonu (AABF, Federation of Alevi Unions of Germany), Hacı Bektaş-ı Veli Kültür ve
Tanıtma Derneği (HBVKTD, Hacı Bektaş-ı Veli Culture and Information Association), and
Federasyona Elewiyan Kurdistani (FEK, Federation of Kurdistan Alevis), and political
organizations such as PKK (Partiya Karkeran Kurdistan, Kurdistan Workers’ Party), PSK
(Kurdistan Socialist Party), and TİKKO (Türkiye İşçi Köylü Kurtuluş Ordusu, Liberation Army
of Turkish Workers and Peasants) in the same way. In most cases, my informants would be
members of only one of those organizations.
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The main argument of this dissertation is that a new field has emerged in the transnational
space for Kurdish Alevi cultural entrepreneurs, whose influence has gradually increased in the
last two decades. Kaya identifies the transnational space as “a wider spectrum of social, cultural,
political, and economic transactions among transnational subjects, families, institutions,
corporations, networks, images, figures, languages, discourses, arts, rituals, cuisines, and
symbols” (Kaya 2007: 485). He calls the space created by immigrants and refugees from Turkey
in Germany a German-Turkish transnational space, which also constitutes the space that the
subjects of this dissertation have engaged in creating a new transnational social field. I extend
Kaya’s formulation of German-Turkish transnational space to include all people from Turkey by
referring to it as the German-Türkiye’li transnational space. Thus, whenever I use transnational
space, I refer to this German-Türkiye’li transnational space in which transnational all German,
Turkish, Kurdish, and Alevi identities and subjects are mediated.
In the newly emerging transnational field, the most mobile actors moving back and forth
among the cities in Germany and Turkey have been those I call cultural entrepreneurs. Two of
the most significant informants of my study, namely Shêxo and Ali Baran, epitomize the figure
of the artist-activist, the socially committed and politically engaged cultural entrepreneur. Both
Ali Baran's and Shêxo's songs make social statements about the problems Kurdish Alevi society
faces. Both men were also involved in political and social organizations. Through their music,
they exemplify a form of activism that can be presented through art and media and is illustrated
in their albums. The category of cultural entrepreneurs also includes musicians, organizers,
producers, and other artists who are involved in the struggle for power over the cultural capital of
Alevis and Kurds. Each entrepreneur acts according to his or her own political agenda. In the
new transnational field, cultural entrepreneurs move back and forth between three homelands in
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order to maintain the shared cultural and social memories of the members. These actors also
benefit significantly from the popular culture industry by appropriating the cultural capital of
Alevis and Kurds, in some cases to the extent of exploitation, by selling albums, giving concerts,
and organizing events benefiting from the consumption of these cultural products. For instance,
many musicians make money out of producing, releasing, and performing live the religious
music of Alevis.
Furthermore, the names of many Alevi organizations in Turkey include the title “culture,”
which in many cases has worked as a shield as they are not allowed to establish religious
organizations, especially when those would be seen as a threat to the dominant “secular” Turkish
nation-state (Tambar 2010). Even as recently as July 2012, the Turkish Parliament would not
pass any legislation that would designate legitimate Alevi religious spaces, namely cemevi, in
Turkey. Accordingly, the current spaces that Alevis use for worship are not legally registered as
religious spaces; rather they were opened as "cultural" centers. Another reason for having named
many Alevi institutions as cultural institutions has been that many leftist and agnostic Alevi
youth, who rebelled against all local tribal, feudal, and religious authorities in the 1970s as part
of the dominant Marxist discourse labeling religion as "opium," perceived Alevism as solely a
secular lifestyle, not as part of a “dogmatic” practice. Therefore, the political, religious, and
cultural domains that shape Kurdish Alevi lives are intermingled. One of the best ways to
understand the complexity of shifts in the social, cultural, religious, and political fields of
Kurdish Alevis is to analyze the music they make and enjoy in settings that favor isolated
cultural acts that could reveal significant traits of shared cultural memories.
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1.5. Situation of the Study within Anthropology and Ethnomusicology
To investigate the music of an ethno-religious double minority from Turkey living outside
its homeland in Germany, I have drawn on thematics from both anthropology and
ethnomusicology. This dissertation integrates migration and diaspora studies with music, social
movements and networks, and the politics of recognition. Studies of Alevi and Kurdish diaspora
formations as well as ethnomusicological works that deal with the music in and from diasporas
ground the project within Turkish, Kurdish, diaspora, and minority music studies. Martin Stokes'
insightful works on Turkish music and arabesk (1992), ethnicity and music (1994), and Alevis
(1996) are used to understand how notions of ethnic belonging have developed and have been
expressed among Kurdish Alevis over the last three decades. Important cultural-anthropological
and ethnomusicological works dealing specifically with Alevis provide the Alevi pillar of the
project (Neyzi 2002, Markoff 1986, 2002, Dinçer 2004, Öztürkmen 2005, Kaya 1998 and 2000).
I also draw from works dealing with Kurds and multiple identities among Kurdish Alevis (van
Bruinessen 1992, 1997, Gezik 2012), Kurdish Alevi history and music (Bayrak 1997, 2004,
2006), and music of an imagined homeland, Turkey (and to some extent Kurdistan), in Germany
(Greve 2003).
I approach Kurdish Alevi immigrants and refugees as a transnational community
(Solomon 2005, Sökefeld 2006) struggling with and for the formation of multiple identities
among its members. The transnational quality of this group lies not only in the character of Alevi
religious identity, but also in the Kurdish identity that has been influential among the members of
the community living in their second and third homelands, especially with the reinforcement of
Kurdish nationalist movements like the PKK (Kurdistan Workers’ Party, which is the most
powerful Kurdish nationalist organization active since 1979; see Chapter 3 for more). In Chapter
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2, I problematize the application of the diaspora concept that is used indiscriminately by scholars
on the Kurds and Alevis. I interrogate the use of diaspora as a conceptual tool for analyzing the
identities and loyalties of the Kurdish Alevi population in Germany, drawing on recent
scholarship on the subject of diaspora (Brubaker 2005, Dufoix 2008).

1.5.1. A Note on Identity
In this dissertation, I regard identity as a socially constructed and collectively claimed
concept with boundaries that are constantly contested and redefined by political and social
actors. Drawing on Stuart Hall's assertions regarding identities' location in social space, this
dissertation builds on the understanding of defined and continuously contested social constructs
resulting in collective claims-making for groups whose members may or may not come from the
same ethno-religious backgrounds (Hall 1992, 1996). Hall writes that identities

... are about questions of using the resources of history, language, and culture in the process
of being: not 'who we are' or 'where we came from,' so much as what we might become,
how we have been represented and how that bears on how we might represent ourselves.
Identities are therefore constituted within, not outside representation. They relate to the
invention of tradition as much as to tradition itself, which they oblige us to read not as an
endless reiteration but as 'the changing same': not the so called return to roots but comingto-terms-with our "routes." (Hall 1996: 3-4)

In this sense, individuals of the same ethnic or religious affiliations might have simultaneously
diverging and converging political agendas that enable them to coalesce around specific socially
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constructed forms or modes of belonging, i.e. identities. The unsolidified nature of these modes
of belonging is evidenced by the fact that they can be manipulated, redefined, and reproduced by
multiple social and political agents. The initial tribal or kinship boundaries grow into different
social and political loyalties surfacing at different points in time, with different manifestations
among people with the same ethno-religious backgrounds.
Identity is a key element in theorizations of meaning and representation. Modes of
representation and cultural poetics become primary for my research in tracing narratives that
have been articulated among Kurdish Alevis in the last three decades. In analyzing and
comparing the production of cultural texts (mainly the albums and performances) and the
personal narratives of the artists and authors of those cultural texts, I tackle the various
underlying currents of multiple identity construction. Kurdish Alevis’ personal and collective
identifications could inform us about the possible audiences who consume the music that this
study is researching and the possible candidates to be recruited by the religio-political parties.
Documenting the life histories of my subjects, in conjunction with the production of their
cultural texts, was a major part of my research objective. My approach is to explain cultural texts
within their historical context in order to understand the cultural memory of Kurdish Alevis.
In some instances, a specific identity marker that is claimed by the members of a specific
group might refer to a mode or form of belonging that was totally lost or has been reinvented,
like many other invented modes of belonging and imagined communities (Anderson 1991 and
Hobsbawm 1990). Furthermore, imagined communities are not only imagined by members who
share the same imagination, but by those who might imagine a community in contrary ways. For
example, with respect to an imagined Turkish identity, there are those who imagine an invented
Turkish community as pluralistic rather than monolithic, embracing ethnic and religious
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differences. Others imagine “Turkish identity” representing a more homogenous or even
monolithic community. Building on differences in understandings of imagined communities,
there follows the problematic attribution of a static or unchanging quality to the communities,
both by their members and by outsiders who label them. This assumption ignores the fact that
socially constructed imagined communities, and by extension, identities claimed and contested
around those imaginings, evolve through time and space along with the boundaries and linkages
of the people who claim, challenge, and negotiate around them. Finally, members of those groups
can bend the putatively ascribed categories that define the boundaries of those contested
identities. In that sense, categories that people use to distinguish themselves from others become
more blurry and fluid than they were once thought to be by members and non-members alike.
Scholars studying those groups have too often re-essentialized certain categories, as many recent
works suggest (Brubaker 2013). In the end, the self-inflicted ambiguities among Kurdish Alevis
have been exacerbated by multiple assertions regarding the categories to which the members of
this group supposedly belong.
Throughout this dissertation, I deal with the entanglement of the categories of politics,
culture, and religion among Kurdish Alevis in multiple homelands and in transnational space.
One of the key issues I had to contend with was to reframe the discussion of culture, politics, and
religion to better approach Kurdish Alevi discourses of belonging through music, which has
become an embodiment of all three at once.

1.6. Situation of the Researcher and Methodology
My interest in the music of Alevis and then in the ethnomusicology of Asia Minor led me
to become a founding member of a band called Kardeş Türküler [Ballads of Solidarity], a
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popular and progressive experimental folk music group performing in multiple languages in
Turkey in the late 1990s and the 2000s. This ensemble, established at Boğaziçi University in
İstanbul, performed the music of Anatolia, the Balkans, and the Caucasus, with a specific interest
in Kurdish and Alevi music. The group's repertoire was research-based, relying heavily on multiethnic musical archives and field trips in Turkey where traditional folk tunes were recorded in
the village context. From 1995 to 2002 we gave concerts in many cities across Europe and
Turkey. During that time, the band released four solo albums and a joint production with Şivan
Perwer, perhaps the most famous Kurdish musician alive today. By being involved with the
production and dissemination of Kurdish, Turkish, and Alevi music as a member of Kardeş
Türküler, I witnessed and participated in the emergence of a new transnational field maintained
by Kurdish-Turkish-Alevi cultural entrepreneurs.
Historically, artists and musicians in their second and third homelands have been able to
bend the first homeland aesthetic norms, not only by cultural but also by political modes of
conduct, in order to achieve their political agendas. In some cases, artists have managed to create
their own aesthetic, sending it back to the first homeland, in the form of social remittances
(Levitt 2001) or cultural remittances (Flores 2009). Kurdish Alevis maintain ties with their
origins. For example, many who reside in Istanbul tend to return to their villages in the summer.
More significantly, in the past several decades, many have started investing millions of euros to
improve the living conditions in villages. I argue that music functions like remittances: it is a
means of communication, mobilization and, ultimately, transformation of the Kurdish Alevi
communities in both Germany and Turkey. To that end, in later chapters of this study, I compare
and contrast Kurdish Alevis' religious and traditional music and lives in Germany to those in
Istanbul and their ancestral villages.
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This dissertation is based on multi-sited ethnography (Marcus 1998) and participant
observation in the three homelands that I conceptualized above. To understand the cultural
formations and cohorts within the Kurdish Alevi communities in Cologne and Istanbul, I
participated in cultural events sponsored by different social and political organizations that
provide an arena for Kurdish and Alevi sociability and socio-political outreach and organizing. In
addition, my research included participant observation at weddings among the members of the
communities; at intimate muhabbet gatherings where the members of the communities sang
together; and at türkü 8 bars (Rebecca Bryant (2005) calls them saz bars) located in Cologne, all
of which constitute significant spaces of Kurdish and Alevi socio-musical practices. Aside from
in-depth interviews with the people attending those events, I had the chance to perform in several
venues with various musicians, which enabled me to see the cultural codes, performance settings,
power relationships between audience and musicians, and cultural intimacy that could be missed
from the other side of the stage. I played the saz and sang some tunes from the repertoire I know.
I was not immune to istekler (audience song requests) either, so I did my best to perform what I
could after I received a couple of those requests.
As a Turkish-born Kurdish Alevi musician, my ethnic and religious background allowed
for liberal access to, and a greater understanding of, the exclusive events of Kurdish Alevis. The
first phase of the tripartite research was conducted in Istanbul, where I observed the state of
current music-making of Kurdish Alevis in their second homeland. Through interviews with
Kurdish and Alevi musicians, producers, and consumers, the fieldwork traced current trends in
the cultural and musical life of Kurdish Alevis. In Istanbul, I visited particular cemevis in
__________________
8

Generic term used to refer to all Turkish folk songs and sometimes applied to Kurmancî songs.
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different districts of the city (such as Yenibosna and Karaca Ahmet Cemevi) and attended cem
ceremonies to broaden my view of Alevi religious musical practices in metropolitan areas.
Through extensive interviews with dedes in charge of those ceremonies, I am now able to trace
current trends in the cultural and musical life of Alevis. The second phase was dedicated to
research in the first homelands of the Kurdish Alevis. There, I observed the Alevi dedes who live
or regularly visit Kurdish Alevis of Maraş and Malatya and conduct their semah (dances in circle
during the cem ceremonies) rituals. In the days I stayed in Maraş and Malatya, I also attended
weddings and other social gatherings in order to learn more about the local performance settings.
In the third phase of the fieldwork, I spent time in the houses, weddings, türkü bars,
cemevis, and other cultural centers that are run by Kurdish Alevis who live in the Cologne
vicinity. I chose to work in Cologne for several reasons as mentioned in I.3 above. Personal
connections enabled me to adapt easily and begin work from the first day of my arrival in the
city, as my cousins have been living there for more than ten years. One of the most important
respondents in my study, Shêxo, a self-identified Kurdish Alevi musician, is also a resident of
Cologne, and I spent a significant amount of time with him. Germany is the country with the
largest Turkish immigrant population in Europe, hosting about 70 percent of all Turkish
immigrants, and Cologne hosts the second largest immigrant population in the country. Almost
half of those immigrants are from Turkey, with a sizeable Kurdish segment (Sirkeci 2006). At the
same time, Cologne has been an important center for Kurdish and especially Alevi social and
political organizations in Germany. The headquarters of many associations such as KOMKAR
(Immigrant Organization of the Kurdistan Socialist Party), FEK (Federation of Kurdish Alevi
Associations), and AABF (Federation of Alevi Unions of Germany) are located in Cologne. The
founders of those cultural, political, and religious centers have also chosen Cologne as their base.
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In order to understand the transnational field that I have described, I also did research on
Internet forums and forms of digital sharing platforms including social media sites like Facebook
and YouTube. I researched Internet forums, popular websites, and Facebook notifications in
order to learn how musical learning processes occur. The learners of the tunes usually ask for
sheet music notation or sometimes the guitar chords of popular songs they want to play with their
saz or guitar. I gathered almost a hundred songs that are popular among Kurdish Alevis
according to the download rates on the Internet forums. These songs are requested and performed
frequently at türkü bars and are listed on the Facebook profiles of my informants. Most of these
songs belongs to the türkü repertoire and are sung in Turkish. With a couple of exceptions, the
musical aesthetic of Kurdish Alevis resembles the aesthetic of their fellow Turkish Alevi
immigrants and refugees. The Kurdish songs also play significant roles, as most have political
implications. Some türkü songs are also in the domain that I call “alebesk,” indeterminate
because they constitute a grey area between arabesk and the Alevi türkü repertoire (for detailed
analysis see Chapters 4 and 5).
Finally I prepared an online survey via google.com (Online Survey App) that Kurdish
Alevi informants from the Cologne vicinity participated in (see Chapter 6). I aimed at
understanding the listening habits of Kurdish Alevis living in their third homeland, which greatly
resemble the habits of those living in the second homelands in Turkey. Participants were required
to type some answers, while for other questions they could just check boxes. They were asked to
specify the names of musicians and songs that trigger an emotional impact on listeners. The
purpose was to learn the extent to which listeners associated their emotional states with certain
musicians and their songs. The first question on the survey asked them to define what musician
or singer makes them feel the most sadness. With those questions, I aimed at understanding the
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cultural memory of Kurdish Alevis. I conceptualize cultural memory as an entity that mediates
the tensions between collective and individual ways of imagining the past in individuals'
contemporary experience.
I realize that emotional connection with music has culture-specific ramifications. In
certain cultures, the emotional connection to a collective identity could be associated with
perceived happy tunes, whereas among Kurdish Alevis I observed that sadness is strongly
associated with the reproduction and remembrance of a collective memory. Signs of emotions
associated with exile, homeland, pride, and nostalgia, among others, are all present in the
answers to the survey questions. I believe that the cultural memory of a community connects
both individual and collective imagination with the identities articulated in public both
individually and collectively. Cultural memory pertains to the individual and collective stories
about the past told in public and private.

1.7. Studying the Music of Kurdish Alevis
One of the many valuable insights I acquired from the ethnomusicological literature has
been that the authors show how music does so much more than merely "express" some kind of
pre-existing identity or experience, rather playing a formative role in the construction of
identities and experiences (Sugarman 1989, Small 1998, Turino 2000 and 2008). Indeed, I
observed complex negotiations over production and creative transformation among performers
and listeners, who are themselves understood to be multiple and complex. Identity emerges from
performers' and audiences' multiple interpretive efforts, whether the object of interpretation is
musical meaning, the political and social context of performance, social media representation, or
the ontological presuppositions that allow music to do different kinds of work in different times
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and places. For me, this reinforces the methodological strength of using music to inquire into
broader social, political, and cultural questions, a major aim of ethnomusicology since the mid1990s. In this dissertation, I explore how notions of cultural belonging underpin the complex
identity politics of a double minority in their second and third homelands, not only in the
outpouring of grief, but also in the process of transformation.
Alevism intricately incorporates music into its religious rituals. The central Alevi ritual is
the cem, a communal gathering involving music, singing, and dance. The close relationship
between music and religiosity also manifests itself in social and political life. The central role of
music in the multiple identity formations within Kurdish Alevi communities makes the study of
musical activities and religious and secularized rituals a promising subject for ethnographic
research on this group. The Kurdish identity of Kurdish Alevis has been influenced by the
ethnonationalistic Kurdish movement led by organizations like the PKK, which engaged with the
politics of recognition. In that process, the organizations promoted albums in Kurdish language
with lyrics invoking nationalistic aspirations. My project explores the aesthetic and political
sensibilities of Kurdish Alevi music through an analysis of the production, presentation, and
dissemination of their secular and sacred music in relation to social and political formations.
Investigating the reception of music associated with multiple identity conceptualizations helps
one understand how the members of this community construct and imagine different kinds of
cultural belonging as a dual minority group (as Kurdish and Alevis in relation to a predominantly
Turkish and Sunni majority in Turkey) both in Turkey and as part of the immigrant population in
Germany. As Thomas Turino eloquently points out, music is social life; it is not just a way or tool
to get at or to reflect on social life (Turino 2008).
The spectrum of music that Kurdish Alevis produce and consume ranges from highly
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produced and carefully arranged recordings to simple recordings by a solo vocalist accompanied
by the bağlama or saz. It is not uncommon for Kurdish Alevi musicians to issue recordings that
are not only in different styles but are also intended to convey a different sense of identity in
each recording, emphasizing leftist aspirations on one recording and pan-Kurdish or pan-Alevi
features on another. Through not only the music but also the venues where it is performed, both
secular and sacred spaces, Kurdish Alevis in Turkey and Germany engage in identity
negotiations (Kastoryano 2002). They have a number of options in choosing their ethnic,
religious, national, and other identifications. The terrain is muddied by second homeland and
first homeland political realities and ideologies, as well as by global trends and national
alignments.

1.8. Outline of the Dissertation and Summary of Findings
I lay out the framework of the pages and chapters to follow in five strands of assertions
regarding the music of Kurdish Alevis in Istanbul and Cologne. First, I argue that this group
cannot be categorized under the rubric of any single diaspora, such as Kurdish, Turkish, or Alevi
(Chapter 2). There are significant enough differences between the Sunni Kurds and Alevi Kurds
that, except in limited instances, it would be inaccurate to include all Kurds in a “Kurdish
diaspora.” Similarly, there are significant differences between Alevi Kurds and other Turkish
Alevis that would prevent me from including all of those Alevis in the same “Alevi diaspora”
category. Instead, Kurdish Alevis navigate in a transnational space between both homelands that
they can easily share and communicate within, organize around, and politically use to claim
loyalties, distinctions, and boundaries. I deal with theoretical issues regarding the Kurdish Alevi
groups, transnational networks, and diaspora studies in Chapter 2.
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My second assertion is that the Kurdish Alevi musicians’ struggle during the conflict
between the Turkish state and the alleged Kurdish “separatists” shaped their understanding of
ethnic belonging and politicized them in favor of Kurdish identity, especially in the late 1980s
and early 1990s (Chapter 3). This process is manifested in the songs that they have written,
performed, and disseminated from the late 1990s through today. I analyze the reconciliation
between Turkish and Kurdish sides, since it has been one of the main themes that my informants
mentioned in interviews in multiple cities. It is also significant to talk about the “Kurdish
Question” (Kürt Sorunu) of Turkey in this context, since it has shaped the political loyalties of
Kurdish Alevi musicians and the cultural production of their music. The question, though, of
whether a particular music is credited with the capacity to overcome politically significant lines
of difference and contribute to the development of a new politics is complicated by consideration
of the many fields in which power can operate within a complex performance context. The
aesthetic force of a piece to do certain kinds of political work has a lot to do with how highprestige and influential segments of the audience value and interpret the work. Our
understanding of music’s political efficacy depends on careful examination of who among
audiences has the power to create meanings that last. This presses us to inquire into how
questions of class, gender, ethnicity, and other categories inflect the performance context of the
genres scholars scrutinize.
The third assertion I make is that a recent shift in the claims-making processes of
mobilized Kurdish Alevis is evidenced in new attempts to reconvert Kurdish Alevis into specific
denominations within Alevism (Chapter 4). After the Alevi revival in the late 1980s and early
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1990s, which, building on the anthropology of Alevism, I called the Alevis’ coming out, 9 the
recent decades witness a new phase in Alevi religious alignment in which new Alevi missionaries
are trying to recruit or convert primarily agnostic Alevi youth into specific religio-political
parties. In that process, one of the dominant movements among the Kurdish Alevis I have studied
has been the emergence of strategic essentialism, taking the term Kızılbaş (“Red-headed,” a
formerly derogatory term referring to Alevis) as an alternative to the generic title of Alevi. The
reemployment of the Kızılbaş label is a result of the religio-political parties’ attempts to
distinguish Kurdish Alevis politically, culturally, and religiously from the big Alevi-Bektaşi tent,
which has been used to label all heterodox groups in Anatolia since the early 20th century. One
of the musical manifestations of this process is the resurrection of the instrument called dede sazı
(Figure 1.5) among Kurdish Alevi musicians in both Germany and Turkey, including Cemil
Koçgün, Mikail Aslan, Ahmet Aslan, and Ulaş Özdemir, among others.

__________________
9

As Aykan Erdemir, an anthropologist of Alevism, remarks, the rapid social change that Alevi
religious groups have experienced in Turkey since the 1990s has drawn increasing scholarly,
journalistic, and lay attention to the topic. This phenomenon of Alevi transformation has been
labeled in different ways: ‘process of rediscovery’, ‘revitalization’, ‘enlightenment’,
‘innovation’, ‘coming out’, ‘revival’, ‘remaking’, ‘re-politicization’, or even ‘the explosion of
Alevism’ (Alevilik patlaması) (Erdemir 2004).
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Figure 1.5. Ulaş Özdemir playing the dede sazı

The dede sazı had become popular especially among young Kurdish Alevi musicians as part of
the project of finding roots to the old and divine Alevi religious rituals in which the dede sazı
used to be indispensable, whereas the recently used saz is a relatively young and modified
instrument. I believe that these are symptoms of the search for an “authentic” belief system on
the part of those musicians.
My fourth major observation is the emergence of a new genre among the Kurdish Alevis
in both homelands, which I call alebesk (Chapter 5). Based on the analysis of performance
settings of the Kurdish Alevi musicians, especially in türkü bars, I argue that there is a sizeable
culture industry exploiting and marketing this music to their audiences in both homelands. The
türkü as a focal genre produces a unity among different ethno-religious communities from
Turkey that encompasses and transcends regional, religious, and many times political
differences. My depiction of music at türkü bars in Germany relies on the premise that music is
understood as ontologically capable of aesthetically and emotionally blurring otherwise
significant political divisions. I have also observed that some musicians or music groups,
irrespective of their publicly stated political loyalties, have been regarded as organically tied to
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certain political movements or parties that are active in Turkey and/or in Germany. Listeners’
affinity to certain musicians, in some cases, might go beyond aesthetic listenership; in the cases
of politically active respondents, it signifies a political loyalty with the parties that those
particular musicians are regarded as affiliated with. Türkü bars have become transcending
entertainment venues, perhaps the only viable spaces occupied by almost every immigrant group
from Turkey, including leftists, conservatives, Alevis, Sunnis, Kurds, and Turks alike. All of
these sociopolitical identities or boundary markers are welcomed in those bars as long as they do
not interfere with the economic interests of the owners. I found it helpful to identify the
redundancy of a classificatory distinction between “sacred” music and “secular or ethnic” music
among Kurdish Alevis (Chapter 5). Finally, I lay out the musical landscape of different
generations of immigrants in Germany to get a better understanding of their integration within
the German secular public (Chapter 6). The questions regarding the spiritual edification of
Alevism and political mobilization of Kurdish ethnic identity in Germany cannot be untangled
without looking at the historical journey from a small village in Turkey to the suburbs of
Cologne.
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Chapter 2. Kurdish Alevis in Multiple Homelands and Transnational Space
2.1. Introduction
This chapter sets the stage for an analysis of the musical practices of my subjects, a group
of ethnic Kurds speaking Kurmancî-Kurdish, self-identified Alevis, all of them initially citizens
of the Republic of Turkey, who are now immigrants and refugees living in Cologne. Each of
these individuals identifies his or her place of origin among a group of villages in a small triangle
of territory between the present-day Turkish cities of Maraş, Malatya, and Adıyaman. 10 By
exploring their musical practices, I demonstrate how members of this population are positioned
in a transnational space. My discussion arrives at an appropriate concept for constructing a
sensitive and productive investigation of the changes in social and political formations within
Kurdish Alevi community in the subsequent chapters.
To that end, I first review recent uses of the diaspora paradigm, presently a popular
approach in social science scholarship, for understanding the unique condition of immigrants and
bodies in transnational spaces. After discussing key works of this literature in a broad sense, I
review current trends in how ethnomusicologists have engaged the concept of diaspora. I then
examine whether the diaspora concept adequately attends to the characteristics of the Kurdish
Alevi diaspora from which I drew my research. I ask the question: which aspects of Kurdish
Alevi subjectivity fall outside the analytical scope of an approach that treats their condition as
diasporic? Finally, after reviewing some of the limitations of the diaspora concept for the
analysis of contemporary Kurdish Alevi life in Germany and Istanbul, I close the chapter by
__________________
10

In most cases, those I interviewed are both Turkish and German citizens, and most interviews
were conducted in Turkish.
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proposing a new approach to describing this and similar populations. I also introduce the concept
of "second homelander" as a concept in exploring the conditions shared by the Kurdish Alevis I
met during my research in Germany, in relation to the aesthetic that emerged among Kurdish
Alevis outside their first homeland. Building on the discussion of agents and the new
transnational field that emerged among the Kurdish Alevis, I describe shifts in the cultural and
social loyalties of the members of this population in two homelands. For the sake of simplifying
my claims, I call all Kurdish Alevis living in their second and/or third homelands “second
homelanders” (I define this term further below).
In order to support my use of “second homelander,” I rely primarily on ethnography I
conducted among members of this community in Cologne and Istanbul. Most of my informants
were directly or indirectly associated with cultural or religious organizations. I also included
musicians and artists who have taken an active role in maintaining the transnational field that has
transformed the Kurdish Alevi cultural world in the last three decades. To that end, I include
findings from my interview notes as well as the images and messages shared among members of
Facebook groups of which I eventually became a member. To have a more accurate snapshot of
their cultural memory, I also conducted an online survey among Kurdish Alevis living in
Germany, and to better explain the social transformations occurring in new homelands. I indicate
how I encountered the concept of second homeland during my fieldwork. Finally, I close by
identifying significant themes that this concept evokes about how individuals of this population
imagine themselves as members of various social formations. Instead of placing Kurdish Alevis
in Germany within the Turkish or Kurdish diasporas, I tend to emphasize their socio-spatial
difference in terms of a sequence of homelands. When they refer to their fellow Kurdish Alevis,
those I interviewed used terms such as bizden (from us), Kürt Aleviler, Kızılbaş toplumu
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(Kızılbaş society), Kızılbaş Kürd, Elbistan’lı or Maraş’lı (from Elbistan or Maraş, emphasizing
the hometown), bizim halk (our people). When they refer to those in Europe, they use terms such
as gurbetçi and göçmen (immigrant) as a reference to their immigrant status. When they refer to
the Germans with no ties with Turkey they frequently use terms such as yabancı (foreigner).
Participants in this study have used Turkish terms such as memleket and vatan as well as the
Kurdish term welat when they have referred to their first homeland.
Kurdish Alevis have established a new aesthetic in their second and third homelands
among the Kurdish Alevi diasporic community. I call this new aesthetic a second homelander
aesthetic, embodied in the türkü bar, alebesk genre, and other cultural forms. I agree that this
group is dispersed and diasporic in nature, but in its specificity it differs from other diasporas,
such as those of Jewish, African, or Armenian peoples. The second part of my argument
concerns other diasporas associated with this group, such as those of Kurdish, Alevi, or Turkish
peoples. My main argument contends that “Kurdish,” “Alevi,” or “Turkish” diasporas cannot be
isolated, given the various loyalties among members like Kurdish Alevis, who have two if not
more political or religious modes of belonging.
I build on the diaspora scholarship, developing a more nuanced understanding of this new
aesthetic, shaped and informed in the new homelands throughout the new transnational field I
argue has come into existence. Thus, ethnomusicological methods of learning about this group’s
music and rituals can help illuminate, for example, the new aesthetic formation of alebesk, which
I also call second homelander aesthetic. First, I review the term diaspora and its use in
anthropology and ethnomusicology.
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2.2. The Diaspora Concept
Diaspora as a conceptual term has been debated among scholars since the late 1980s in a
number of different disciplines including sociology, anthropology, and cultural studies. It is
important to note at the outset that scholars of diaspora studies were not in agreement on a single
definition of the term as a description of a human condition. A few social scientists have applied
the idea as a substitute for "immigrant communities," but as diaspora studies have flourished the
proliferation of scholarship has resulted not in a consensus, but in a variety of uses for the
concept. This is particularly the case when "diasporic" is used as an adjective to index the
particularities of life for members of immigrant communities. Thus, even while there may be
agreement regarding whether a population constitutes part of a diaspora, there is likely to remain
significant disagreement over what makes an experience or a practice diasporic. This result may
indicate that using the term is to further confound an already complex issue. I argue that such
ambiguity should not be interpreted as a problem but instead another manifestation of diversity
and healthy debate within the social sciences. Why dismiss a concept simply because there is
disagreement over its use or definition? Such differences mark the practice of discussion, if not
always the practice of refinement. These differences should be taken to indicate a widely shared
sense of a concept's analytical value and certainly not as a reason to avoid its use.
What constitutes a diaspora? Although the complexity encompassed within diasporic
populations has been a challenge, some scholars, including Robin Cohen (1997), Gabriel Sheffer
(2003), Khatchig Tölölyan (1991, 2007), and William Safran (1991), have attempted to define
the boundaries of the diaspora concept. Where are the borders of those assumptions? Safran
identifies the global population of Jewish people as the “ideal” type of diaspora and presents ten
criteria from which scholars may determine what groups do or do not constitute an ideal
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diaspora. Notably, in this theoretical formulation, the diaspora is not only a matter of movement
but also of religious and ethnic affiliation, passed across generations (Safran 1991). Departing
from Safran's definition, James Clifford (1997) emphasizes the agency of individuals and the
role of diasporic consciousness, drawing attention to the formation and reformation of diasporas
through a constant renegotiation of their borders by persons choosing how they will associate
themselves with others. For Clifford, diasporas are not static bodies, but rather a mode of
consciousness marked by ethnic or religious boundaries. Similarly, Martin Sökefeld (2006), who
has studied Alevi communities in Germany, has suggested an understanding of diaspora as the
creation of an "imagined transnational community." Building on the diaspora studies scholarship,
Sökefeld rightly argues that speaking of an “Alevi diaspora negates the idea of [national]
homogeneity… and Alevi diasporic associations endorse multiple identifications” (2008: 252). It
is important for this dissertation to point out that the varying conditions for the formation of the
new transnational space have resulted in multifaceted manifestations of those imagined
transnational communities among Kurdish Alevis in two homelands (Chapter 1 and Chapter 4). I
approach the concept of transnational space through the lenses of recent studies on immigrants
with strong ties with multiple locales (Levitt and Glick-Schiller 2004, Kaya 2007, and Yurdakul
2009).
For the new transnational social field to be created, cultural entrepreneurs, in
collaboration with the members of religio-political parties, needed to imagine, and in some cases
reimagine and essentialize, transnational communities such as Alevi, Kızılbaş, KurdAlawi, or
Kurdish Alevi (Chapter 4). It is worthwhile to quote Sökefeld about the conditions among Alevi
immigrants in Germany before the emergence of the new transnational field:
Alevis have maintained transnational relationships with their relatives in Turkey, with
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their hometowns, villages, and regions even before the formation of an imagined
transnational Alevi community. The formation of Alevi diaspora was not simply a natural
consequence of such ties. Accordingly, transnational relationships may be a necessary
condition for the formation of diasporic consciousness, but they are not sufficient.
(Sökefeld 2008: 260)
Anthropologist Steven Vertovec (2010), building on Paul Gilroy’s work, calls diaspora a
level of consciousness and a mode of cultural creation. Vertovec's theory attends to the
discursive nature of diaspora formation. This theoretical understanding stems from the claimmaking processes of certain ethno-religious group formations. Vertovec also applies the findings
and suggestions made by Arjun Appadurai, who in his Modernity at Large (1996) claims that the
world system cannot be explained by the center-periphery dichotomy, as there are other
spatiotemporal openings, negotiations, and opportunities. He offers the concept of -scapes with
such prefixes as ethno-, media-, finance-, for identities and cultures that are negotiated in more
complex and multidimensional ways than Marxists and neo-Marxists have suggested.
Concerning the diaspora's discursive formation, Appadurai also mentions the significance of the
imagination and nostalgia (Appadurai 1996).
In the field of diaspora studies, some scholars theorize ways and forms of the
maintenance of diasporic boundaries, such as Dufoix’s Diasporas (2006). Dufoix has contributed
to the analysis of group formations in diaspora communities: how they maintain transnational
networks, for example, distinguishing two Greek applications of the dendritic (local groups
whose members maintain connections with the help of the Greek government) and galactic
models (through the central Orthodox Church).
Cultural studies scholar Ien Ang's chapter entitled “Heritage and Diaspora: Unsettling the
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National” (2011) suggests the challenges that diaspora communities face in their involvement
with their nation of origin in the determination of cultural and heritage identities. Ang defines
diasporas as "... dispersed, fluid, hybrid transnational formations with shifting, and constitutively
ambivalent (dis) identifications to many places around the world, shaped by the contradictory
experience of 'dwelling-in-displacement’" (Ang 2011: 86). Social scientists have emphasized the
implications of the transnational movements of peoples largely in terms of how they challenge
nationalist unity narratives (Cohen 1997, Anthias 1998). These narratives are especially
inapplicable in countries such as Turkey, which hosts significant populations with multiple
memories and identities, "many of whom simply may not want to inherit and/or represent or be
represented by, a single essence, a single essentialized identity" (Ang 2011: 92). The challenge
may be less that of holding onto the memory of the distant homeland than of re-establishing
cultural identities in diverse new locations, those where the old homeland may well be a mere
genealogical influence or a location the subject has never seen.
As Ang reminds us, “the diasporic experience is not just about the nostalgic remembering
of the past, or about the place left behind, but also about life in the present and the process of
reinvention towards a new future. This process of reinvention under conditions of displacement
and in new sites of settlement may also require a rupture with the past, rather than its virtual
continuation through preservation of a particular cultural heritage” (Ang 2011: 92). In this sense,
cultural identity may act as a constraining factor for migrants, because a focus on preserving that
identity tends to deemphasize and devalue the importance of change, transformation, and
hybridity. Being locked into the identity of “immigrant” forever reminds the diasporic subject
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that s/he comes from “elsewhere” and does not really belong “here.” 11 At the same time, being
cast as one who got “away” from “home” may only strengthen a sense of cultural dependency
and inferiority vis-à-vis the putative “homeland,” where diasporic subjects will always tend to be
positioned as having “lost” their “authentic” cultural identity (Ang 2011).
Diasporas are conceived not only by scholars who study them and members of immigrant
groups, but also by the publics of the countries "hosting" a diaspora. Sandya Shukla provides a
more nuanced version of this argument by pointing out that diasporas, as the logical “others” of
the nation, exist where nations and national borders are defined (Shukla 2002 and 2003).
Following the route provided by Partha Chatterjee, Shukla also emphasizes the multiplicity of
diaspora identities, locations, and temporalities. Nations’ “others” define the borders of a
nationhood, as they do for diasporas, argues Shukla.
Probably the most influential of all sociologists dealing with diaspora issues is Brubaker.
In “'Diaspora' Diaspora” (2005) and Ethnicity without Groups (2004), Brubaker focuses on the
terms, narratives, and categories used by the group itself to maintain cohesion. He argues that
those group formations and the tools they apply should not be equated to ethnicity or diaspora.
He draws a distinction between ethnicities and the organizations or groups that claim to represent
those ethnicities through a process that he calls “micropolitics.” One of the most useful offerings
to come from diaspora studies is a new approach to understanding multi-centered formations of
nevertheless cohesive groups. Brubaker's commitment to beginning with the terminology already
in use among members of a group––starting from the inside, rather than outside––is instructive

__________________
11

See Chapter 6 for more details.
50

and, as I will demonstrate later in this chapter, something I believe to be of utmost importance
and value in analyzing the Kurdish Alevis in Germany.

2.3. Ethnomusicology's Response to Diaspora Studies
The role of music as a cultural expression of immigrant groups or diasporas has attracted
more attention among scholars in the 1990s (Wong 2004), and the field of ethnomusicology has
been absorbing some of the ideas emerging from the discipline of diaspora studies. More recent
ethnomusicological works have dealt with the functions of circulation of music among
immigrants and members of diasporic communities in forming and maintaining national, ethnic,
and religious identities and social networks (Stokes 2004). In the last decade, we can see a
significant attempt to incorporate debates in diaspora studies into the larger body of
ethnomusicological work.
The 2000s witnessed a gradual increase in the level of engagement of ethnomusicologists
with diaspora scholarship. Some have built on the debates and added new theoretical foundations
to the discussion. In general, it seems relevant to point out Martin Stokes’ assessment that "a
more recent ethnomusicology has situated itself on the border zones, in 'global cities', along the
pilgrimage routes and amongst the diasporic communities, in spaces and places that challenge
the logic of bounded culture and positively demand attention to multivalent and multi-directional
kinds of musical circulation" (Stokes 2008: 4). We will probably witness a stronger engagement
between ethnomusicology and diaspora studies in coming years if ethnomusicologists and other
scholars continue to study the music of diasporic communities.
Music is increasingly recognized by anthropologists and sociologists as one of the
primary media for facilitating interaction among people across different locations. Discussions
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on music in the diaspora provide insight to understand the third spaces (Bhabha 1994), contact
zones (Clifford 1997), and -scapes (Appadurai 1996) that diasporic communities inhabit.
Ethnomusicologists have responded to the debates surrounding diasporic communities and their
music by identifying specific diasporic formations and their music. A few edited volumes have
resulted: on the African diaspora, edited by Ingrid Monson (2000); on diasporas and their music,
edited by Thomas Turino and Lea (2004), and by Hemetek and Reyes (2007); and on Turkish
music in diaspora by Hemetek and Sağlam (2008). All of these volumes have mirrored
theoretical discussions of diaspora studies in considering immigrant groups' musical practices
and their ties with homelands. After laying out the main theoretical debates on the term diaspora
and its use, Thomas Turino distinguishes between different kinds of social group formations like
immigrant communities, diasporas, and cosmopolitans. He claims that immigrant communities
live between two specific places, whereas diasporas connect multiple sites. Turino maintains that
an individual within a dispersed community decides whether to join up with or partake in a
diaspora, which is not always the case for many immigrants with multiple ethno-religious and
political loyalties (Turino 2004).
The discipline of ethnomusicology has followed similar methodological and theoretical
frameworks as those occurring within diaspora studies. Following the diaspora studies path
through the Jewish experience as the ultimate example of diasporic formations, among earlier
installments of the ethnomusicology of diasporas were those written on the Jewish diaspora and
their musical practices. Kay Shelemay's Let Jasmine Rain Down, for instance, is a study of paraliturgical Jewish songs performed by the Syrian Jewish diasporas in multiple centers such as
New York City, Israel, and Mexico City. Shelemay applies this de-centered diaspora formulation
to the Syrian Jewish practice of remembering the diaspora by performing these songs (Hebrew
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pizmonim), with local Arabic melodies brought with them "to the diaspora" as part of this
consciousness in different locales.
Ethnomusicologists' use of the diaspora concept has contributed a variety of insights
including musical transformations among diaspora groups. Ethnomusicologists have provided
strong cases for the use of ethnographic research on the perception of music and ritual, in order
to understand the cultural formations and cohorts among ethno-religious minorities in the
diaspora.
The late 1990s and 2000s can be perceived as the period in which immigrant and
diasporic communities became a focal point in the ethnomusicological scholarship.
Ethnomusicologists began to work in urban settings with immigrant and diasporic communities
in order to answer overarching questions that social scientists have been trying to understand
about those communities. One of the ethnomusicologists working on the immigrant groups
relevant to this study, Kurds and Turks, is Thomas Solomon. In his 2006 paper, "Whose
Hybridity? Whose Diaspora? Agency and Identity in Transnational Musics," Solomon argues
that "hybridity and diaspora should come in for re-evaluation, especially for ways they have been
uncritically applied in rhetoric that celebrates the possibilities for constructing transnational
identities beyond the constricting paradigm of the mono-ethnic nation-state" (Solomon 2006: 2).
Solomon advocates for a more nuanced approach with respect to the identifications of minorities
and their music in the migration context.
Drawing on fieldwork conducted in Trinidad, Guyana, and Surinam, Peter Manuel has
analyzed the music of the Indo-Caribbean diaspora. Manuel points out that, for Indo-Caribbeans,
the physical homeland has become less important to the members of diaspora than the idea of
Indian-ness. Manuel also notes how members of the diaspora rely on depictions of Indian-ness
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from movies and secondary representations of movies (i.e. movie posters and advertisements),
rather than from relatives in the first homeland. He examines the diverse and often contradictory
roles played by images of India in the music culture of the Indian diasporic community and its
members. Manuel’s assessments are significant; he observes, with respect to the Indo-Caribbean
diaspora, that "local concepts of 'India,' while remaining important, have become tenuous,
idiosyncratic, and imaginative" (1997: 19). His assessment that for many members of the IndoCaribbean diaspora, "India has become more a state of mind than a locale..." remains a powerful
insight (1997: 31). In this study, confirming Manuel’s assertions on Indo-Caribbean diaspora
communities’ musics, I found that the music produced by diasporic populations such s Kurdish
Alevis in Germany takes new forms that are closer to those imagined than the actual living form
in their first homeland, and sonic representation in the second homeland gradually becomes the
normative form given the lack of performances in homeland and in diaspora.
Other works in ethnomusicology apply various sociological and anthropological
definitions of the boundaries of diasporas as units of social science research. In his work on
diasporic Jeliya, David Racanelli (2010) explores the ways in which Mande griots' (bards or
wandering minstrels) experiences in the most recent African diaspora in New York have affected
their musical practices. Racanelli argues that constant collaboration and the Western music
milieu with which these griots have had to engage have altered their aesthetic and artistic norms
through exerting change in the parameters of their repertoire and performance practice in New
York.
Other useful insights for this study come from scholars of Asian diaspora music like
Deborah Wong and Su Zheng. In her writings on the Asian diasporas and their musics, Wong
(2004) argues that ethnomusicologists should study the music in diaspora as transplants’ music.
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Music changes as it moves to new places. She also tackles questions of agency of the individual
performer and of genre, as certain genres demand specific qualities that may or may not conform
to the musical aesthetic of the homeland (Wong 2004). Zheng (2011) argues that Chinese
Americans’ struggles in identifying themselves in the new America can be best explained with
the conceptualization of "claiming diaspora" as opposed to the previously popular notion of
"claiming America" (Zheng 2010: 10). In Asian American immigration history, the exclusionary
period around World War II and the following decades has evolved to embrace subjectivities of
Asian Americans in America (Zheng 2010). As I observed among Alevis in Germany, the
notions of claiming Kurdish and Alevi identities have become more prevalent compared to the
frequently used “Turkish,” “proletariat,” and “immigrant” identities.
In this context, ethnomusicology has incorporated theoretical frameworks provided by
diaspora studies in locating immigrant groups within different migration and integration
experiences. Ethnomusicologists have also engaged with musical practices of immigrant groups
such as those pertaining to persons migrating from Turkey to Germany. One such study, edited
by Max Peter Baumann, is Musik der Türken in Deutschland (1985), which consists of
descriptive and ethnographic work done by German musicologists on Turkish musicians living in
Berlin. It also features interviews with musicians like Şah Turna, a blind Alevi singer and saz
player. The articles include interesting studies, for example, on children’s songs, a dance troupe,
a music group, and the protest and political music performed by Turkish immigrants living in
Germany.
Martin Greve’s 2003 book, Die Musik der imaginären Türkei: Musik und Musikleben im
Kontext der Migration aus der Türkei in Deutschland, a more detailed work featuring some
discussion of diaspora studies, analyzes the music of the Turks in Germany in order to
55

understand the imagined Turkey or imagined identities perpetuated by Turkish immigrant musicmaking. Opening with historical accounts of Turkish workers in Germany, Greve points out the
cultural dilemmas of first-generation Turkish immigrants who had imagined returning to their
homeland one day. The second section of the book deals with cultural survival, using the
"improvisation" metaphor to explain the strategies applied by Turkish musicians. Greve's
intensive ethnography also addresses issues related to Turkish music-making with connections to
regional, religious, ethnic, and political identities.
Recent ethnographic research on Armenian music (Adriaans 2012) and Syriac church
congregational music in the Netherlands (Bakker 2013) helped extend the analytical and
geographical scope of this dissertation. Scholars like Ayhan Kaya (2000), Levent Soysal (1999,
2004), Thomas Solomon (2006, 2011a, 2011b), Orhan Kahyaoğlu (2003), Sinan Gündoğar
(2005a, 2005b), and Ayşe Çağlar (1998) have written descriptive and analytical studies on
popular genres among the larger Turkish immigrant communities in Germany and elsewhere in
Europe. I discuss these ethnographic diaspora studies in more detail in Chapter 6, along with
others whose focus on minorities and diasporic groups informs my discussion on the Kurdish
Alevis. In order to introduce the conceptual framework building on uses of the term diaspora, the
following section examines the music of this community to provide musical context for the
analysis to follow.

2.4. A Musical Tale of Kurdish Alevis in the 20th Century
This section lays out a brief history of the Kurdish Alevi double minority in Turkey with
the intent of analyzing the multiple identities that Kurdish Alevis have claimed in multiple
homelands. I provide a musical history of this group, describing foundational or iconic music
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examples from various eras. I use ethnomusicological methodologies in order to analyze
messages conveyed and negotiated through public representations. Taking the approach of
Martin Stokes (2010) in his work on music in Turkey, I rely on a particular set of
representations––in this chapter cornerstone or iconic songs and their representations through
radio, TV, and Internet broadcasts––explored as texts. These musical examples, as specific
musical "objects," mediate multiple and sometimes contradicting identities through sonic, social,
discursive, and visual modes. When needed, I add my personal reading as a member of this
community and a former member of a popular music group whose music has found a loyal
following among Kurdish Alevis interviewed for this project. I summarize the cultural memory
of Kurdish Alevi communities in Turkey and in Germany through excerpts from oral histories
and ethnographic data gathered during my fieldwork. Furthermore, I incorporate my informants'
narratives into historical information and findings, adding interview data on musicians such as
Shêxo, Ali Baran, Hakan Akay, Mehmet Akbaş, and Ömer Avcı.
One of the writings on Kurdish Alevis in Turkey is a pseudo-memoir of the late journalist
Evrim Alataş, Her Dağın Gölgesi Deniz'e Düşer (The Shadows of All Mountains Reach the
Sea). I met Alataş years ago when she was working as an editor for the pro-Kurdish newspaper
Gündem. We had mutual friends, just as we shared questions about the multiple identities both of
us struggled with as Kurds, Alevis, and leftists among others, as we came from the same ethnoreligious background. As Alataş eloquently elaborates in her semi-fictional autobiography,
starting from the early years of the Turkish Republic in the 1930s, a homogenous citizenship
model was devised to conform to the social needs of the Sunni Muslim majority. Kurdish Alevis
were forced to fit into a citizenship “uniform” designed for every citizen. The uniform
citizenship clothes, tailored for the new nation, unraveled for many Kurdish Alevis who refused
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to fit into a uniform "Turkish" Sunni citizen prototype (Alataş 2009: 11).
In the early years of the Republic of Turkey, some Kurdish Alevis responded to the
impact of Kemalism (the official Turkish state ideology) by hanging Kemal Atatürk's portrait
next to Ali’s in their living rooms. 12 Kemalism, along with its other modernist goals, at least in
rhetoric, provided a secular framework that would benefit especially the Alevi minority in the
new nation-state but that also denied Alevi religious and Kurdish ethnic rights. The Kemalist
discourse of “secularism,” one of the six arrows of Kemalism, 13 helped Alevis embrace the
ideals of the new republic by trying to participate in Western modernity. As the Kemalist
modernity project took off, especially during the Cold War period, it was common to encounter
Marxist and other leftist movements being embraced by secular youth of all denominations, but
especially Kurdish Alevis (Ertan 2008).
In this period, the leftist movements swayed Alevis in Turkey towards denying their
religion in favor of socialism or communism. Alevis embraced the secularism arrow more than
had other Muslim groups. Gradually Alevi dedes (religious leaders) became more involved with
Marxism along with their constituents. This involvement resulted in numerous Alevi dedes
abandoning their duties as they began to view the religion "the opiate of the masses," a claim that
Marxists of Turkey adapted from Marx. In the 1970s, religious tensions between Alevi and Sunni
groups were transformed into political disputes and in some instances outright fights between the

__________________
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Ali, the Prophet Mohammad’s son-in-law, is also the first imam of the twelve-imam Shias.
Also known as the six arrows represented in the flag of the CHP (Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi,
Republican People's Party): republicanism, nationalism, secularism, statism, populism, and
revolutionism.
13
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Left (comprised mostly of Alevis) and Right (predominately supported by Sunnis), as political
legacies and loyalties were historically realigned according to previously religious distinctions.
An important figure in the folk and protest music scene in 1960s and 70s Turkey was the
great Aşık (bard singing folk poetry) Mahsuni. Mahsuni composed more than 5000 songs on his
bağlama before his death in Cologne in 2002. He was a popular figure, especially among
Kurdish Alevis of the older generation, and my parents still admire his work. As a member of the
leftist anti-imperialist movement, Mahsuni objected to American influence in the conservative
and right-wing government policies of Turkey; in 1976 he wrote the song “Amerika Katil Katil”
(America the murderer), which became very popular among the Kurdish Alevis at the height of
this period:

Defol git benim yurdumdan

Get the hell out of my country

Amerika katil katil

America the murderer

Yıllardır bizi bitirdin

You consumed us for years

Amerika katil katil

America the murderer

Kurdish Alevis moved from the first homeland to the second while listening to Aşık Mahsuni’s
songs in any media they could. The sound of the saz or bağlama, and the lamentations on old
places and times, followed them as reminders of the historical oppression Kurdish Alevis had
faced wherever they settled. Thus, for many Kurdish Alevis, laments about their painful past
were conveyed through the combined effect of the saz and vocals (see Chapters 4 and 5).
In the 1960s and 70s, communal gatherings in villages became focal points for listening
to radio broadcasts in order to hear news and music from stations including Turkish Radio
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Television, Radio Yerevan, and Radio Baghdad, along with the BBC. Radio and TV both
symbolically and practically replaced the dede, storytellers, and musicians, as the power of the
religious authority among Alevis diminished. Among Kurdish Alevis, decades of Turkish state
teaching and enforcement of the requirement for youth to speak Turkish, coupled with internal
migration, hindered the transmission of Kurdish language to the younger generation. The elderly
spoke in Kurdish solely for communications they hoped to hide from Turkish guests. In most
cases, Kurdish was spoken in a whisper in the presence of foreigners. It survived among younger
generations in part because some words did not have Turkish equivalents that they were aware
of, so the young had to learn or remember Kurdish words like golik (calf), babiko (a dish), and
dotmam (uncle’s daughter). Such words occupied the young people’s memories, sometimes
unconsciously and in many cases involuntarily (Alataş 2009).
In the same period, Kurdish Alevis began moving from small towns in western and
southern Turkey where they had settled, heading toward urban centers in the north. Nowadays,
almost all Kurdish Alevis live in either their second or third homeland. Numerous Kurdish
Alevis have settled in districts of Istanbul, where they have established networks based on
kinship and prior relationships. These immigrants have settled in Istanbul and other metropoles
in Turkey through a gradual acceptance of such locations as their second homeland. In the
cosmopolitan settings of such cities, and through encounters with other Turkish inhabitants, "the
music they listen to, the books they read, the way they talk, and the food they eat all are different
from the first homeland counterparts," said Kadir Abi, an elderly restaurant owner in Cologne.
"While their parents and grandparents used to hold hidden cem (religious gatherings) in the
memleket (homeland), those ceremonies have almost vanished in the second since the new
generation started to believe in different ideals, such as the revolution," observed Şevki Abi, who
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is in charge of religious affairs at the Wuppertal Alevi Culture Center. As much as they have
stopped believing in or practicing the Alevi religion (signaling a rise in atheism), for many
Kurdish Alevis, Alevi identity has become a badge of honor to defend against others who would
disseminate lies of incest and orgies to denigrate Alevis.
In the years preceding and following the third military coup d'état of September 12, 1980
in Turkey, possession of audiocassette tapes by Şivan Perwer, who sang proletariat marches in
Kurdish, or Aşık Mahsuni, Aşık Nurşani and Aşık Ihsani, who sang türküs (the generic term for
folk tunes) along with other calls for solidarity, were deemed grounds for the arrest for Kurdish
Alevis who had bootlegged the albums. The 1980 military coup demonstrated definitively how
the Turkish state exerted its power over dissenters by arresting almost every adult who had
anything to do with politics, and by torturing and killing thousands of innocent people (Zürcher
2004, Ayata 2011). The coup marked the limits of the freedoms granted by the state, which
reclaimed hegemonic power over its citizens.
Gradually Kurdish Alevis went even further, to Europe, to pursue a safer and better life.
As mentioned in Chapter 1, the first wave of Kurdish Alevis to settle in Germany (along with
other guest workers from Turkey) began arriving in the early 1960s. As migrant laborers, they
worked in harsh conditions with low pay. The environment of insecurity in Turkey caused a
second major wave of politically active Kurdish Alevis arriving Germany as refugees and
asylum seekers.
Recording voices and music on cassette tapes and mailing them to family members in
Germany maintained ties, and made possible the retention of the sonic environment of the first
homeland. These cassettes gradually replaced long letters, which posed problems, especially for
the illiterate elderly. One of the iconic songs of this period, a proletarian march, was the Turkish
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version of the “Austrian Workers’ March,” otherwise known as "Hayat Denilen Kavgaya Girdik"
(“We Joined the Fight Called Life”). Fervent Kurdish Alevi activists in Germany sang this song
on every possible occasion as part of the remembrance of shared revolutionary values. "Singing
certain marches together must have sealed certain initiation ceremonies within a leftist group,"
said one of my elderly informants. Certain marches were associated with specific political
groups. Later, Group Yorum, Ahmet Kaya (see Chapter 3), and Ferhat Tunç became popular
among the Kurdish Alevi youth (see further discussion below). In the last three decades, these
musicians along with other agents have presided over the establishment of a new transnational
field.

2.5. The New Transnational Field and Kurdish Alevis in Transnational Space
Kurdish Alevi cultural entrepreneurs in Germany and Istanbul have established a
transnational social field in which they can relate to members from those communities living in
multiple locations. This multiplicity results from simultaneous politicization processes of Alevi
and Kurdish movements that have allowed old and new actors to engage with political and social
capital along with symbolic capital through cultural and religious activism around multiple
identities (Bourdieu 1984). The transnational space has allowed new actors to employ different
means to serve their main political goals: cultural, musical, and those of other art forms, along
with public campaigns to mobilize activists. Therefore, cultural entrepreneurs and other religiopolitical actors have been navigating in this transnational space while reformulating religious and
secular political demands.
Cultural entrepreneurs and religio-political parties use the transnational space to further
their own political interests. The transnational space is organized through previously established
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kinship networks, which have helped maintain long-distance artistic exchanges that were
established in the late 1970s. Historically, artists and musicians in a second and third homeland
have been able to bend first-homeland aesthetic norms, not only by cultural but also by political
modes of conduct. In some cases, artists have managed to create their own aesthetic, sending this
back to the first homeland in the form of social or cultural remittances (Levitt 2001). In the
Kurdish Alevi case, increased speed and diversity of media have helped to improve relationships
among community members in two homelands.
This new transnational field has emerged predominantly via mobilized cultural
entrepreneurs in Germany and other countries in Europe. In the early years of immigration
(1960s and 1970s), most musicians were located in the first homeland but had performed in the
second homeland. In the 1990s and 2000s, the situation has begun to work for both locations
thanks to the transnational space and the networks musicians have established, even more in
favor of musicians located in the second homeland than those in the first. Musicians active in
new homelands have started visiting the first homeland more frequently than did previous
generations. Cultural entrepreneurs keep ties between the two homelands alive; while they enjoy
new iterations of the field, they focus on survival and growth. Artists and musicians maintain
bonds with the help of new media and the condensing of time and space in today's connected
world.
Older and slower forms of transnational ties with first-homeland relatives and friends
have always existed among immigrants, first through letters, then through audio- and videocassettes as mentioned. Nowadays, these immigrants communicate more quickly, for longer
periods of time, and more frequently than ever. New media tools have made it easier to share and
diversify content and have increased the symbolic capital of new actors mobilized in both
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homelands and within the new transnational field. This more democratic environment
(Sheyhulislami 2011) has provided space and opportunity for new cultural entrepreneurs to
mobilize towards new religio-political alignments. The new environment has also provided
opportunities for a politically and religiously diversified alignment and transformed the field
with new actors, including the cultural entrepreneurs and new agents who now have tools to
accumulate and spend political, cultural, and social capital.
While these agents reproduce the bonds between two homelands, they also enable or
encourage immigrants to stay in a liminal zone between the two homelands. In all locations
where Kurdish Alevis have settled, the transmission of institutionalized religion, music, and
culture from one generation to the next has been hindered. Compared to other institutionalized
groups, such as Sunni religious brotherhoods or Christian congregations, Kurdish Alevis have
lacked institutional anchors they could rely on, as they have constituted a minority wherever they
went.
Cultural entrepreneurs building on, or sometimes exploiting, Kurdish and Alevi
sensibilities have utilized the transnational space in order to accommodate their own needs while
responding to, and to a certain extent shaping, audience demands. For the cultural entrepreneurs
to maintain this new transnational field they have needed continuous support of their followers,
who attend their events and concerts, purchase their albums, and request their songs, calling for
political mobilization by joining those organizations. The new music addresses themes relevant
to immigrant issues. Several musicians I interviewed, including Mehmet Akbaş, Ali Baran,
Shêxo, Hakan Akay, and Mikail Aslan, give concerts in Turkey in the summer and in Germany
in the winter, to benefit from opportunities in both countries while maintaining the field that
shapes the aesthetic in both homelands. In the summer, these musicians give concerts in places
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where immigrants might spend a few weeks, either their hometowns or near vacation spots on
the west coast of Turkey.
I observed that the majority of songs listened to by Kurdish Alevis, or requested from
musicians, belong to the türkü repertoire and are in Turkish. Some tunes popular in the 2000s can
be classified in a grey area I call alebesk, a hybrid genre area between the arabesk and Alevi
türkü repertoires. Ayhan Kaya (2000) calls arabesk a “syncretic form of music” promulgated as
an “epiphenomenon of urbanization” in Turkey in the 1970s. The main characteristics of arabesk
lyrics include fatalism, sadness, and pessimism (Özbek 1991, Stokes 1992). Alebesk lyrics
combine arabesk notions or themes of love, loneliness, and pain along with a türkü musical
setting (i.e. the prominence of bağlama) and other compositional elements selected from Turkish
and Kurdish folk repertoire. In the last section of this chapter and in Chapter 5, I analyze in detail
the alebesk genre, which has historic ties with other aesthetic and musical norms of the Kurdish
Alevis. Like numerous songs written by Kıvırcık Ali (an Alevi musician who passed away in
2012 leaving behind a long list of songs that are still popular at türkü bars) and others, the lyrics
include commentary on social inequalities and issues related to immigration, and longing for
places and people left behind.
The Kurdish Alevis I met were active members of local and transnational organizations,
as epitomized in their creation and maintenance of hemşehrilik (being from the same place of
origin such as village, town, or city) through Home Town Associations (HTAs). As Elise
Massicard observed among the HTAs with ties with the city of Sivas in Turkey, "despite their
apolitical image, some hemşehri organizations––more openly on the province or sub-province
scale, but in some cases even on a village scale––have been political channels" (Massicard
2005). Her observations corroborate my findings regarding the Kurdish Alevi HTAs, as these
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organizations can be categorized among the religio-political parties of the immigrant groups in
Germany and Turkey (see Chapter 1). Through HTAs, my research subjects went about seeking
other Kurdish Alevis in and around Cologne. I observed that HTAs were one of the places where
music became a popular means for individuals to connect to one another and to Kurdish Alevis
elsewhere, especially those remaining in Turkish Kurdistan.
Together with such scholars as Sökefeld and Kaya, I contend that for groups having
multiple identifications, politicized use of the diaspora concept must be broadened. The presence
of groups like Kurdish Alevis or Turkish Alevis challenges the holistic perspectives that label all
Kurds in Europe as members of the “Kurdish diaspora,” Turks as the “Turkish diaspora,” or
Alevis as the “Alevi diaspora.” The PKK, one of the key actors in the political mobilization in
transnational space, for instance, would like to call all Kurds in Europe members of the Kurdish
diaspora, a claim that will serve its own political agenda in order to unify all Kurds around the
party’s message. Like Sökefeld’s analysis of Alevis (2008), my research suggests that
“diasporas” as categories of social scientific inquiry regarding immigrant Kurds, Alevis, and
Kurdish Alevis should be understood as imagined transnational communities in order to be
applied to those groups. Contrary to what the PKK would like to claim, the multiple religious
affiliations of the Kurds to Sunni Islam, Alevism, and other religions weaken the possibility of a
cohesive Kurdish diaspora. This is not to claim that all immigrant groups must exhibit a cohesive
set of attributes; however, as I demonstrate in the following chapters, if Kurds in Germany are to
be regarded as part of a “Kurdish diaspora” those in Istanbul must also be considered part of the
same Kurdish diaspora.
In fact, I found that most members of the Kurdish Alevi community in and around
Cologne do not claim membership in a Kurdish or any other diaspora. Moreover, certain
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members of the community expressed a pointed rejection of the term; as Serdar, one of my
refugee informants, told me, "we as people in exile with two, three identities have a specific,
urgent need to protect ourselves." I felt an evident hesitation to use the term “diaspora” among
the Kurdish people in Germany. Shêxo, a prominent musician, expressed strong reservations
about the use of "Kurdish diaspora" with respect to the Kurdish Alevis, as he rightly observed;
"we don't have one single goal or identity that ties all of us to each other." As I learned, there
were two main reasons for this, both of which correspond to Mishra's (2006) critique of the way
applications of the diaspora concept have tended to create inaccurate generalizations of
populations.
First is a popularized (mis)use of the term by the Turkish state, which treats Armenian
populations as a diyaspora as a means of erasing the past and denying official recognition of the
Armenian genocide of 1915-1923. In the official Turkish narrative, Armenians in Europe and the
US are referred to as the Armenian diaspora. While it may be true that members of these
populations consider themselves as such, the point is that the Turkish state has refused to
recognize as a diaspora those Armenians living in Turkey. Recognizing this population’s
separation from places of origin would draw attention to the circumstances of its displacement
and the current state of dispersal. In this framework Armenians in Turkey officially "become"
Turks, and Armenians outside of Turkey are the “Armenian diaspora”––in neither case are these
populations officially recognized as the grandchildren of Anatolian immigrants who survived
genocide. Thus, because use of the term "diaspora" denies the displaced status of Armenians in
Turkey, at least ten Kurdish Alevis in Germany I interviewed told me they saw the term as
holding a certain stigma.
Second, the fact that Kurdish Alevis in Germany do not describe themselves with the
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term "diaspora" stems in part from the way outsiders and some social scientists (mis)apply the
term. In Germany, Kurdish Alevis are often referred to as belonging to the Turkish diaspora,
because they and their parents migrated from within the Turkish national borders. Because the
state has called Turkey their place of origin, when in fact some Kurdish Alevis trace their origin
to Kurdistan, some Kurdish Alevis I interviewed for this dissertation indicated that the term
"diaspora" connotes false claims and that, as a result, rather than apply the term only with a
correction––Kurdish diaspora rather than Turkish diaspora––they had opted to avoid using the
term altogether. In particular, the resistance derives from the problem of representation among
members; political parties and organizations that claim to represent a large unique body, such as
the PKK, present themselves as the most ardent advocates of the Kurdish diaspora. In that vein,
Kurdish Alevis who do not support the PKK's politics worry about misrepresentation of all
Kurds in new homelands.
In the remaining sections, I discuss the term some Kurdish Alevis chose in describing
themselves relative to their membership in this transnational community, and I explore the
theoretical distinction it points to between the concept of diaspora as figured in recent literature,
and the sense of self articulated by the Kurdish Alevis with whom I spoke.

2.6. Second Homelanders
A self-claimed, well-integrated Kurdish Alevi immigrant told me that he is living in his
"second homeland" (zweite Heimat) in Germany, although if one views homelands in sequential
order of the dispersal of the population, Germany would be their third, not second homeland.
Kurdish Alevi villages and hometowns in the southeast of present-day Turkey would constitute
the first, metropolitan cities in Turkey, mainly Istanbul, the second, and German cities such
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Cologne the third homeland.

FIRST or OLD HOMELAND

NEW HOMELAND

Second Homeland
Villages in ("Kurdistan")

Istanbul or Izmir (TR)

Third Homeland
Cologne (G)

Cologne (G)
"SECOND HOMELANDERS"

Figure 2. 1. Typology of Homelands for Kurdish Alevis

I have observed no significant differences in daily practices of enculturation in the two
communities (Kurdish Alevis in Cologne and Istanbul), especially regarding ethnic or religious
mobilization around specific identities, in this case, Kurdish, Alevi, or Kızılbaş. I categorize
Kurdish Alevis residing in villages or nearby hometowns as those in their first or old homeland,
and those residing in metropolitan cities in Turkey, mainly Istanbul, where Kurdish Alevis
constitute a double minority, and in German cities, such as Cologne, as in their new (second or
third) homeland. However, my research shows that this linear sequence may not be applicable to
all of my informants.
Criticizing the scholarly assumption that one homeland and one or more host countries
define a diasporic community, Stuart Hall (1994) suggests the presence of a cultural identity that
provides room for collective unities, given the discontinuity, hybridity, and differences among
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members of immigrant communities. By maintaining the possibility of multiple homes rather
than a single home, Hall questions the strict dichotomy between homeland and host-land
identification. As if developing Hall’s definition, my informants have claimed multiple
homelands, but, more importantly, they do not consider these in sequence, attached to a linear
process of dispersal across time. Rather, as I conclude, they view Germany as their second, not
third homeland, and Istanbul also as a second homeland: in other words, these people would
consider any place outside of Kurdistan as a second homeland. Calling Germany their second
homeland implies as firm a root as would anywhere else, including most significantly, Istanbul.
Thus calling any place outside Kurdistan their second homeland indicates the intensity of their
commitment to a single place rallied around as first homeland.
The most difficult challenge for Kurdish Alevis in Germany is that they oscillate between
two or three languages, religions, belief systems, lifestyles, and cultures. Emekçi, from Turkish
Kurdistan, a well-known Kurdish Alevi musician now exiled in Germany, describes this state of
mind:
There is also the problem of space. Are we from here or not, which space and location do
we belong to? We simultaneously belong to Germany and we do not. When we visit our
homeland we feel that we don't belong there either. Some feel that way and some do not.
I think I feel that there is a community of people who are looking for their identities
every single moment in their lives. For a couple of seconds they find something they can
closely relate to themselves. They find some objects, symbols, emotions, songs, spices,
and poems that they feel comfortable with. Then within a couple of seconds that comfort
disappears, the moment she opens her eyes she realizes that she is not where she feels
really at home, she is in fact on a street where there are traffic rules that must be obeyed.
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At that moment she loses the taste of that momentary spice she gets and that comfort
feeling disappears. (Emekçi, Cologne 2010)

I conceptualized the term "second homelander" in order to indicate one possible way individuals
of this population relate to other Kurdish Alevis in time and space. Thus, I use the term “second
homelanders” to denote the population of Kurdish Alevis living in both Germany and Istanbul or
anywhere outside the historic first homeland. My interviewees expressed a sense of
displacement––a detachment from what the diaspora literature would simply call their
"homeland"––but did not refer to Germany as a host country. Their strong sense of loss of place
harkens back to the forced dispersal of Kurdish Alevis from the triangle between the cities of
Maraş, Malatya, and Adıyaman.
The sense of loss among Kurdish Alevis has been exacerbated and carried forward as the
Turkish state has resisted accepting Kurds and Alevis among the founding partners of the
Turkish nation, but it also powerfully reflects a shared sense among Kurdish Alevis in Germany
that political structures do not at present exist that would allow for a reestablishment of
sovereignty and a return of displaced Kurdish Alevis. I have had several conversations about the
lack of a real homeland among Kurdish Alevis in their second or third homelands. Because
Sunni Turkish majority does not include them among the founders of the Republic of Turkey,
Kurdish Alevis have internalized this exclusion and view it as a barrier to their integration into
Turkish society. In various locations, they have had to stay in neighborhoods in which they
constitute a minority, unlike Sunni Kurds who could relate to the Sunni Turks through religious
camaraderie in their mosques or other locations. The main cause of this constant emotional
exclusion is the double minority status they hold in the first homeland, which travels with
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immigrants to the second homeland. Shêxo remarked, "if you don't have a real home in your
homeland, and your homeland [Kurdistan] is still in question, it is not easy for Kurds to feel they
belong to one place.” Müslüm Alagöz, a 54-year old restaurant owner in Bonn, formulated the
situation of himself and his fellow Kurdish Alevis as “in-between many homes" (Kr. nave malan
mayin) He went on:

I live at my workplace in Germany, at home as Turkish and Kurdish. If someone is able
to put all of these qualities from both homelands together in their lives they don't even
need a homeland, you don't need to be limited within one space and homeland. I don't
want to get from one perspective. The people coming from Turkey, regardless of their
ethnic or religious affiliations such as Kurdish, Turkish, Alevi, or Sunni, have a constant
emphasis and search for a clearer identity every moment. The lifestyle of the people here
becomes different because of this constant search for identification. (Field notes, June 15,
2010)

This well-integrated Kurdish Alevi demonstrates that the term “second homeland” is actually a
corrective to this sense of transcending the locales. Such a state of mind among interviewed
immigrants and refugees can be described as what Homi Bhabha calls “unhomeliness” (1994),
which was a common sentiment among the Kurdish Alevis I interviewed in Germany and
Istanbul. Many second homelanders reflect a commitment to the idea shared among Kurdish
Alevis in Germany that Germany is indeed a homeland––that they may be displaced but they are
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not homeless. Second homelanders try to convert the place where they live to look, smell, and
sound like the first homeland. This is most evident in the şark odası (eastern room), 14 a
decorated corner of a house with kilims, garments, and other artifacts resembling those in the
first homeland of Kurdistan. Such garments and artifacts in Shêxo's living room are almost
identical to those my grandmother made and gave to her daughters upon marriage. They
represent village living rooms, giving household members and guests in Germany the comfort of
a familiar Kurdish living room. Quite a few of my informants in both Turkey and Germany
devote at least a section of their living room, if not the entire room, to exhibiting items from the
şark (see below).

Figure 2.2. A Picture representing the şark odası from Saz Time Türküevi in Cologne
__________________
14

The şark odası is an old practice of exhibiting personal items, such as oriental rugs and
pottery, in one's living room. It reflects the sensibilities of the şark feel in the modern world.
Kurds and Armenians in Istanbul, and in other large cities in Turkey, tend to have a site at home
set up to remind them of their origins.
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We might ask why Kurdish Alevis are embracing Germany as their second homeland.
"German society has opened its arms and accepted the Kurds and Alevis," Ali Baran said in one
of our conversations. This new homeland has given them linguistic and educational rights, which
alleviated the integration process by building confidence and loyalty, thus making it easier to be
part of their second homeland. In new homelands (both in Istanbul and Germany), I observed
that people are more involved with the search for identity.

The concept of second homelanders

reminded Shêxo of the recent citizenship debate in Germany with respect to the status of
immigrants (see Chapter 6). He remembered that in some instances, the affirmation of Germany
as Erste Heimat (first homeland) by the immigrants was used by the German authorities as a
litmus test to confirm them as loyal German citizens. In our conversation, Shêxo went on,

… people like me who left their (first) homeland and lived for a long while in another
cultural structure seem to have lost the battle. My search for a homeland is over. I look at
my beliefs and myself if I need to find some homeland. Kurdish culture and Alevi
religion guide my life and philosophy. It is the person’s values that would and should
guide someone when s/he has lost the way, not a specific piece of land.

On that note, I turn to the musical implications of the concept of second homelanders.

2.7. The Results of the Survey: Conclusions
The locales where I investigated the music-making practices of Kurdish Alevis included
homes, cemevis (house of worship), bars, festivals, and inside the cars of my informants, as well
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as media such as the Internet, radio, TV, and Facebook. In these places they listened to live
music, drank alcohol, danced, or listened to their cassette players, iPods, computers, or TVs. The
music and musicians that circulate in these venues give insights into the transformation of this
community and the consumption of music in such spaces.
I observed among Kurdish Alevis a nostalgia for the first homeland enacted through
songs about village life, references to hometowns, and singing in the local dialects in intimate
settings in the ways of local singing. Hometown pictures and videos about elderly villagers have
increasingly been shared through Facebook posts. This trend is also visible in the repertoire of
the new generation of musicians like Mikail Aslan, Ahmet Aslan, Cemil Koçgiri, and Garip
Dost.
Listening habits of the Kurdish Alevis living in Germany closely resemble those of
individuals living in Turkey (Chapter 4). The online survey I prepared indicated that Kurdish
Alevis in Germany dedicate an average of 1.25 hours a day and 7.75 hours a week to listening to
music (see Appendix for the questions in Turkish and Kurdish with English translations). More
than 85% of participants listen to music via the Internet, which includes YouTube, Facebook,
Internet radio, and downloaded mp3s. Although the online survey automatically selected
younger people over the less technology savvy elderly, the community members have been using
Internet more frequently than their relatives and friends in Turkey. Almost all of the people I
engaged with for the study have been using Facebook on a daily basis and they all have email
addresses.
I asked participants to type in names of specific musicians they follow and songs that
have an emotional impact on them. With these questions, I aimed to understand the cultural
memory of Kurdish Alevi second homelanders. I view cultural memory as an entity that links
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collective and individual ways of imagining the past to the individuals' contemporary experience;
it connects both individual and collective imagination with the identities articulated in public.
Cultural memory pertains to the individual and collective stories about the past told in public and
private. Thus, the cultural memory of Kurdish Alevis could be mapped in their answers to
questions about sadness or happiness resulting from listening to specific songs.
Question 1 on the survey asked them to name the musician or singer who makes the
questionnaire participant feel saddest (en çok hüzünlendiren). Although there were different
answers to those questions, the names Ahmet Kaya (a Kurdish musician who performed music in
Turkish until his exile from Turkey in 1999), Kıvırcık Ali (an Alevi musician whose songs are
still popular at türkü bars as mentioned above), and Şivan Perwer (probably the most well-known
Kurdish musician alive, exiled in 1976 from Turkey and living in Germany) were mentioned
significantly more. The second question asked what musician or singer made the participant feel
happiest (en çok mutlu eden). The answers to this question, to my surprise, constituted a more
diverse spectrum of musicians and groups, as no answer was given more than once. The
musicians or groups mentioned included Şivan Perwer, Farid Fariad, Kamkaran, Emin Erbani,
Kardeş Türküler, and Sezen Aksu. The happiness articulated by those Kurdish Alevi participants
was generated by an inclusive set of musicians associated with a larger geographical region,
namely Anatolia. Happiness had more to do with inclusion in the larger Anatolian landscape than
did sadness, which was confined to the Kurdish and Alevi psyche exemplified in the laments of
Kaya and Perwer as well as the alebesk of Kıvırcık Ali. Some members of this community,
especially youth, indicated that they are not just listening to Turkish or Kurdish music, as was
evident from the American and European musicians they mentioned on their Facebook profiles
as well as the questionnaire answers they gave. Some of my respondents have become members
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of fan clubs of musicians and groups such as Metallica, Madonna, and 50 Cents according to
their social media profiles (see Appendix A).
When asked which specific pieces (şarkı, türkü, and parça) make them feel happiest,
most respondents named fast-tempo Kurdish folk tunes. Most of these line-dances (govend) are
indispensable parts of celebrations, weddings, and public gatherings. When asked which tunes
make them feel saddest, the participants gave a long set of songs. The detailed answers on songs
associated with sadness could speak about the cultural memory that comes most to the fore in the
sad moments in their journey (for a case study see Solomon 2012). The answers included gurbet
türküleri, alebesk, and laments (lorik and ağıt) about the history of Kurds, such as the Halabja
massacre. The term gurbet has been used among many ethnic groups in formerly Ottoman
regions (Buchanan 2007) to refer to different experiences such as being exiled, leaving and/or
working in a foreign city or country, or more broadly living outside the home. Although male
self-pity and other emotional reactions have been prized in the larger Mediterranean region, I
observed among the Kurds that the lamentation and other forms of articulation of sadness have
constituted a large portion of poetry, folk music, and epics told by the dengbêj (bard). The
Kurdish Alevis who responded to the survey provided longer lists of sad songs as opposed to
happy ones (see Appendix B). The history of displacement and atrocities they or their parents
have faced along with already existing repertoire of gurbet and laments after the deceased have
exacerbated the large lexicon of sadness. Among adjectives frequently used for sad songs or
states have been acıklı (touching), yanık (burned), içini yakan (burning inside), hüzünlü (sad),
duygusal (emotional), kırılgan (fragile), dertli (heartbroken), xemgin (sad), gamlı (sorry),
ağlamaklı (tearful), süzgün (drawn out), and melül (blue).
When asked to describe their national or ethnic identity, almost all participants claimed
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Kurdish identity. However, they used different ways to say Kurdish; some used the Turkish
pronunciation of Kürt while others used Kurd, and a few used Alevi Kurd as their ethnic
identification. Scholars of Alevism have reported the confusion and varying answers given by
Alevis when they were asked to define Alevism (Massicard 2013, Erdemir 2004, Erol 2011 and
2012). The results of the survey confirm the same kind of multiplicity in identification among
members of this group. Some do not even consider themselves Alevis. On the other hand, when
asked about their ethnic or national identification it becomes obvious that they identify
themselves as Kurds.
Question 3 was about religious identification, in which participants could write in any
option, just as they could for the ethnicity question. The set of answers was more complicated
than that to the ethnicity question. Half said that they were Alevi; a quarter specifically
mentioned that they were Kızılbaş-Alevi, and the other quarter included answers such as
Humanist, Atheist, and Tolerant. These findings corroborate what other studies on Alevis have
suggested with respect to Alevi religious self-identification (van Bruinessen 1997, Sökefeld
2008, Gezik 2012).
When asked how they described their political identity, forty percent used different
versions of Demokrat (or democrat, an umbrella term used to describe all liberals, social
democrats, and some socialists), forty percent claimed they were socialist, and the rest split
between answers such as "Marxist-Leninist," "leftist," "pacifist," and "unaligned." Seventy
percent claimed to have visited their village at least once in the previous year (2010). This
question was designed to see how much participants kept ties to the first homeland, and the
percentage of positive answers was higher than expected. It confirmed the recent increase in
back-and-forth mobility between homelands. Question 4 asked "Have you ever attended any
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religious observance or visited any sacred place in 2010?" Almost a third of the respondents gave
an affirmative answer. Their responses mostly mentioned funeral services they attended and cem
ceremonies held once a year. When asked whether they attended any political strike or
demonstration in 2010, fifty percent gave an affirmative response. The events attended included
demonstrations against racism, the actions of the Turkish state, and some Kurdish and Alevi
rallies around various political purposes. These results corroborate my findings on Facebook and
other social media, where I have observed a similar multiplicity in self-identification with
various ethnic, religious, and political loyalties.
Kurdish Alevis in Germany demand media content relating to their first homeland,
captured and mediated through music and other forms. As an example, the popularity of a song
or a TV show in the first homeland could make it easier for dissidents in the second homeland to
be assimilated into the evolving first homeland. The decrease in political tension and the
depoliticization process for many refugees and immigrants in Germany, has led to the Kurdish
Alevi people (at least those I met) becoming more versed in Turkish culture than they could have
been had they stayed in the first homeland. Therefore, Kurdish Alevis in Germany are becoming
receptive to the cultural shifts in the first homeland at least as much as, if not more than their
relatives living in another second homeland in non-Kurdistan Turkey have been. These cultural
productions in the second homeland, mediated not only on the Internet but also in entertainment
venues, resemble those of first homeland practices.
An essential example of the second homelander aesthetic is found in alebesk, which has
been embraced by several second homelander Kurdish Alevis. The similar landscape of türkü
bars in Istanbul and Germany leads me to include them as part of the same second homelander
aesthetic (See Chapter 5 for musical examples of alebesk).
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To conclude, I have introduced the concept of the second homelander to understand my
research subjects, describing how it builds on mainstream academic discussion of similar
populations as diaspora, discussing briefly why some research subjects have opted against the
term to describe themselves. Displaced from their place of origin, they root themselves in a
series of new homelands (Cologne and Istanbul, for instance), but meanwhile ally themselves
with other Kurdish Alevis and work to shore up and perpetuate the ties that bind all Kurdish
Alevis together regardless of the geographical space separating them.
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Ch. 3: Kurdish Identity, the ‘Kurdish Question,’ and Kurdish Alevi Musicians
3.1. Introduction
In this chapter, I focus on the most common theme that emerged in almost all of my
conversations, what the Turkish state has labeled Kürt Sorunu 15(the Kurdish Question), and the
problem of reconciliation between Kurds and Turks. In order to better understand the Kurdish
identities embraced and claimed by the Kurdish Alevis I studied, I deal with the history of the
Kurdish Question in Turkey, as most Kurdish Alevis I have interviewed have embraced their
Kurdish identity in the context of the conflict between Turkey and its self-identified Kurdish
citizens. This chapter looks at the reconciliation between Turks and Kurds as part of the
discursive analysis of the work of Kurdish, Turkish, and Alevi musicians. I observe that the
ongoing conflict helped accelerate the participation of some Kurdish Alevi musicians in the new
transnational field as cultural entrepreneurs. This process is manifested in the songs that they
wrote, performed, and disseminated from late 1990s through today. During the past 30 years, the
Kurdish conflict became a national issue in Turkey, which created major difficulties for the
articulation of Kurdish identity demands. Whenever Kurds have been mentioned in the public
sphere by the Turkish media, the government officials, and many others, it has been in the
context of the conflict, and intimately connected to political violence, separatism, or terrorism.
Michel Foucault’s understanding of discourses embedded and naturalized in the public
space forms the primary lens for understanding the function and implications of this discourse of
__________________
15

It is significant to note in other historical writings on minorities, that the oppressor has often
termed the formation of a situation a "question," with a pejorative connotation. Kurds, as this
chapter shows, have a distinct identity and culture that is not at all in “question.” Nonetheless,
the term seems to be embraced by everyone involved with the conflict.
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“separatism.” Foucault conceptualizes discourse as constitutive of social relations and identities,
and he emphasizes the interdependency of discursive practices. He argues that the chosen
discourse delivers the vocabulary, expressions, and style of communication that impart a point of
view (Foucault 1972). In discourse on the Kurdish Question in Turkey, the official Turkish
nationalist discourse has historically been framed around notions of “war” and “terrorism,”
resulting in denial of the cultural, linguistic, and political demands of Kurds in Turkey. In this
context, a counter-discourse against war and violence has emerged among a small group of
artists and musicians in Germany and Turkey who from the early 1990s onwards have been
calling for peace and reconciliation. Musicians who have promoted peace and reconciliation,
even in the very limited form of performing songs in languages other than Turkish, have created
a new layer of argument over the prevailing line, which suggests a militant resistance against the
Turkish Republic regarding the Kurdish Question. The discourse of these peace-seeking
musicians who have had to struggle against the policies of militant Kurdish organizations as well
as the Turkish state cannot be separated from the significance of performance aspects (i.e.,
performance settings, dress, and presentation among others) of their argument and discursive
strategies. Such groups have applied these strategies in order to open up a space invoking
solidarity among the different ethno-religious peoples of Turkey. In effect, musical performance
has provided an arena for musicians to rehearse and enact solidarity.
Within a historical account that traces the emergence of Kurdish and other non-Turkish
music produced and disseminated in Turkey and Germany, the late 1990s show increased
production and collaboration among musicians from diverse ethnic backgrounds. Such close
collaborations have invariably contributed to reconciliation by lessening the effects of deepening
polarization between the Kurdish and Turkish communities, which became more and more
82

visible during the 1990s as a result of the escalation of the conflict. In particular, the efforts of
the band Kardeş Türküler [Ballads of Solidarity] – established by students in Istanbul’s Boğaziçi
University in 1993 (and of which I was a member) on the principle of living together in
solidarity and taking a firm stand against polarization and conflict – stand at the center of the
solidarity and reconciliation activities of musicians in Turkey. Those efforts, I argue, have
contributed to the emergence throughout the 2000s of polycultural alternatives to the discourse
of war and exclusion, promoting instead the development of a peaceful resolution to the Kurdish
Question in Turkey. Although the efforts of many peace-seeking musicians and artists, i.e.
cultural entrepreneurs, have helped to open an alternative and peaceful discursive environment
and have contributed to a greater public understanding of Turkey’s ethno-cultural diversity,
much remains to be done to reach a solution to the Kurdish Question.
In my research I observed that Kurdish Alevi musicians, myself included, would like to
play a role in politics, similar to the roles of organic intellectuals as defined by Gramsci
(Gramsci, Hoare, and Nowell-Smith 1972). In their endeavors, they enact the organic intellectual
mission that Gramsci was suggesting in his model. This self-appointment by the musicians and
other cultural entrepreneurs secures musicians’ and other artists’ place in the new transnational
field I described earlier (Chapter 1). Depending on the issue that the musicians have advocated,
they have claimed to fulfill a mission as either representatives or mouthpieces of the cause at
hand. In some cases there were musicians who were directly involved with politics entered into
politics from the left-leaning or pro-Kurdish parties in Turkey as well as from Social Democratic
parties in Germany. One of the candidates for the July 2011 elections for MP in Dersim, Tunceli
was Ferhat Tunç, a musician from the region who was nominated by the pro-Kurdish BDP party.
Since the BDP was not allowed to participate in elections, the party declared that it was
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supporting “independent candidates” in districts that they could win. Tunç ran as an independent
candidate supported by BDP and lost. Arguably one of the key cultural entrepreneurs in Kurdish
Alevi life, he used to live in Germany and had some ties with the organization called Partizan,
which reportedly “sent him back" to the first homeland to help in organizing. He publicly denies
any ties with the organization but had performed at almost all of its events in the last three
decades. His populist message and overt lyrics raised his profile among Kurds and Alevis. He is
also part of the “musician imports” to Turkey who spent a period of time outside the first
homeland.
The first section of this chapter provides the historical context of music-making in
Turkey, exploring the environment within which Kurdish and Turkish musicians worked and
created music from the 1980s until the late 20th century. I briefly reflect upon the tragic
experience of Ahmet Kaya in order to highlight the difficulties and outright repression faced by
Kurdish musicians. I then explore the reconciliation efforts in Turkey and look at the case study
of Kardeş Türküler. Music has been an important medium to articulate political and social
demands; and music produced by Turkish and Kurdish musicians in Turkey has reflected, and in
certain cases helped to accelerate, the process of change in the perception and recognition of the
rights of Kurds. As this chapter elaborates in detail, the music that has been popular among the
Kurdish Alevis I studied reveals a yearning for a more peaceful era by reinforcing the claims for
peace, unity, and reconciliation. In this context, some Kurdish and Turkish musicians have
attempted to go beyond the discourse of violence, war, and denial dominant in Turkey in the past
three decades in order to shape public opinion and perceptions of Kurds and Kurdish identity.
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3.2. Kurdish Question and Kurdish Musicians in Turkey: A Historical Overview
The history of Turkey’s Kurdish Question can be understood by analyzing the history of
the Turkish authorities’ policy of assimilation and denial of Kurdish music and dance, and thus
the existence of a Kurdish ethnicity or nation. The denial of the existence of a Kurdish nation or
ethnicity within the current borders of Turkey is evident in the official denial of the existence of
a separate Kurdish music, which, well into the 1990s, has often been officially designated as
‘Turkish music.’ The forced appropriation and colonization of the Kurdish cultural heritage has
taken the form of translating folk songs from Kurdish and other languages into Turkish without
acknowledging their ethno-linguistic origins. This has been a significant assault on Kurdish
music. The suppression of textual expression in Kurdish has given more reason to Kurdish youth
to organize around cultural centers and political activities established and promoted through the
performance of Kurdish music. Kurdish music has played an important role in mobilizing Kurds
around their ethnic identity, and they have used both traditional and modern Kurdish music as a
counter-hegemonic tool as well as raw material in Kurdish identity formation. Throughout the
past three decades, Kurdish music has become an inseparable part of the Kurdish national
movement, where music is utilized as a powerful vehicle to state positions either in support of or
in opposition to issues that often provoke political demonstrations and public gatherings
(Kızıldemir 1995). This close relationship with music also manifests itself in the social and
political struggles of the Kurds in Turkey, where protest songs have been integral to group
cohesion and mobilization as well as a vital platform for formulating political critiques and
demands.
The concept of identity is a complex and evolving one. Turkish and Kurdish labels and
identities can carry different meanings determined by various processes in different contexts. For
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example, the term ‘Turkish-ness’ (Türklük) refers to both ethnic and national identities. Denial of
the non-Turkish elements within the multiethnic fabric of Turkey since 1923 has contributed to
the interchangeable use of ‘Turkish-ness’ to refer to both Turkish ethnicity and Turkish
nationality—exclusive of Kurdish and other ethnicities. Only non-Muslim religious communities
have been legally recognized as “minorities” in Turkey. No legal or judicial standing applies to
Kurdish, Alevi, or any other Muslim ethnic or religious groups since the Lausanne treaty in
1922, by which Western allies recognized the establishment of the new Republic of Turkey
instead of the Ottoman Empire. Therefore, I refer to Kurdish musicians in Turkey as those who
self-identify as Kurds and who are also citizens of Turkey or another country. Kurdish musicians
can also be defined as musicians who sing or perform music in Kurmancî or Zazakî (Dimîlî).
In order to situate Kurdish musicians within a historical context, I begin by discussing the
musical climate and context of music-making in Turkey since the early 20th century. Following
the First World War, the majority of Kurdish-inhabited lands (called Kurdistan) were divided
between the states of Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Syria. In these countries, musicians who performed
in Kurdish faced harsh punishments by states in addition to the denial, homogenization, and
assimilation policies that forbade cultural production of the Kurds (Beşikçi 1969, 1997; van
Bruinessen 2000). In many instances, such harsh policies presented Kurdish and Alevi
musicians, artists, and scholars with choices that resulted in either persecution by the government
or forced exile. Among the harshest policies for Kurdish culture and music were those of the
Turkish Republic, which established a legal framework to silence political and cultural activities
perceived as iç mihrak ‘internal threats’ soon after its founding in 1923. As Murat Yüksel’s
(2008), Deniz Gökalp’s (2007), and Bilgin Ayata's (2011) dissertations demonstrate, in the early
years of the Turkish Republic repressive state policies prompted dramatic shifts in the
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geographical distribution of the population and forced many Kurdish Alevis to leave their homes
and resettle in predominantly Sunni Muslim cities. 16 Laws implemented by the Turkish
government in the 1920s, 1930s, and 1940s were intended to minimize the density of the Kurdish
and Alevi population by scattering them into different parts of the country (Gökalp 2007, Yüksel
2008, and Ayata 2011). The Takrir-Sukun Kanunu (The Law of the Maintaining Order) of 1925
and the Iskan Kanunu (Settlement Law) of 1927 played an instrumental role in sparking this
dispersion movement in order to homogenize the Turkish nation by diluting Kurdish population
in the eastern cities. The 1927 Law of Settlement authorized the Ministry of Internal Affairs to
relocate and (re) settle nomadic tribes (in many cases Kurdish tribes), thus provoking migrating
Kurdish Alevis to strike out in a multitude of different directions. The Settlement Law
consequently led to the breaking apart of Kurdish Alevi enclaves. In most cases, the state
physically deported people, but in some cases, they were otherwise subjected to constant
surveillance and in some cases intimidation. Nevertheless, despite moving west and south
throughout the 1940s and 1950s, many retained contact with their relatives and searched out
fellow Kurdish Alevis to create new bonds of community in their new homelands. Turkey
continues to fail to officially acknowledge the existence of its Kurdish or Alevi population;
hence, that population has faced systematic state violence and forced migration as well as
__________________
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In Forced Migration and the Politics of Internal Displacement in the Making of Modern
Turkey: The Case of Dersim, 1937-1947, Yüksel focuses on the laws forcing the Kurds and other
ethnic groups in Turkey to settle throughout the west and north of Turkey. In her dissertation
titled The Politics of Displacement: A Transnational Analysis of Kurdish Forced Migration in
Turkey and Europe, Ayata asserts that the displacement of Kurds was state policy. Deniz
Gökalp's dissertation, Beyond Ethnopolitical Contention: the State, Citizenship and Violence in
the 'New' Kurdish Question in Turkey, is another significant study of the migration of Kurds
within Turkey (Gökalp 2007).
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intensive assimilation into the Turkish language and culture. However, in private and in informal
gatherings, the Kurdish people have continued to practice Kurdish culture and music even as
they were banned publicly.
In informal gatherings, the folk music tradition of the dengbêj continued to play an
important role in transmitting old Kurdish folk melodies and stories to new generations of Kurds.
It was almost impossible to hear recordings of such repertoires in Turkey in the public sphere
until the 1970s, when homemade bootleg cassettes of local singers began to emerge and were
secretly distributed among Kurds to be listened to at home. Before the circulation of such
underground copies, the only opportunity for Kurds to hear Kurdish music was provided by
Yerevan and Baghdad broadcasts of Kurdish music. Key developments in Kurdish folk music in
Turkey, ironically, occurred in other countries. Illegally copied and disseminated cassettes of
Kurdish singers living in exile, such as Şivan Perwer, Nizamettin Arıç and Ciwan Haco, were the
first Kurdish albums to circulate among Kurds in Turkey.
In the late 1980s, Kurdish national movements (primarily the work of the Kurdistan Workers’
Party (PKK) and the Kurdistan Socialist Party (PSK), and other party activists) grew.
A recent discursive analysis of ideological texts produced by the Kurdish movement,
primarily by the PKK, suggests that there have been three separate periods in the history of
Kurdish activism (Güneş 2012). Until the early 1970s, Güneş argues, the Kurds in Turkey
emphasized the joint struggle of Kurdish and Turkish progressives against internal and external
oppressors, namely feudalism and imperialism. From the late-1970s onward, and especially since
the rise of the PKK, the dominant Kurdish discourse was one of national liberation: Kurdistan
was a colony of Turkey. A shift in the Kurdish political activist discourse occurred in the late
1990s and became especially apparent after the imprisonment of the PKK’s leader, Abdullah
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Öcalan, in 1999. From that time, the PKK renounced the idea of an independent Kurdish state
and redefined its objectives as democracy and equal rights for all Kurds and Turks (Güneş 2012).
Kurdish political activism took the form of a resistance movement and military activity
against the Turkish state beginning in the mid-1980s. The state used the conflict as a pretext for
violence against the members of political organizations and the musicians associated with them.
In many instances, Kurdish musicians and artists were the most vocal and visible representatives
of the movement, their public visibility making them targets of suppression. Throughout the
1980s and 1990s, Kurdish musicians made unambiguous references to the sufferings of the
Kurds in their recordings and public performances both in Kurdistan and in the diaspora. Even in
these decades the Turkish state responded by censoring cultural organizations such as the
Navenda Çanda Mezopotamya (NÇM, 17 Mesopotamia Cultural Centers) in Istanbul and Izmir.
Throughout the 1990s, this organization was under constant police surveillance; on numerous
occasions its members were subjected to police brutality, its archives were destroyed, and the use
of its concert hall was banned for years. The state’s violent reaction to the political demands of
the Kurds made it difficult to distinguish between political activists demanding separation from
Turkey and peaceful activities demanding cultural, linguistic, and educational rights. Thus, many
Kurdish musicians demonstrated their solidarity with organizations such as the NÇM;
consequently, most have faced prosecution and imprisonment. These musicians became activists
in protests.
In the 1990s, the cultural policies of the Turkish Republic had certain openings, either
due to the pressure from external actors criticizing Turkey’s poor human rights record, or
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internal openings that were thought to help win the hearts of some Kurds to support the state
against ‘separatists.’ However, in most cases, the state’s legal system was for a long period of
time not tolerant of music in the Kurdish language. An example demonstrating a governmental
response toward Kurdish music is the case of Rahmi Saltuk, a Kurdish musician who established
his career by singing in Turkish, as many of his fellow Kurdish musicians did. Prior to 1989, his
work had centered on türkü, traditional Turkish folk songs. Saltuk’s Hoy Nare, released in 1989,
became the first Kurdish album that initially received approval from the Turkish Ministry of
Culture. It featured songs sung in Kurdish, and was possibly overlooked on its initial perusal as
the Ministry censored the album only a few weeks later. The public prosecutor stated that the
reason for the ban was that the use of the Kurdish language violated an article in the penal code
against the use of non-Turkish local languages in cultural productions (Aksoy 2006).
The law against releasing local non-Turkish albums was eventually altered in 1992,
although it still did not allow the dissemination of Kurdish albums in Turkey. Even after several
legal amendments, harsh resistance by the authorities to the dissemination of Kurdish music
remains. Most recently, this resistance was evident in the 2008 arrest of the public bus-driver
Mustafa Tüzün for playing a Kurdish song in his bus. A court in Diyarbakır sentenced Tüzün to
ten months’ imprisonment (Antenna Turkey 2008).
Performing Kurdish music in concert has not been easy for Kurdish musicians. Local law
enforcement and police authorities have banned many concerts for the content of the music, and
such policies continued into the late 1990s and early 2000s. As I have personally witnessed along
with many other Kurdish and Turkish musicians, Kurdish musicians were arrested and the police
__________________
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Also known commonly with its Turkish acronyms, MKM (Mezopotamya Kültür Merkezi).
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regularly destroyed their archives throughout the 1990s. The Turkish Ministry of Culture could
ban a song and thus an album if the lyrics contained words that even alluded to Kurdish identity,
Kurdistan or the Kurdish national movement. Musicians and producers have had to submit
translations of their lyrics to the Ministry of Culture in order to obtain permission before the
release of an album. Therefore, Kurdish musicians have developed strategies to circumvent the
censorship barriers by replacing a ‘dangerous’ word such as ‘Kurdistan’ with a rhyming
alternative, such as ‘Gülistan’, meaning the garden of roses.

3.2.1. An Event: Ahmet Kaya’s Departure
Another dramatic event that highlights the marginalization of dissident musical voices in
Turkey was the forced departure of Ahmet Kaya from Turkey in 1999. 18 Kaya, whose mother
was Turkish and father Kurdish, was born in Malatya. Although he never became fluent in
Kurdish and wrote his lyrics almost exclusively in Turkish, he expressed flawlessly the
experience of the Kurds, in Turkey and elsewhere, for nearly three decades. Kaya’s appeal
originates from the populist and protest quality of his lyrics and his unique delivery style. His
voice stood out among the few musicians and intellectuals who were protesting the undemocratic
policies of the Turkish state, particularly after the military coup d’état of 1980, which destroyed
all such protest movements. Although Kaya usually performed in Turkish, his audiences
consisted mainly of disenfranchised Kurds and Turks who occupied the outskirts of metropolitan
cities.

__________________
18

For an analysis of the events that led to Kaya’s departure, see Aksoy 2010.
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Kaya had to leave Turkey after a physical attack, upon receiving the 1999 Best Turkish
Singer of the Year Award in Istanbul. During his acceptance speech at the award ceremony,
Kaya told the audience: ‘I composed a Kurdish song, I am looking for a brave producer and a
brave TV channel to broadcast it, and I know there are some among you.’ Upon hearing this
statement, prominent Turkish musicians and celebrities in the audience began throwing objects at
Kaya, including forks and knives from the dinner table. A few friends and sympathetic waiters
protected him, but soon after this event, Kaya, facing constant harassment and death threats, was
forced out of the country and fled to Western Europe. Approximately two months before his
death in 2000, from a heart attack while in Paris, I met Kaya just before a concert at a proKurdish event in Germany. He invited us, the members of Kardeş Türküler, into his dressing
room to reminisce. He looked sad and lonely, yet said he did not regret voicing his criticisms
about the state of the Kurds and Kurdish music in Turkey.
In an interview appearing in Milliyet (Çini 2009), Serdar Ortaç, a Turkish pop singer and
songwriter who was among the instigators of the attack against Kaya, apologized for his actions
during the 1999 awards ceremony. Ortaç admitted that he had been wrong and stated that he had
only recently realized his mistake. In a similar change of heart, the Turkish Radio Television
Broadcasting Company (TRT) recently announced that it plans to retract its policy of banning
blacklisted singers, including Kaya, following the new government’s democratization policy
called demokratik açılım (democratic opening). For more than twenty-five years, hundreds of
blacklisted singers had been banned from all national radio and TV stations controlled by the
state.
Skeptics have continued to question the viability of reconciliation efforts given the
problems and decades of hostility exemplified by the violence that led to Kaya’s exile. The
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incident of his forced exile left an even deeper scar, not only because Kaya was a highly popular
figure, but also because his message was more conciliatory than those of other Kurdish
musicians. The attack on Kaya made manifest the power of Turkish nationalism’s exclusionary
practices and the accompanying mainstream campaign against Kurds. In response to this
experience, Kaya developed a new more pro-Kurdish stance in exile, which reflected the lives of
many exiled Kurdish musicians and artists in Europe and elsewhere.

3.3. Musical Expression and Reconciliation in Turkey
Ethnomusicology has been described as the study of music in its social contexts. The
main inquiry of many ethnomusicological studies has been to examine music’s social and
cultural uses, meanings, and functions in both local and global contexts. Music does not at all
times have to communicate something readily understood, but in most instances, it does. Musical
practices and discourses express specific stances, ideas, messages, and emotions. Music can
either help or thwart people in listening to what others say and feel. It can alleviate pain and
suffering; it can heal. Musical practices and discourses can also convey hatred, exclusion, and
violence. Musicians might also help to initiate peace in a discourse outside of the boundaries of
official claims. Musical expression includes lyrical discourses as well as sonic, aesthetic, and
symbolic messages that musicians bring together. In order to highlight the strong bond between
music and socio-cultural identities, the analysis presented in this chapter relies on feminist
scholar Susan Friedman’s assertions in her Mappings (1998), which describes the process of
identities becoming narratives of formation as they go through space and time. Friedman argues
that ‘the narrative texts––whether verbal or visual, oral or written, fictional or referential,
imaginary or historical––constitute primary documents of cultural expressivity’ (1998: 8). I
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approach musical expressions and performances as cultural texts that represent the memories and
narratives of people in Turkey and Kurdistan. This formulation also entails treating the works of
Kurdish and Turkish musicians who contribute to the reconciliation process as narratives of the
formation of a peace-seeking cluster of artistic expressivity. These musicians, who articulate
peace and reconciliation in the forms of peace-seeking narratives, call for a change in the public
understanding of the Kurdish Question.
Listening to the music produced to reach audiences who would like to see a more
peaceful environment might help all concerned to recognize the feelings and experiences they
share. Music can provide a sonic and kinetic space to help enhance bonds between people of
varying backgrounds, identities, memories, and traumas. Music can also enhance cultural
understanding between peoples who have systematically been indoctrinated to misunderstand
each other, and can create a sense of a common cultural tradition and historical bonds shared by
Turks and Kurds in Turkey for centuries.
Music and dance can foster engagement between peoples at concerts or political rallies.
Dance has become an indispensable part of the protest tradition. Among many festivals and
events I have attended, as performer on stage or as audience participant, the most exciting and
anticipated part centers around the dance. At various kinds of political rallies for organizations
associated with Turkish, Kurdish, and Alevi groups I have found it difficult to resist joining in,
feeling the collective teeming and waving bodies of Kurdish and Turkish youth all together. In
dance, engagement between individual bodies and with the collective kinesthetic whole is
expressed in the line-dance (govend in Kurdish, halay in Turkish). At protests, Kurdish and
Turkish activists and onlookers join in govend while shouting certain slogans in unison. They
dance hand-in-hand in the same rhythm with complex foot movements, which are reminders of a
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shared expressive history. More than just a traditional line-dance, the govend becomes a tool to
discipline the bodies and create a unified collective. In political rallies, the govend represents the
appropriation of a traditional dance into the demonstration, supporting the political cause of the
organizations involved, a phenomenon that resembles the common practice of dabkeh (a line
dance among Arabs in the Levant) by Palestinian refugees in Jordan (MacDonald 2010). In both
the Kurdish and Palestinian gatherings, group dancing works alongside other discursive forms of
struggle (speeches, for example) to reinforce and reproduce collectivity among people to
coalesce around common political causes. In these two contexts, collective dance with
responsive singing, like other genres in the world, can be interpreted as creating a new habitus as
a bodily inscribed practice that breaks away from verbal discourse, as a bodily inscribed
communal action, and eventually as a group cohesion-building process. This practice also
improves the bonds among Turkish and Kurdish audiences from different backgrounds who
come to the concerts and events organized by peace-seeking musicians and artists. It provides
space where bodies move together and hold each other, as even another form of reenacting
peace, harmony, and synchronization.
The language in which a song is performed, regardless of its content, often becomes a
more prominent marker than non-textual musical features differentiating it from other songs in
other languages. 19 In the 1990s, performing a song in a language other than Turkish constituted
a political act. Performing in a language banned for decades deployed a counter-discourse to the
official “separatist” discourse promulgated by Turkish nationalist power centers that continued to
__________________
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This has been the case for many other minority languages, such as Catalan songs in Spain; see
Liew 1993.
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consider public use of the Kurdish language and music sung in Kurdish as separatist or terrorist
acts.
The relationship between music and sound and social movements, and social networks in
various communities, has received ample attention in recent ethnomusicological and
anthropological studies (Sugarman 1999, Hirschkind 2006, Bohlman 2004, Turino 2008, and
Nooshin 2009). Many scholars have argued that music has a unique and indispensable role in
articulating the demands of community members. Recent ethnomusicological studies have come
to focus more on the power, politics, and musical expression among immigrants and minorities.
Drawing on ethnomusicological studies of the relationships between music/musicians and
political and social movements, I believe that music has been a crucial part of both the
sociocultural and the political milieux. Other ethnomusicological studies have dealt with the
functions of circulating music among immigrants in the formation and maintenance of a variety
of national, ethnic, and religious identities and social networks (Hyder 2004; Meintjes 2003,
Shannon 2006).
Recent studies on the reconciliation efforts of musicians within the disciplines of cultural
anthropology and ethnomusicology have explored the ways music functions in and contributes to
cultural reconciliation processes and formations of cohorts among immigrants, in both majority
and minority communities (Laurence and Urbain 2011, O’Connell and Castelo-Branco 2010).
Both collections are welcome additions to the process of understanding music and conflict, and
the transformation as well as fomenting of conflict through music-making. The authors
demonstrate the significance of music in both reinforcing disputes and in conflict-resolution
efforts in situations ranging from the Catholic-Protestant dispute in Northern Ireland to the
enactments of conflicts between African American and Euro-American musicians in the U.S.
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Others have examined the role of music in peace-building and the reconciliation efforts in
conflicts in South Africa, the Americas, and the Arab-Israeli conflict (Urbain 2008). On the
subject of the Arab-Israeli conflict and musical reconciliation, Brinner (2009), for example,
argues that the efforts of musicians on both sides of the conflict contributed significantly to the
emergence and sustenance of a common cultural ground. In that regard, reconciliation attempts
through music in the Turkish and Kurdish dispute show commonalities with similar attempts
elsewhere, as in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict that Brinner discusses. In the case of Turkish and
Kurdish communities, music and musicians have reenacted peace both on stage and on their
albums in order to counter the othering of the Kurds in Turkey that occurs in both the political
and cultural spheres (Said 1978, Mackey 1993). Drawing on the studies mentioned above, peace
might be rehearsed and staged via representing others as the perceived ‘us’ (i.e. Turks, Kurds,
and others) in order to create a platform engaging all distinct socio-cultural entities constituting
the multi-ethnic fabric of Turkey.
While the close focus on the role of music in reconciliation has been a welcome addition
to the growing literature on the topic, not everyone is convinced that music has made a positive
impact in reconciliation processes. The main critique of the reconciliation efforts through music
and art comes from the proponents of the culture talk criticism initiated by Mahmood Mamdani
(2002). Opponents of the possibility of reconciliation through actions other than political or
armed struggle claim that confining the actual social and political reconciliation issues to the
cultural domain may lead to the devaluation of enormous political and historical problems. These
skeptics of cultural or musical reconciliation also claim that focusing solely on cultural
production as the only or main vehicle to address complex and difficult political issues could
simply bypass the actual problem, which might also function as another form of manipulation.
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Although those concerns are both legitimate and significant, as my chapter demonstrates, cultural
and musical reconciliation efforts have contributed significantly to the visibility of the music,
language, and culture of the Kurds and various other minorities in Turkey who have been
ignored, silenced, and oppressed for decades.
Given the severe and at times dangerous ethnic polarization in Turkey concerning the
Kurdish issue (Blum and Hassanpour 1995; Bayrak 2002; Aksoy 2006), some intellectuals and
musicians on both sides have attempted to raise the demands and voice calls for peace and
reconciliation. Here it is important to underline the extremely hostile and demonizing discourse
deployed by the Turkish state and mainstream media in representing the Kurdish rebels, which
has also strongly informed the actual military policies implemented against them. During the
1990s, any support of the cause of Kurdish culture (or in fact anything associated with Kurdish
identity) could result in severe consequences including imprisonment. 20
Nevertheless, during the 2000s there have been important improvements in Turkey’s folk
music scene in linguistic and ethnic terms, and in cultural expressions of Kurdish, Alevi,
Armenian, and Laz musicians, especially after the ceasefire between the PKK and the Turkish
Army between 1999 and 2005 (Bates 2008). Productions and collaborations among musicians of
different ethnicities have led to the encouraging emergence of non-Turkish music produced and
disseminated in the late 1990s and the early 2000s. In 2009, the ruling Adalet ve Kalkınma
Partisi (AKP, Justice and Development Party) started the project ‘democratic opening’ to begin a

__________________
20

At the time, even worse forms of official harassment and suppression were applied to other
dissident Kurdish and Turkish musicians who dared to question the status quo on the Kurdish
Question. It is worth mentioning here that Aynur Doğan, a worldwide renowned Kurdish singer
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dialogue around Turkey’s internal problems, starting with a conversation around Kurdish identity
and civil and cultural rights. In 2010, the prime minister of Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, met
with some sixty musicians and composers to discuss the country’s democratic initiative. Here,
Erdoğan gathered Turkey’s top performers and celebrities to talk about the government’s plans
to end the civil war between Turks and Kurds by extending more cultural rights to Kurds.
Turkey’s most popular singers such as Sezen Aksu, Ajda Pekkan, İbrahim Tatlıses, Emel Sayın,
Ferhat Göçer, and Mahsun Kırmızıgül were among the participants. This relatively small
development encouraged some peace-seekers and highlighted the significance of reconciliation
efforts.
Music indeed has a role in creating space for dialogue with and about, and an
understanding of, the other. There are many instances, exemplified by the participation of
prominent figures of Turkish popular music in cultural political events and in festivals held in
predominantly Kurdish cities and organized by different cultural and political Kurdish
organizations. One important and symbolic example from recent years is the work of Sezen
Aksu, an important figure in Turkish popular music who is undoubtedly the most popular singer
and songwriter of Turkish popular music and wrote many hits in the last three decades. In 2009,
in order to show solidarity with the Kurdish Alevis from Dersim at their national regional
festival, she performed a couple of Kurdish songs with Mikail Aslan, a Kurdish Alevi musician
living in Germany. In a musical evening, Aksu sang in Kurdish with Aslan, which was
interpreted as a great symbolic gesture and public display of solidarity with the Kurds and their
__________________
and songwriter, was harassed at multiple events in public, even as recently as July 16, 2011 at the
Istanbul Jazz Festival (www.radikal.com.tr, July 16, 2011).
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language. The popularity of Aksu has helped vernacularize the multicultural fabric and
legitimize the existence of the other, meaning cultures and languages that have been ignored,
denied, and excluded for so long. As organic intellectuals in the Gramscian sense, those
musicians use choice of language as part of their political strategy. Such symbolic cultural and
musical activities have also helped to de-stigmatize and de-politicize Kurdish language, identity,
and culture away from associations with separatism, terrorism and violence held by the general
Turkish public.

Figure 3.1. Sezen Aksu in 2009 Munzur Festival in Dersim (Tunceli)

Other events where Turkish musicians have shown—at significant risk to their careers—
solidarity with Kurds and their Kurdish musician colleagues have been the Kurdish New Year
celebrations of Newroz (New Year) in Diyarbakır and other Kurdish cities, as well as various
political events and rallies featuring Turkish and Kurdish musicians standing side by side.
Emphasizing historical and cultural proximity by performing music from all sections of the
society has alleviated tensions and transgressed imposed boundaries, and so-called
100

‘insurmountable’ cultural differences.
Emphasizing historical and cultural proximity through such multi-genre performances
might question perceived boundaries formed by those who have been led to believe that
differences between ethnicities stem from insurmountable cultural factors. By emphasizing both
proximity and difference between the Kurdish minority and the Turkish majority, the Kurdish
people might be more fairly represented to a larger and more liberal Turkish audience. While the
nationalists on both sides have articulated differences, peace-seeking musicians such as Sezen
Aksu emphasize the commonalities while not denying differences. Not only do these cultural
leaders work more diplomatically than the fear mongers, but they also envision a better and more
peaceful possible future, at least through their songs. Thus, they may enact peace on stage and in
their recordings. Ultimately, such attempts of enacting peace in their most idealized or poetic
forms help initiate a lived peace first articulated in formal and vernacular discourses.
It is important to recognize the vital contribution Turkish musicians have made to such
reconciliation efforts. The members of my former group Kardeş Türküler contributed to the
Derguş (Cradle) album of Koma Amed, one of the most popular Kurdish bands of the 1990s. My
former group was also involved in the musical direction and arrangements of the famous Kurdish
singer Şivan Perwer’s Roj u Hiv (Sun and Moon) album, demonstrating its solidarity with one of
the best-known Kurdish singers who has been forced to live in exile for the past three decades.
Various Turkish studio musicians have not hesitated to contribute to the Kurdish koms (music
groups) and their albums produced in Turkey. The newly established koms of the 1990s could
not have produced their recordings without the help of such Turkish musicians, producers, and
arrangers (Aksoy 2006, Sarıtaş 2010). This cooperation (which also represents to some extent a
form of reconciliation) began in the Turkish music industry through collaboration on various
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aspects of recording and studio production processes, sales, organization, performance, and
personal training. Thus, a collaborative network of Kurdish and Turkish musicians has played a
catalyzing role in fostering links and better understanding between the communities in times of
war and devastation. Kardeş Türküler, along with many other Turkish and Kurdish musicians, 21
has confirmed the possibility of music and musicians contributing positively to the healing
process that anticipates political reconciliation in attempting to resolve the ‘Kurdish Question’ in
Turkey.

3.4. Kurdish Music and Musicians in Germany
Political tensions between the Turkish state and its Kurdish citizens have resulted in a
significant exodus of Kurdish musicians to Europe. As a result, modern developments in
nationalistic Kurdish music take place in countries like Germany and through the new media. It
is significant that the key developments in Kurdish music have occurred more in Europe than in
Kurdistan in the last decade. The history of Kurdish music closely parallels the history of
Kurdish politics. Political tensions have not only spurred the development of Kurdish music but
have also allowed for its widespread dissemination. The 1990s and early 2000s have seen the
distribution of a large number of Kurdish albums produced by Kurdish musicians living in exile.
Production companies like Mir and Hunerkom – established by Kurds living in Europe –are
largely responsible for the dissemination of Kurdish music throughout the world.

__________________
21

Such as Turkish pop singers Sezen Aksu and Sertab Erener; and Kurdish musicians like
Mikail Aslan, Mehmet Atlı, Aynur Doğan, and Metin Kahraman among many others.
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Another recent development in Kurdish folk music has been the shift towards placing an
increasing importance on the individual artist. Only recently have Kurdish musicians developed
celebrity status, as seen by the recent trend of Kurdish youth establishing fan clubs for their stars.
Two important examples are Şivan Perwer and Diyar, both of whom have been very successful
in appealing to the Kurdish youth in the metropolitan areas of Turkey. I had a chance to work
with Şivan Perwer in 2000 on his Roj u Hiv album when I was a member of Kardeş Türküler.
Later, in 2004, I composed, arranged, and performed pieces for both Shêxo and Ali Baran,
Germany-based Kurdish Alevi musicians. I have maintained contact with these musicians since
our collaborations.

3.4.1. An Oral History with Ali Baran in Düsseldorf, Summer 2010
In order to provide a representative sample of extended oral histories with Kurdish Alevi
musicians who left their first homeland for Germany and who produced albums extensively
within the realm of “Kurdish” music, I include here certain parts of my interview with Ali Baran,
a well-known Kurdish Alevi musician. I worked with Baran in 2005 as an arranger and studio
performer for his album Teberik. I believe that Ali Baran’s albums are significant historical texts.
As one of the initiators of the new Kurdish Alevi transnational field and an active cultural
entrepreneur, his music documents the political and social state of Kurdish Alevis, who also
constitute his main audience. Baran has performed for nearly every religio-political organization
active in Germany and Turkey. This broad connection has given him a unique perspective about
members of religio-political parties, as they often request songs from him. As an immigrant
musician living in Germany, he has witnessed all of the phases that Kurdish Alevis in two
homelands have undergone. I lay out Ali Baran’s life and his experiences in order to illustrate
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how multiple identities held by Kurdish Alevis have been shaped by historical events.
Born in 1956 in Hozat (a predominantly Kurdish Alevi town in Turkish Kurdistan),
Baran sings Kurdish songs at public events and began playing bağlama (or saz) on stage when he
was 12 years old. Like many Kurdish Alevis of that era, he grew interested in leftist youth
movements in those years, and was eventually suspended by the school authorities due to his
political activities. In 1973, he decided to visit his father in Germany, returning to Turkey in
1975 after his father died in a car accident. He began to give concerts in other Turkish cities,
including Iskenderun, Istanbul, and several predominantly Kurdish cities. He was arrested a few
times simply for singing in Kurdish. In 1977, in Diyarbakir he was arrested after a concert in
which he sang songs in Kurdish and was imprisoned for nearly a year.
In 1979, Baran had to leave the country for Germany, where he attended the University
of Karlsruhe, studying engineering, a similar career path for almost all Kurdish Alevi musicians
in their new homelands. In 1982, after the military coup in Turkey, he was denied his Turkish
citizenship along with prominent union leaders and musicians such as Melike Demirağ and Şanar
Yurdatapan, whose citizenship was abrogated by the junta regime. He was forced to seek asylum
in Germany.
Baran’s first album, Lo Wara (“Come On”), was released in Cologne in 1982 by the
leftist organization Devrimci Işçi Dernekleri Federasyonu (DIDF), the Federation of
Revolutionary Workers Union. Some Kurdish Alevis brought bootlegged copies of this album to
their relatives residing in the first homeland.

The most striking characteristic of this album was

Baran’s use of traditional Kurdish vocal style in several songs and its most popular songs were
“Lê Dayîkê,” “Xezal,” and “Tev Lê.” Ali Baran told me he had been a member of Halkın
Kurtuluşu (Freedom of People), a leftist organization popular among Kurdish Alevis in the1970s
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and 80s. Baran invoked the political affiliations of artists of the era by mentioning those of one
of his idols, Yılmaz Güney, an important figure that influenced all musicians and artists in exile.
Güney, the most famous of all Kurdish exiles and a noted actor and director who left Turkey in
1982, was close to anti-Soviet leftist movements in the late 1970s and early 1980s. 22 Baran
participated in solidarity nights after which people requested cassettes of his music. At the time,
he had none and thus decided to record. The DIDF Workers Federation sponsored Baran’s
recording project with Nedim Hazar, who featured piano and accordion frequently in his
arrangements.
Baran was a university student at the time he released Lo Wara. Subsequently, he felt that
the leadership of DIDF disliked his recording songs in Kurdish. "They were not open to my
singing in Kurdish, and one night after an event a member of the party approached me and said,
‘Don’t you know any Turkish songs? Sing one so that we could enjoy too.’”

I felt they were not accepting me anymore, which led me to get closer to other
organizations. Then I met Hasan Kuş, a member of KOMKAR (Immigrant Organization
of the Kurdistan Socialist Party) at the time, who invited me to perform at their solidarity
night. KOMKAR was Ulusalcı (nationalist, or Kurdish nationalist). Then I asked my
people from Halkın Kurtuluşu for their permission to perform for KOMKAR. Ranking
members within the organization would not let me perform after saying to me, “What
kind of business can you have with those social fascists?”

__________________
22

The Cannes-awarded Kurdish film director later died in Paris in 1984.
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This exchange caused Baran to decide to leave the Halkin Kurtuluşu during the period right after
Yilmaz Güney passed away. Becoming an independent artist meant that Baran could produce his
second album himself and organize his own events. Baran’s second album, Deriye Hepisxane
(“Door of the Jail”), was produced independently and released in 1984. The lyrical content of
this album was mostly about political advocacy, and specifically the jail strikes and protests
against the junta regime in Turkey. Due to distribution problems and ongoing political turmoil,
this album failed to reach much of his audience in either of the two homelands.

But I couldn’t be as successful as I was with their [DIDF’s] institutional help. My second
album cost me about 5000 DM [Deutsche Mark] at the time, in a studio in Cologne with
Orhan Timur, in 1983. The album was simple with few instruments. Some criticized me
for making an arabesk album, which was almost like a sin among my fellow leftists.
Then I did the Êy Dêrsimê (“Hey Dersim”) album. I went to the PKK (Kurdistan
Workers’ Party) people to get their distribution companies to release the album. I then
went to Hunerkom in 1984, which was the production section responsible for
dissemination of albums that were supported by the PKK. I talked to people at Hunerkom
to get some money to pay the bills as an advance before the release of the album.
Hunerkom managers told me, “we are at war and we don’t have money.” Then I went
back to KOMKAR, which then agreed to pay me an advance and they released my
album. They were nice as they cared so much about art and education of Kurds. They
showed their respect for my music. They represent the intellectual section of the Kurdish
political activists. I picked happy and fast songs for the album repertoire. Then we
learned that it became a success and I was invited to countless concerts and solidarity
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nights. I became more popular among Kurds.

Ali Baran’s third album, and his most popular, Êy Dêrsimê was released in 1987, and
prominent Turkish and Kurdish musicians living in Turkey have covered a few songs from this
album since. By releasing Êy Dêrsimê, Baran was the first in the recording industry in Germany
or Turkey to sing in Kurmancî, Zazakî, and Turkish. The most popular songs were “Êy
Dêrsimê,” “Yekê Bigrim,” “Betlis,” “Ax Baba,” and “Bukê.” Orhan Temur wrote the
arrangements that, importantly, featured individual styles on the various songs. The Zazakî song
titled “Lori Lora Mına” became a hit and has been performed by various musicians, including the
late Armenian musician, Arame Tigran. Ali Baran told me that he was inspired by the Alevi
religious songs when he composed the beyit titled “Ax Baba.”
Ali Baran, in this album preceding the Sivas massacre and the Alevi revival, expressed
the idea that Kurdish ethnic and national identity, with the ideal of Kurdish independence, was
the most significant mode of belonging for all Kurds, asking Kurds to join the ranks of the
Kurdish movement in one way or another. The album and especially the title song are significant
examples of Kurdish nationalist and to some extent militant calls made by Kurdish musicians. In
“Êy Dêrsimê,” Baran calls for all Kurds to unite through deferring all internal disputes, political
differences, and historical problems.

107

Êy Dêrsimê 23

Êy Dêrsimê, êy Dêrsimê

Hey Dêrsim, Hey Dêrsim

Çi halê me heya niha

How do you do?

Dujminê me, bavkujê me

Our enemies and those who killed our ancestors

Runiştîye mala me da

Are occupying out houses.

Em kar dikin, xebat dikin

We labor tirelessly

Tiştek tune mala me da

Yet we are left hungry

Êy Dêrsimê, êy Dêrsimê!

Hey Dêrsim, Hey Dêrsim

…

…

Êy Dêrsimê, êy Dêrsimê

Hey Dêrsim, Hey Dêrsim

Çi rewş e ew heya niha

How are you doing nowadays?

Zêr zane û zor zane

We know gold and the hardship

Devê tifinga mor zane

And the front side of the rifle.

Her bêje gel, em şer dikin

Bless our people, we are going to struggle

Bo Kurdistan me can fîda

For Kurdistan, our lives worth sacrificing.

Êy Dêrsimê ,êy Dêrsimê

Hey Dêrsim, Hey Dêrsim

In the lyrics of “Êy Dêrsimê,” Baran has a clear agenda of reporting the issues that Kurds,
mainly those Alevi Kurds of the Dersim region, have faced. He calls Kurds to use all tools
__________________
23

The YouTube link for “Êy Dêrsimê:” http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BWLFhM-f3Ms
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available against their enemies, whom he does not name. In the end, he calls for Kurds to join the
fight and salutes those Kurds who could sacrifice their lives for Kurdistan, a clear nationalistic
reference making it illegal for the song and album to be circulated in Turkey until the 2000s.
Although Baran had not continually emphasized Kurdish identity, and was less militant than
some of his peers, the lyrics of “Êy Dêrsimê” are unblemished examples of a pan-Kurdish
political and musical stance.
Baran’s singing style on “Êy Dêrsimê” exhibits the vocal characteristics of Kurdish folk
and traditional music, which is known for the extensive use of higher register crescendo male
vocals (Christensen and Blum 2001). In this song, Baran’s vocal starts with a high-pitched
crescendo resembling the timbre of the Kurdish dengbêj. When he starts singing from the higher
register, he uses Kurdish male vocal ornamentation as well as other folk music vocal
embellishment techniques such as vibrato. The vocal section starts from the seventh degree and
reaches the higher octave in calling to ask how the people of Dersim are doing. The melodic
structure exhibits parallel features with many folk songs from Turkey and Kurdistan where many
melodies follow a common formulaic melodic progression resembling a ladder of tones. It
follows a pattern of climbing down the steps of a ladder from a high pitch to the karar sesi, the
tonic or the strongest pitch in the pitch hierarchy.
The scale used in “Êy Dêrsimê” is the most common one used in the Kurdish Alevi tunes
that share considerable melodic and rhythmic features with Turkish Alevi and Kurdish music.
Although the song uses the scale of Hüseynî makamı, it does not necessarily follow the rules of
the Turkish makamlar (melodic modes), like many other folk and arabesk tunes (see Stokes
1992).

109

Figure 3.2. Hüseynî makamı composed of Hüseynî pentachord and Uşşak tetrachord.

On “Êy Dêrsimê,” written and composed by Ali Baran, the rhythmic structure consists of a cycle
of five beats split into groups of two and three beats marked as strong (Düm) or weak (Tek)
beats. This rhythmic mode, usül in Turkish, is also known as Türk aksağı.

1

2

+

3

4

5

Düm Tek

+

Düm Tek Tek

The percussion instruments most likely consisted of a darbuka (goblet-shaped drum) and
a bendir (frame drum) marking the beats. Similar to many other folk music arrangements made
in Turkey and Germany in the 1980s and 1990s, the overall structure of the arrangement exhibits
a heterophonic character with a couple of significant exceptions in which the bağlama, the cura
(the smallest bağlama), strings, and bass play parallel thirds and fifths in specific melodic
sections, mainly in the descending sections of the interlude. The arrangement of “Êy Dêrsimê”
shares common features with those of albums by Şivan Perwer and Arif Sağ (the most famous
Turkish Alevi musician alive) in terms of functional harmonic use of thirds and fifths and
especially utilization of the bass. The use of a string section (with drones and glissandos in
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specific melodic phrases) resembles Şivan Perwer’s famous tune “Yare,” 24 while the calls and
responses between bağlama and vocals, the harmonic use of the cura, and the bağlama timbre
resemble Arif Sağ’s “Sözde Ben Bir Insan Olmaya Geldim,” 25 which utilizes thirds, fourths, and
the fifths in the melodic or contra-melodic parts. The bağlama and cura used on the recording of
“Êy Dêrsimê” were tuned in the bağlama düzeni (bağlama tuning system).

26

Ali Baran has

always used the bağlama düzeni, which has been associated with Alevi musical, rhythmic, and
melodic milieu. Through “Êy Dêrsimê,” Ali Baran tapped into rhythmic, melodic, and
instrumental qualities of continually submerging traditions of Kurdish, Alevi, and Turkish folk
music while maintaining his Kurdish nationalistic view through the lyrics.
In 1989, emotionally stressed due to the massacre of Kurds in Iraq instigated by Saddam
Hussein, Baran released his fourth and most pan-Kurdish album, Helepçe u Zindan (“Halabja
and the Dungeon”). The song selection of this album resembles that of Êy Dêrsimê.

The Halabja massacre left a big emotional scar for Kurds including myself. I released an
album called Helepçe u Zindan. Sufferings of my fellow Kurds under Saddam moved me
so much. I included my Zazakî songs as well.

Baran released his fifth album, Çene Çene, in 1991. Along with bağlama, the arrangements
featured such instruments as violin and kanun (plucked zither). The title song, “Çene Çene,” is in
Zazakî and makam Kurd. Baran worked with Hasret Gültekin (who was killed in the Sivas
__________________
24
25

The YouTube link can be reached at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lyyDBqGz-9k
The YouTube link can be reached at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=K__qZo0ykT8
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massacre along with 33 other musicians and artists in 1993) and Oğuz Abadan on this album. His
strong Kurdish voice can be heard over rich instrumental arrangements, especially in the popular
song titled “Dılem Loy Loy.” Baran’s compositions for the lyrics of nationalistic Kurdish songs
such as “Azadixwazım” (“I Want Independence”) written by Cigerxwin, and “Tu Kurmancî
Nizanî” (“Can’t You Speak Kurdish?”) by Cizrewi are among the highlights of the album.
In 1993, after fifteen years in exile, Baran returned to Turkey with a German passport,
along with other prominent labor leaders who had lost their citizenship. There he worked with
Arif Sağ for his sixth album, Deste Ma, released that year. This album is striking in its dominant
bağlama sound. The first song on the album, “Dem ê Dem ê,” resembles the Kurdish Alevi deyiş
(para-liturgical tunes). The song became popular when my former band, Kardeş Türküler,
covered it in 1997. In protest of the Sivas massacre, Baran released no other recordings until
2000, when his seventh album, Evina Me, came out.

I met Hasret Gültekin, one of the musicians who died in the burning of the hotel in Sivas,
at a KOMKAR night. We had a great muhabbet (intimate gathering at homes featuring
playing the bağlama and singing together) until 4am. I had many friends killed in that
massacre [meaning Sivas]. That is why I decided not to visit Turkey for three years; I
didn’t want to visit the country that allowed my fellow Alevis to be burned alive. Sivas
was another turning point in my life and in many other Alevi lives as well.

__________________
26

See Chapter 4 for more on the bağlama tuning systems.
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Baran visited Turkey and Turkish Kurdistan more frequently after Evina Me and eventually
participated in Kurdish Alevi cultural events. On the album, which features minimalistic
arrangements, he worked with arranger and drummer Ömer Avcı. 27 Baran’s efforts to compile
the recordings of Kurdish folk musicians on Evîna Me marked a significant contribution to the
preservation of the tradition. The popular song “Em Dixwazin” expresses the yearning for a new
world, and “Sino” is significant in its reliance on the Kurdish dengbêj (bard) tradition, and also
its large vocal range that displays the expressive quality of his voice.
A key development in the history of Kurdish Alevis was the emergence of the Kurdish
nationalist movement, embodied in the PKK of the 1980s. The PKK has played a significant role
in creating the discursive tools for Kurdish youth to unify against their common enemy, the
Turkish state (Güneş 2011). At least in earlier times, the PKK managed to strike a tone of secular
discourse, which allowed Kurdish youth from different religious backgrounds to transcend
religion in favor of a nationalistic ideology that could unite all Kurds. This transcendence has not
spread to some elderly Kurds, who have kept their religious differences, which could jeopardize
a Kurdish national unity project. Even though some elderly Kurds argue that they are
“enlightened,” they still carry on old feuds stemming from sectarian differences and problems
between Kurdish groups (see Chapter 4). Thus, a wide gap between factions appears in terms of
generational approaches to the Kurdish nationalist movement.

The next event that shocked me was the arrest of Öcalan in 1999, the leader of the PKK,
and the terrible treatment he received by the Turkish authorities. I felt humiliated by
__________________
27

I interviewed with Ömer Avcı for this study as well (see Chapter 6).
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those actions they made on Öcalan. I felt my Kurdish identity humiliated by Öcalan’s
humiliation by the Turkish law enforcement. After Öcalan came to the court and
apologized to the Turkish families who had lost family members as soldiers that was
another blow to us, as I came to believe that we were right in terms of our fight against
the Turkish army. I lost any hope that I had for the Kurdish movement. I was criticizing
the Kurdish organizations’ officials who did not even try to speak in Kurdish as the next
generation began losing the language and the national identity. They said let’s create
Kurdistan and then we will deal with the language. When you lose your language you
lose your past and your difference.

Baran’s 2005 album, Teberik (on which I worked with him as an arranger and performer in the
studio) features his original compositions. The songs concern historical events and feature
traditional themes. Teberik also features such successful musicians as Hakan Akay and Mikail
Aslan in Germany, myself and Soner Akalın in Turkey. “Medîna Min” and “Teberik” became
the most popular songs on the album. Baran's latest album, Çel Avaz, was released in 2010, with
arrangements by Hakan Akay and Ali Baran himself.
Baran has engaged with both Kurdish and Alevi repertoires since his early childhood
years. Baran’s quest to represent traditional forms has resulted in a diverse set of compositional
approaches. Along with original lyrics, he has composed music for poems written by famous
Kurdish poets such as Cigerxwin, Feqiye Teyra, and Mela Ciziri. Prominent Turkish and Kurdish
musicians have covered many of his compositions. Our conversation ended with talk of the
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passing of Aşık Mahsuni, probably the most prolific Alevi aşık or ozan (bard) 28 of modern
times. Baran told me that although he used to criticize Aşık Mahsuni, now that he has passed
away no other Turkish and Alevi folk music composer can fill the void. Baran described elderly
musicians like himself as “like apples fallen to the ground, waiting to go bad.” When I asked him
how he would describe the sources of his music, he said:

I had many melodies in my head from my early childhood. Like “Medina Min,” which I
had on my last album, the melody I remember my grandmother used to sing; I added
some parts and modernized it with a traditional touch. “Demme Demme” is another
melody I remember from a Kurdish Alevi cem ceremony I attended when I was five
years old. It was sung and performed by Seyit Murtaza, who was a rehber (guide) and
also mirtik (entertainer), in a big house in our village. I also recorded my mother’s
version of the dance of that semah a couple of decades ago. Our holy book is this threestringed lute [bağlama], which goes back all the way to Zarathustra. Its melody allows
human spirits to rest. The dance makes the body connect with the soul.

When we talked about the Turkish Republic's policies to prevent Kurdish Alevis getting involved
with the Kurdish nationalist movement, Baran remarked,

__________________
28

Both terms refer to itinerant musicians playing the saz or bağlama and telling stories. Since
Ozan is also my first name, I should note that these also denote Alevi religious/ethnic belonging.
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The Turkish Republic used Alevis. Especially to prevent Kurdish Alevis from joining the
Kurdish nationalist movement, Turkey did everything it could to widen the divide among
Kurds by highlighting the religious/sectarian differences between Alevi and Sunni Kurds.
Some Alevi dedes were told to convince their Kurdish Alevi congregants not to get
involved with Kurdish separatists, who according to some dedes were predominantly
Sunni and would harm Alevis after they succeeded in accomplishing their goals.

On his 2006 album, Baran recorded a song called “Aşkın Divanesi” in Turkish, which has
become his most popular song on YouTube, with more than 160,000 views as of September
2013. It is a simple love song in which the protagonist searches at length for his beloved. A
commenter on YouTube wrote that he “loved the song, even though it was in Turkish, Baran
managed to sing it like it is Kurdish.” The premise of this observation stems from the differing
modes of singing in the two languages. Baran embraces a Kurdish vocal and articulation style in
his expression of the song, as opposed to the Turkish, which listeners would expect from a
Turkish love song (see Berger 2008). I informed Baran of the listener’s comment at our
interview and he agreed that people love him for different reasons, and that he could not hide his
Kurdish stance even when he sings in Turkish.

One of my latest popular songs, “Aşkın Divanesi,” is in Turkish. It is popular among
young Kurds. After one of my concerts a couple of my fans came and congratulated me.
One of them told me that I was singing it like it is Kurdish anyway. People love your
music for different reasons, some appreciate your laments, some appreciate your fast and
entertaining songs, and some like your voice.
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…
Some of our fellow Kurds wanted to be assimilated into Turkish. We tried to escape from
ourselves. We tried so hard to become like Turks. I have an audience from Kurdish,
Alevi, and Turkish backgrounds. One interesting observation I had over the years has
been that while the Kurdish audience requests me to perform fast Kurdish songs, Kurdish
Alevis specifically want me to sing laments and sad songs as if they had not cried enough
in their lives. Sunni Muslim Kurds want happy songs from me to dance.

Ali Baran’s life story and music have influenced Kurdish Alevi musicians who have claimed
both Kurdish and Alevi identities. His primary audience has been of Kurdish Alevis, though he
had many followers among other Kurds and Alevis in Germany and Turkey. Baran emphasized
to me that a key issue preventing some Kurds from embracing him was his Alevi origins,
whereas some Alevis renounced him because he sings mostly in Kurdish. Some Kurds from
predominantly Sunni Muslim regions avoid listening to Baran’s music, especially those from the
regions of Hakkari, Van, and Mardin. I have observed in recent years that young people have
embraced the old tunes associated with both Kurdish and Alevi identities in Baran’s music.

3.5. Conclusion: Return to the Reconciliation Process
The 31st of October 2011 marked the 50th anniversary of this official mass migration
from Turkey to Germany. In order to mark the anniversary local and federal authorities, along
with Turkish organizations in Germany, organized events celebrating the occasion with concerts,
panels, and public programs (Çelik 2011). Nowadays, more than four million people whose first
homeland has been Turkey have settled in their second or third homeland, Germany. Many times
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in my research, I heard the same phrase that was supposedly used by the German officials: "We
asked for workers, but they sent human beings." In a different way this sentence crystallizes the
resentment regarding the early years of German authorities' treatment of migrant workers, who
suffered during their adaptation period into German life (Greve 2003).
Among those who attended the 50th anniversary were the members of Kardeş Türküler.
Kardeş Türküler and the Augsburg Philharmonic Orchestra gave a concert in Augsburg,
“Germany’s city of peace.” First, the Augsburg Philharmonic Orchestra took the stage
performing the overture from Mozart's "Abduction from the Seraglio," and four sections from
Rimsky-Korsakov's “Scheherazade.” The organizers and the music director of the orchestra had
selected the most famous examples of Western composers’ imagination of the Orient in an
attempt to perform pieces that could be played together. It is significant to point to the cultural
imagination of some Germans regarding the east and its music as part of the event, which was
titled Songs of Migration (Çelik 2011). Since the concert was organized to improve the ties
between the places of origin of immigrants and their new locations as immigrants, the organizers
must have tried to find the most eastern-sounding pieces that could be performed by both the
orchestra and Kardeş Türküler. Although the organizers wanted to demonstrate the cultural and
historical ties between Germany and the east, the classical music section was limited to the
examples depicting an exotic orient from the past.
Then, Kardeş Türküler took the stage, performing Turkish, Arabic, Laz, Romany, and
Kurdish songs. Finally, Kardeş Türküler and the Augsburg Philharmonic Orchestra together
performed Borodin's “In the Steppes of Central Asia,” and then “Dargın Mahkum” (a Turkish
tune composed by late Alevi Aşık Mahsuni), “Kerwane” (Kurdish), “Bingol” (Armenian), and
“Güldaniyem” (Romani) from the Kardeş Türküler repertoire (Çelik 2011).
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The experience of Kardeş Türküler going to German and exploring the music scene in
Augsburg was a common one that I encountered in my fieldwork. Kardeş Türküler was formed
as a collective by members of the multi ethnic fabric of Turkey. For this reason, the Kardeş
Türküler project (KTP) was invited to every single event organized by Germans as well as other
Kurdish and Alevi organizations as a prototype of collective living. KTP began performing in
1993 with folk tunes from Turkish, Kurdish, Armenian, Laz, Georgian, Circassian, Roma,
Macedonian, and Alevi musical repertoires. All CDs of the KTP deliberately included songs
representing these ethnic and religious groups in order to highlight the diversity in Turkey, but
also to preserve and to educate their listeners about historical commonalities these traditions
have maintained.
The members of the group itself are musicians from various ethnic and religious groups,
including Turks, Kurds, Laz, Sunnis, and Alevis. The group has arranged its repertoire in
accordance with the polycultural philosophy of the ensemble, based on research conducted by
members who were active in the Boğaziçi Üniverstesi Folklor Klübü (BUFK, Boğaziçi
University Folklore Club), performing at a variety of artistic events, festivals and celebrations
(Akkaya 2008). In 1997, Kalan Music released Kardeş Türküler, an album with various
examples from the musical traditions of the Anatolian/Mesopotamian landscape, featuring
Kurdish, Turkish, Armenian, Laz and Georgian folk songs. The presence of songs sung in
multiple languages on this album forms a groundbreaking contribution to the movement for
peaceful coexistence. Drawing on research via conducting regular field trips through villages and
obtaining personal recordings of local musicians with the intent of creative experimentation, the
group, for instance, merged a Kurdish-Alevi tune with a Turkish-Alevi tune to highlight their
shared history and common features.
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Reconciliations following a long history of complex political strife are not easy to
accomplish. I have argued here that peace-making efforts should include cultural/musical
approaches, and that using music to address political concerns does not devalue or oversimplify
the complexity of the underlying conflict. Compared to the early years of denial of Kurdish
people and their music, this chapter argues that Kurdish music and culture have become more
visible as a direct result of the efforts of Kurdish and Turkish musicians in two homelands. Many
musicians and millions of fans have been deeply shaken by the tragic end of the famous singer
Ahmet Kaya and have questioned the actions against him as an activist musician. Turks and
Kurds in Germany and Turkey have heard and appreciated for the first time in their lives the
public articulation of the linguistic and musical plurality of musicians such as Sezen Aksu and
bands such as Kardeş Türküler. Ultimately, one might argue, as cultural entrepreneurs, musicians
carry the burden of conflicts and wars, and they should especially enjoy the rewards of peace and
reconciliation. On the other hand, no one should expect that musicians can solve the decades-old
problems alone.
Those working for reconciliation have affirmed, despite the ongoing war, the need for
such alternative ways in beginning and nurturing a conversation among the country’s various
ethnic groups. Such a space fostering musical exchange among all ethnic groups from Turkey
has helped negate the differences and lessen misunderstandings and prejudices. Reconciliation
continues to be a very difficult process in Turkey, as evidenced by the ongoing stalemate in the
Kurdish Question. Within this context, music has helped initiate a healing process and, over
extremist voices that benefit from the status quo, has created a very small but significant space
where one side might hear what the other has to say. Music was probably one of the few domains
that was open to dialogue and reconciliation, at first for Kurdish and Turkish musicians, and later
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for their audiences. The fragile and sonic field that opened for efforts at peace and reconciliation
could not lead to a solution of the problem by itself, given the enormity of the challenges and
historical political problems.
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Chapter 4: “Alevi music” and Identity among Kurdish Alevis in Turkey, Germany, and
Transnational Space
4.1. Introduction
My primary focus in this study is how musicians from the Kurdish Alevi immigrant
community have engaged with defining and refining the shifting modes of belonging that
members of the community have articulated over the last three decades. Musicians from the
Kurdish Alevi community in Turkey and Germany have accomplished that process mainly
through releasing albums with songs related to identity politics, teaching at cultural centers,
performing at public events, and articulating their stances in political activities they have
attended along with other Kurdish Alevis. This chapter investigates the transformation of the
relationships between Alevi religious formations and the music produced for and consumed by
community members in both homelands and through the transnational space. In particular, I
examine the musical manifestations since the Alevi revival in the 2000s, as the number of public
performances has visibly increased. In this chapter, I also reflect on “Alevi music” in relation to
the Alevism of both Turkish and Kurdish Alevis, to the extent that it becomes "political" as
opposed to "religious," or more significantly "cultural" (see below and Chapter 6 for more).
In order to understand the multiple social and political formations within the Kurdish
Alevi community, I analyze the production, presentation, and reception of music, and
specifically its role in religious rituals. Group listening, collective singing, and line dancing,
among other activities, are components of Alevi rituals as well as collective representations of
Alevi identity, which has been mediated and negotiated through musical representation. This
ethnographic approach to the rituals of the Kurdish Alevis provides some insight on the extent to
which “Alevi music” has mobilized or instilled a sense of community.
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In analyzing Alevi music and identity, I utilize findings of prominent Alevi
ethnomusicologists Seyit Yöre (2011), Bedriye Poyraz (2007), and especially Ayhan Erol, whose
research among Alevi communities in Izmir (2009, 2010, and 2011) and Toronto (2009, 2012)
provided significant information to build on for this study. In his research on the Alevi
community in Toronto and its music, Erol reaches similar conclusions to those I have reached in
my study of Kurdish Alevis in Cologne. Though he does not primarily deal with Kurdish identity
in his work, Erol’s research subjects comprised mostly Kurdish Alevis from the city of Maraş,
like some of my informants.
With the goal of understanding the social memory of Kurdish Alevis, I explore Alevi
musicians’ compositions, stances, and public messages in the context of protests against the
difficult events Alevis have faced in the last four decades. Those recent events, combined with
previous atrocities committed by the Sunni Ottoman Empire and then the Republic of Turkey,
resulted in a victimhood discourse around which Alevi identity has coalesced. Scholars like
Shankland (2003) and Kosnick (2004, 2007), among others, have documented this victimhood
discourse. Even a quick review of the web pages of Alevi organizations in Germany and Turkey
confirms the utilization of Alevi victimhood and martyrdom as a discursive tool through images
such as those of Alevi musicians killed in the Sivas massacre (see below).
In this chapter, I also argue that musicians along with other cultural entrepreneurs have
strategically essentialized the label and identity of Kızılbaş (“red-head”), a derogatory term even
today, by appropriating it from the literature historically used to describe Alevis and reinserting
it into the daily lives of Kurdish Alevis who have begun to identify themselves more often as
Kızılbaş than just Alevi. In the 2000s, Kurdish Alevis in two homelands have begun to embrace
the new strategic essentialism imbued in e ‘Kızılbaş’ to claim their new transnational field and
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the space it has opened. This reappropriation, aimed at politically distinguishing themselves from
other Alevi groups, has flourished especially after influential institutions, such as Kalan Müzik,
released albums with titles nodding toward the Kızılbaş, several musicians like Metin and Kemal
Kahraman released songs with titles such as "Ez Kızılbaş im" (I am Kızılbaş), and journals were
published with the Kızılbaş title.

4.2. Alevi Identity, “Alevi Music,” and the Bağlama
While Alevi beliefs are closer to Shi’a Islam than they are to Sunni Islam, Alevis do not
subscribe to the mainstream doctrines of either. Their worship takes place in assembly houses
rather than mosques. Alevism does not have an authoritative tradition of religious scholarship; its
main religious practice lies in shared local traditions and esoteric interpretations of Muslim as
well as non-Muslim local beliefs and practices. Music, sacred or not, plays a vital role in Alevi
identity formation and has deep kinesthetic and symbolic meaning for Alevis. One important
question that remains to be addressed in this section is, whether there is an authentic and unique
Alevi music. The answer is probably limited to some religious ceremonial music. As Ayhan Erol
argues, there has never before been a holistic definition of Alevi music (Erol 2009). In this
section, I attempt to contribute to that discussion.
Major aspects of “Alevi music” share many features with other types of folk music of
Anatolia. I was told many times by my informants that “Alevi music” is not solely religious. It
has embraced the daily issues Alevis have dealt with as well as their emotions, desires, and
aspirations. As Turan Koluaçık, an Alevi dede (religious leader and guide) from the Wuppertal
Alevi Cultural Center, told me, what he calls Alevi music "improves his morale, deepens his
philosophical understanding, and unifies all Alevis around one common purpose." It still
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survives given all of the interruptions in the history of Alevism. Alevi music and musicians have
made a large contribution to what is now called Turkish folk music, also known as the türkü
repertoire (see Chapter 2).
Bedriye Poyraz, in her Direnişle Piyasa Arasında: Alevilik ve Alevi Müziği (Between
Resistance and Market: Alevism and Alevi Music), argues that the survival of music in Alevi
culture is the main reason Alevism has survived for generations (2007: 119). Erol argues that
defining Alevi music was never an issue until the first quarter of the 20th century, when the
Turkish state's cultural policy makers through the Turkish Radio TV Corporation (TRT) decided
to lump together all of the local music that Alevis had been performing as part of “Turkish folk
music,” devoid of its religious or other values and implications for Alevis (Erol 2009:113). He
also observes that among its practitioners and audience, part of “Turkish folk music,” devoid of
its religious or 119). Erol argues that defining Alevi music was never an issue until the first
quarter of the 20th century in the history of Türk Halk Müziği (THM) (Turkish folk music) after
the establishment of the Turkish Republic. For this dissertation, then, I distinguish between the
liturgical repertoire of Alevi music and the music Alevi people enjoy in their Alevi-only secular
gatherings. Instead of putting Alevi music in quotes, I will specify the implications of the
categorizations of the repertoires Alevis have consumed in both secular and sacred settings.
Scholars of Alevism and Alevi music have argued that the three pillars of Alevi music
and identity have been the bağlama, the cem ceremony, and the dede and other guides, with
names including murşid, pir, or rehber (Markoff 1986, Clarke 1999, Yaman 2006, Erdemir
2004, Erol 2009, Poyraz 2007). In many respects the most powerful tool for the endurance of
Alevi religious or cultural teachings has been the music that was transmitted orally over
generations. The music has played a central role in maintaining Alevi religious continuity by
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providing a sonic channel for other aspects of culture, history, and practice as well as religious
knowledge and rituals. The bağlama is involved with the practices in two major Alevi-only
occasions. The first is the religious gathering called cem, an exclusive Alevi gathering. The other
is the muhabbet, an informal gathering at an Alevi house. Both cem and muhabbet feature
liturgical and what I call para-liturgical tunes that are performed to commemorate significant
religious figures, events, and dates.
The central ritual of Alevi religious life is ayn-i cem or cem, which features music and
dance called semah to the accompaniment of bağlama. Within the cem ceremonies there could
be tunes for semah (or semê in Kurmancî-Kurdish), which in many cases implies the distinct
musical piece that would accompany specific dances that participants do in a circle. The music
preceding, then initiating and accompanying the semah is performed in the cem in which
participants, both men and women, dance in circles. Some Alevis believe that the semah dancers
symbolize the main planets around the Sun (with men and women turning in circles like
revolving planets) and the liberation of one’s self to unite with the divine light. Usually, this
ritual is held once a year under the leadership and the guidance of a dede (who usually also plays
bağlama) in a private house or a cemevi (communal building), attended by women on an almost
equal footing with men. Performance settings of semah usually include one bağlama, which is
the only instrument allowed in the semah, serving both melodic and rhythmic functions, played
by the dede or by another player called the zakir. The congregants sometimes dance and sing
vocables such as Hü, Allah, and Ali while occasionally beating their knees. In Alevism, men and
women are regarded as equals, and pray side by side. Unlike most Muslim practices in the world
where Arabic prayers and Qur’anic chanting dominates, Alevi rituals are usually conducted in
Turkish, and some in Kurdish.
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For Alevis, the bağlama, Alevi and Bektaşi poetry, and the semah constitute the pillars
of religious practice as well as the articulation of Alevism in public. In my fieldwork, I observed
that all three also constitute representations (real or imaginary) of Alevi cultural identity. Alevis
refer to both the liturgical repertoire and the dance accompanying it when they use the term
semah. Semah as dance can be summarized very briefly as spiritual and ritual acts and dances
during Alevi cem ceremonies, as part of the Alevi rituals, performed with bağlama and vocals by
both men and women. Semah works as a means to reach Hak (God) and to mediate between the
spiritual and the real worlds. Alevis dance in circles during their semah ritual as many other
groups in West Asia have been doing during their rituals. Semah dönmek (whirling in semah) is
an indispensable part of the Alevi religious ritual. My informants gave varying explanations of
what it has meant for them to join the ritual, which included “flying to the sky,” “imitating the
universe’s movement,” “wings like cranes,” “connecting the spiritual world with the real world,”
and “showing solidarity with other congregants.” When it comes to the liturgical repertoire, there
are more than 100 distinct semah with different names known by almost all Alevi groups. The
most commonly known semah include Kırklar Semahı, Turnalar Semahı, Gönüller Semahı, Kırat
Semahı, Hubyar Semahı, Ali Yar Semahı, Urfa-Kısas Semahı (see Appendix for staff notations).

Figure 4.1: Men and women during a semah (www.pirsultan.net)
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The bağlama, considered a sacred instrument by the Alevi people, is a long-necked lute
that is prevalent in almost all regions of Turkey. The beginnings of the Alevi religious
ceremonies are marked by the musicians kissing their instruments and touching them to their
heads before they start to play liturgical and para-liturgical tunes, which make up the larger part
of the ritual. The liturgical tunes can be categorized as: Duaz-i Imam, Miraçlama, Tevhid, and
Mersiye. Those are obligatory sections of the cem ceremonies in which the participants must
follow the lead of the dede. Para-liturgical tunes, resembling the forms and functions of the
piyyutim in Jewish religious practice, can be performed in different forms and lengths. The most
significant para-liturgical song structure is called deyiş. Erol argues that the deyiş are the most
significant cultural forms of expression and the main means of transmission of Alevi culture and
history (Erol 2009: 103). Multiple names are used for deyiş from different regions, such as beyit,
nefes, ayet, and kelam, each of which has different implications for different Alevi communities
in Turkey. Those deyiş are usually sung in Turkish and in some cases Kurdish. The poetic forms
of the liturgical and para-liturgical poems could include varying poetic, lyrical, and syllabic
forms (for more see Yöre 2011).
It is important to point out that even the religious repertoire or the tunes performed during
the cem ceremonies are not fixed among all Alevi groups. One community of Alevis from
southwest Anatolia may not recognize the tunes from a community in another region of Turkey.
An important function of deyiş has been that they have worked as pedagogical and communitybuilding tools that unify singing along, listening, repeating or responding to the soloists, and
reproduction of the traditional Alevi musical codes, almost like the framework of an Alevi
habitus. There are hundreds of deyiş written and sung by aşık and ozan, along with some specific
deyiş that are sung during the religious ceremonies in cem such as Oniki Imam deyişi, çerağlama
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deyiş, niyazlaşma deyişi, and semah deyişi. Attendees of the cem ceremonies occasionally
respond to the dede or ozan or zakir by singing along or singing in chorus. Seyit Yöre, in his
work on the musical codes of Alevi-Bektaşi culture (2011), points to the fact that they consist of
simple musical motifs repeated with some slight modifications by different ozans depending on
the context, sometimes with different texts. Some ozans occasionally change the instrumental
and vocal sections in order to increase the participation of audience members.

4.2.1. The Instrument and Tuning Systems
The word bağlama most likely comes from the Turkish verb “bağlamak,” to tie, as a
reference to the frets that are tied on the neck (Picken 1975, Reinhard and Pinto 1990). In the
most common current practice in Turkey, the octave is divided into 17 tones, allowing for a
chromatic scale plus five microtonal intervals. There are three courses of strings, two of which
are often doubled and one of which is often tripled, for a total of seven strings. The addition of
the seventh string probably happened in the last 50 years (Stokes 1992). The resonator of the
body can be either carved out (oyma bağlama) of a single piece of wood, preferably from
mulberry, chestnut, or hornbeam, or carvel-built from curved planks (yaprak bağlama). The
yaprak bağlama is usually more expensive and fragile than the oyma bağlama. The strings are
commonly plucked with a wooden, or in recent decades nylon, plectrum called mızrap. The
instrument is played either with a mızrap or with bare hands, a technique also known as şelpe
(Parlak 2001). The latter form is the favored method of playing by an Alevi ozan or aşık. The
bağlamas are roughly 70-90cm in length. The body of the instrument is usually 3/8 the length of
the instrument. The three-stringed bağlama is the holy book of Alevis; as one of my informants
said, “our bağlama is our Qur'an." Though some Alevis associate the three strings with the Allah129

Muhammed-Ali trinity, the Kurdish Alevis that I talked to do not necessarily accept that
formulation.

Figure 4.2.a

Figure 4.2.a (left): A long-necked (uzun sap) bağlama

Figure 4.2.b

Figure 4.2.b (right): Short
fingerboard (kısa sap)

Although the uzun sap (long-necked or long-fingerboard) bağlama has been the most
common type in Turkey, among Alevis the kısa sap (short-fingerboard) bağlama is preferred as
it is more suitable to be played during the Alevi gatherings. Fingerboard length is correlated with
the number of frets that each one has on it: the short-fingerboard bağlamas or curas usually have
nineteen or fewer frets while the divan and other large bağlamas have at least twenty-two frets
providing an additional half an octave. Both types have seven strings in three courses. The
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largest size bağlama is the one known as divan, which has the largest body and fingerboard. It
has seven strings in three courses. Another is the tambura, resembling a modern version of the
dombra, a two-stringed Kazakh and Kirghiz instrument, or the tambur among the Ahl-e Haqq
people in Iran. Its body is the same size as that of a bağlama with a short fingerboard, but it is
played like the long fingerboard bağlama. Like the divan, it has three groups of seven strings.
The short fingerboard bağlama is the one regarded as sacred by the Alevis. The smallest
bağlama, the cura, has a small body and short fingerboard. It is played like the long and short
fingerboard bağlamas, but has only six strings in three courses. The fret sizes are proportional to
the scale length of each type of instrument.
Bağlamas are tuned differently in every part of Turkey. Structures of the folk song to be
played and the strokes of the plectrum also affect the tuning systems. Two major tuning systems
(I assume the middle strings are tuned to G) from top to bottom course are:

String Number:

3

2

Bağlama düzeni

Aa,

GG,

Ddd

Cc,

GG,

Ddd

Kara düzen

1

Figure 4.3. Bağlama düzeni and kara düzen tunings
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The kısa sap bağlamas are almost always tuned in the bağlama or aşık düzeni based on
the scale ratios above. For instance, in order to get the best performance and sound quality, the
bağlama I recently bought from Erdal Erzincan Sazevi in Istanbul should ideally be tuned as:
String Number:
Bağlama düzeni

3

2

1

Bb, Aa, Eee

Below (Figure 4.3) is the diagram used in the Wuppertal Alevi Cultural Center by the bağlama
instructor Ercan Şahin in his bağlama kursu (bağlama class) that also shows the string numbers.
It marks main frets for each one of the three courses of strings (Tr. tel) of the bağlama tuned in
the bağlama düzeni, which is the system almost exclusively taught at Alevi cultural institutions.

Figure 4.4. Corresponding pitches in Turkish for major frets for each string (Tr. tel) on the
bağlama düzeni

Kara düzen is, or used to be according to the bağlama instructors I talked to, the most
popular tuning system in Turkey (Picken 1975: 276). The bağlama düzeni has become more
popular in the last half of the 20th century, thanks to the increasing popularity of the albums
released by musicians like Arif Sağ, Musa Erol, and Yavuz Top, who mostly used bağlama
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düzeni, along with a revival of folk music based on the Alevi repertoire in Turkey (Erol 2009).
The bağlama düzeni, compared to the kara düzen, provides a simpler framework for playing
songs and accompanying vocalists with parallel fourths and fifths. The bağlama düzeni is also a
system engaging all three strings as opposed to kara düzen, which relies more on performing the
highest-pitched string. The bağlama düzeni utilizes fifths and fourths and on a small part of the
neck, a performer can play the whole scale of an octave without changing the left-hand position.
Most performers learn both tuning systems and the playing techniques each requires.
The choice of tuning system provides significant musical, cultural, and historical cues as
to what kinds of messages bağlama players express. Alevi youth are accustomed to the music
shaped by the gradual increase in the use of bağlama düzeni as the number of short-necked
bağlamas used in Alevi-based music and folk music increased in the 1980s and 1990s. The
increase in the number of kısa sap bağlamas in circulation, and thus in the popularity of the
bağlama düzeni tuning, has happened as Alevi music expanded into the mainstream of Turkish
folk music in the 1990s. Alevis, and thus Alevi music’s “coming out” to the public, seem to have
opened a field for the shorter-necked bağlama and subsequent changes in the sonic coding
through bağlama düzeni.
I should also point that becoming a professional bağlama player in Turkey entails that a
player must be able to play in (or master) as many düzens as possible. Each düzen has its stance,
its own performance practice, and its emotional and technical differences coming out of the same
staff notation. As famous bağlama virtuoso Erdal Erzincan once told me, “you cannot be a
bağlama virtuoso without mastering some of the iconic songs on the düzens they were composed
for and supposedly played on.” Among some iconic songs performed in their respective düzens
is the most famous Ali Ekber Çiçek composition “Haydar Haydar” on kara düzen. I observed
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that especially in the 2000s there has been a gradual dominance of bağlama düzen over kara
düzen in Alevi musical practices and other forms that became easily accessible and available by
the bağlama kursu instructors utilizing the pedagogical tools available on the Internet such as
www.turkuler.com and www.bağlama-kursu.de, which provide lyrics, sheet music, and guitar
tablatures as well as instruction videos.
Before moving on to the relationship between folk music and Alevi music in Turkey, I
want to point out another advantage of the bağlama düzeni over the kara düzen. While working
on recent developments in the dissemination of folk music and especially music of Alevis, I
came across an important development for the way bağlama will be taught and played, in the
form of a smart phone application (app) or a computer program. An interesting iPhone
application recently released enables average people to play bağlama on their smartphones. This
development may be another indication of the mainstreaming of Alevi and folk music in the
Turkish public sphere.

Figure 4.5. Saz Cepte Application for the iPhone, released in February 2013
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4.2.2. Turkish Folk Music and Alevi Music
In his analysis of folk music and Alevi cultural identity in Turkey, Erol argues that thanks
to significant contributions of Alevi musicians such as Belkıs Akkale, Musa Eroğlu, Arif Sağ,
Yavuz Top, and Ali Ekber Çiçek during the 1980s, in the 1990s there was a Turkish folk music
revival, Türk Halk Müziği (THM) Uyanışı, among both Alevis and non-Alevis. In this revival,
precursors of which were albums of Belkıs Akkale and the Muhabbet cassette series, bağlama as
the main instrument and bağlama düzeni as the main tuning system played a central role. After
this revival, Building on Erol’s findings, I aimed at identifying the transformation that the music
is undergoing within the newly emerged transnational field as Alevi religious practice and Alevi
religion are going through a transformation process. After a detailed discussion of what folk
music in Turkey means today for different actors and audiences, Erol (2009) argues that there
has been a constant transformation in the definition of the folk, and thus in folk music, which he
classifies in three phases:

1. From 1920s until 1950s: An invented "folk" and "its music" by the Turkish state. This
phase, according to Erol, was marked by the archiving of local melodies by TRT officers,
to institutionalize the “authenticity" of the styles and performances. Most importantly, the
diverse melodies were categorized and treated in the same way, as they all represented
the one and only folk, the Turkish nation.

2. 1960s and 1970s: The Turkish popular music industry and its discovery of folk music.
In this phase, the most important vehicle for folk music to be used and utilized were the
Anatolian pop and Anatolian rock musicians who wished to improve their credentials in
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the political sphere by using folk music instruments and melodies in their compositions
and performances.

3. From 1990s until today: THM Uyanışı (THM revival). Erol argues that this period
witnessed the creation of the first generation of musicians whose core goal as musicians
was to create folk music, unlike the previous generations. This new breed of musicians
“was equipped to create in the THM milieu” (Erol 2009:77). Two factors that Erol
mentions are the end of the state monopoly in the media and other communication tools,
and the Alevi cultural revival of the 1990s.

Alevi music is not independent from Anatolian folk music. Quite the contrary, one might find
almost identical melodies in a religious tune from Maraş or Malatya and a “secular” folk tune
from Erzurum or Erzincan. In the 1970s and 80s, as Alevis increasingly demanded to hear their
music in public through the available channels, they faced institutional censorship by the
officials at the TRT and self-censorship by the producers, musicians and performers. Some Alevi
songs were banned and some were modified. According to Arif Sağ some were stripped of their
Alevi character through modification of lyrics containing words directly or indirectly associated
with Alevi religiosity, such as Ali, Şah, Ehlibeyt, Oniki İmam, and Kerbela. According to an
interview Sağ gave to Poyraz, “an invisible hand would replace ‘Ali’ with ‘Dost’ [Friend] on all
TRT radio shows” (Poyraz 2007: 134).

Reportedly the folk song “Dersim Dört Dağ İçinde”

(“Dersim in Four Mountains”) was banned because it had the word Dersim in it, which was
associated with the city that was renamed as Tunceli by the Turkish government in 1937
following a massacre. Compared to the 1970s and 1980s, ‘Ali’ and other words are perfectly
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acceptable in today’s music industry in Turkey.
Another significant issue in the history of the relationship between Alevi identity and
Alevi music has been the fact that Alevis first “came out” in the public sphere through their
music and dance (Dinçer 2004, Poyraz 2007: 77). For Alevis, the process of becoming accepted
members of Turkish society was preceded by the popularization of “Alevi music,” or tunes that
are associated with Alevi people and culture. In this process of “coming out,” Alevi music
played a significant role in informing the predominantly Sunni citizens of Turkey and elsewhere
about the existence of a separate Alevi music, culture, and ultimately, religion.
In this popularization and becoming public, many recording labels benefited from the
mass distribution of Alevi music. The recording labels, or plak şirketi in Turkish, that produced
and distributed “Alevi music” included Özdemir Plak, ATM Müzik, Yarın Müzik, Güvercin
Müzik, Arda Müzik, Kalan Müzik, Ema, İber, Arif Sağ Müzik, Diyar, Şah, and Akkiraz
(personal communication with Hasan Saltık). Although there are no accurate and reliable
numbers about the sales of cassettes or CDs in Turkey, it is safe to assume that Alevi recordings
have accounted for between 10 and 20 percent of the sales of local music of these companies
since the 1980s. Poyraz argues, “It would be correct but incomplete to argue that as part of Alevi
cultural expression, Alevi music has turned into a commodity if it were to be analyzed from a
political economy perspective” (2007: 120). The best known musicians who recorded and
performed Alevi music in the last four decades include Arif Sağ, Belkıs Akkale, Can Etili, Aşık
Mahsuni Şerif, Ali Ekber Çiçek, Sabahat Akkiraz, Musa Eroğlu, Yavuz Top, Emre Saltık and,
among the younger generations, Erdal Erzincan, Tolga Sağ, Erol Parlak, and Cengiz Özkan,
among others. Alongside these musicians there are self-identified Kurdish and Zaza Alevi
musicians who released albums in their own languages, such as Mikail Aslan and Metin
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Kahraman (see Chapter 3 for more on the relationships between Kurdish identity and Kurdish
music). During the late 1980s a growing Alevi struggle started to gain momentum, and in the
early 1990s the Alevi movement flourished; Alevis would eventually pursue additional struggles
such as the Kurdish Alevis’ political activism in the Kurdish nationalist movement (van
Bruinessen 1997, Sökefeld 2008, Erdemir 2005, Massicard 2013).

4.2.3. An Example from the 1990s “Türküler Yanmaz” (“Türküs cannot be burned”)
The recent tensions between Alevis and Sunnis continue the mistrust between members
of the two communities. The article below (Figure 4.1), describes an incident that occurred in
September 2009, in Hekimhan, Malatya. A Sunni supervisor reportedly cut the hand of an Alevi
woman because, he said, the food prepared by Alevis was not halal or appropriate for Muslims.
After arguing with her, he cut her hand with a knife.

Figure 4.6. Habertürk, 27 September 2009.

Ongoing sectarian problems and historical mistrust, coupled with such incidents, have caused
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Alevis to resist revealing their identity in a Sunni majority society. The environment of hostility
in Turkey has, in a sense, led Alevis to concretize the memories of the massacres of Sivas,
Maraş, Çorum, and Gazi as part of the Alevi identity formation (Chapter 1). The idea of
martyrdom continues to dominate Alevi and Kurdish personal and collective narratives,
reproduced as part of the Alevi imaginary of suffering for centuries under Sunni rule, from the
Ottoman Sultan Selim II through the Sivas massacre in 1992 and the Gazi events in Istanbul
1995, in which Alevis were killed by state troopers along with Sunni rioters (van Bruinessen
1997, Dressler 2002, Bayrak 2011). After the Sivas events, Alevi musicians composed multiple
songs to commemorate and to reflect on the burning of the musicians. Below is the most popular
among those performed by my informants; it was requested multiple times at the türkü bars I
visited.

“Türküler Yanmaz” (“Türkü cannot be burned”) by Edip Akbayram

Güneşin ak yüzüne bir duman çöktü

A smoke cloud fell down on the shining sun.

Bir türkü çığlıkla ateşe düştü

A türkü fell into the fire screaming

Kuytu bir köşede bir çiçek küstü

A small flower stopped smiling,

Döktü yaprağını boynunu büktü

Left its leaves and let its neck loose

Şu Sivas’ın elinde sazım çalınmaz

They don’t allow my bağlama to be played in Sivas

Güllerim yandı yüreğim dayanmaz

My roses were burned, my heart hurt

Kararmış yüreğin hiç ışığı olmaz

There is no light for dark souls.

Bilmez misin ki türküler yanmaz

Don't you know you cannot burn the songs?
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Günü gelir sanma hesap sorulmaz

The time will come for revenge.

Dayanır kapına Pir Sultan ölmez

Like Pir Sultan 29 it will never die.

Şu Sivas’ın elinde sazım çalınmaz

They don’t allow my bağlama to be played in Sivas

Güllerim yandı yüreğim dayanmaz

My roses were burned, my heart hurt

“Türküler Yanmaz” is an important response of musicians to the massacre. It conveys the
symbolic significance of the bağlama and the türkü, the folk song. The bağlama embodies Alevi
history as part of the Alevi identity and it encapsulates the Alevi sonic memory. Thus, the
bağlama is a crucial element of religious practice and of the image Alevis have promulgated.
The bağlama that was not allowed to be played in “Türküler Yanmaz” is a symbolic reference to
the denial of the existence of Alevis. The song urges Alevis to never forget that the mobs in
Sivas wanted to kill the songs and burn the bağlamas.

4.2.4. An Example from the 2000s: Strategic Essentialism of Kızılbaş (Red-head)
As I have surveyed the music and the digital footprints of Kurdish Alevis, I have
observed an increasing trend of strategic essentialization of a Kızılbaş identity among the
members of this community. I probed the reemergence of the Kızılbaş term in this context to see
its significance for those who employ and embrace Kızılbaş identity as an alternative to Alevism
and in some instances to Kurdish Alevi identity. Mélikoff and Erseven (1997), Dressler (2008,
2013) and Karakaya-Stump (2008), point out that initially, around the end of the in the 15th
__________________
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century, the term Kızılbaş referred to the mostly Turkmen adherents of the Safavi Sufi order.
According to van Bruinessen (1997) and Dressler (2013), in today’s Turkey the Alevis, both
Kurdish and Turkish speakers, are descendants of those Kızılbaş groups, which “had rebelled
against Ottoman rule in the early 16th century and were ever since regarded by the Ottomans as
politically unreliable” (Dressler 2013: 12).
Although Gayatri Spivak has since distanced herself from her concept of “strategic
essentialism,” it has proven to be useful when speaking of minority groups’ embrace of
derogatory terms used by powerful majorities to label them as a political and strategic tool.
Spivak (1993) suggests that on occasion subaltern groups temporarily "essentialize" themselves,
or emphasize a particular form of group identity, to achieve recognition and distinction. For the
Kurdish Alevis I studied, this process started in the 2000s with the term Kızılbaş: not only
overturning the negative connotations and rumors about the term (implying that Kızılbaş people
are heretical, people doing orgies and incest, or rebellious people) but also creating a space
where members could identify themselves with a distinct marker. One of the reasons for this
attempt, one could speculate, is that the term Alevi covered too many diverse and distant groups,
such as Bektaşis, Tahtacıs, and Nusayris among others. For some Kurdish Alevis, the declaration
of difference by emphasizing Kızılbaş identity seemed to be the easiest form of strategically
essentializing their distinction. Almost equal to an ethnic slur, the term Kızılbaş has now begun
to have a different meaning among the Kurdish Alevis, like the “N-word” in the USA.
In many cases, this reclaimed and to some extent reconstructed Kızılbaş identity serves as
no more than a historical label for some "myth," unknown and mysterious on its own. Thus,
musicians recreate an identity that does not correspond to a specific reality. In this process of
distinguishing themselves from other Alevis (Turk and Arab) and Kurds (Sunni, Êzîdî, and
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Shaf`i), they increasingly resort to a constructed Kızılbaş identity.
The new transnational field has provided a space and means for cultural entrepreneurs
and especially musicians to get involved with identity politics. One of the most significant
cultural forms Kurdish Alevis and musicians relate to Kızılbaş identity and its history is
"Kızılbaş music." Since the term had almost vanished from everyday use, replaced by “Alevi” in
most cases, there is no way to relate musical characteristics to a particularly Kızılbaş music.
Thus, Kurdish Alevi musicians I talked to, including Shêxo, Ali Baran, Mikail Aslan, and Hakan
Akay, return to the descendants of common ancestors, those living in Iran. By embracing the
music of the Ahl-e Haqq of Iran, and relating to religious or secular music of other heterodox
groups in West Asia, those Kurdish Alevi musicians are trying to resuscitate a mode of
belonging, even as they have no real living example they might relate to in their first homeland.
Instead, they reproduce something they cannot know firsthand; they rely heavily on interpreting
the images and sounds of a Kızılbaş past. Among the most popular examples I came across is a
recent series of CDs with the titles Kızılbaş and Kızılbaş-II, released by Kalan Müzik, in which
Alevi musicians interpreting Alevi sacred tunes and deyiş (see below). In the same vein, Shêxo,
one of many influential musicians, issued an album in which he related to his "true" ancestors,
who were Kızılbaş, by interpreting modes he vaguely remembered from conversations in his
youth (see Chapter 6 for an oral history with Shêxo). Further, musicians of the younger
generation, like Ahmet Aslan and Mikail Aslan, are trying to relate to the "old," the "true or
authentic" form of Kızılbaş music, part of the same search they direct towards the Kızılbaş past.
In that sense, it is an important development that Kurdish Alevi musicians are trying to create a
separate Kızılbaş identity by strategically essentializing the term and embracing its implications.
Kalan Müzik's Kızılbaş albums (2009 and 2012) give us a sense of how cultural
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entrepreneurs (the producers and musicians involved with the project) are perceived and
imagined. These two compilation albums were published in Istanbul; most of the tracks are taken
from previously released albums and put alongside tracks recorded for the first time.

Figure 4.7. Kızılbaş and Kızılbaş II by Kalan Müzik (Istanbul), two album-covers.

The owner of Kalan music, Hasan Saltık, told me in an interview, "Kızılbaş has been in use as a
swear-word and is perceived as such by a great many people." By embracing it and using it in
this new context, Mr. Saltık wants to reverse previous pejorative meanings of the term. He wants
to unveil some of the least known Alevi deyiş and nefes (hymns and other tunes associated with
Alevi repertoire), which were indispensable in their religious gatherings and intimate muhabbets,
to serve a broader audience. Saltık also reminds us that centuries of suppression and other harsh
treatment of Alevis have not erased those tunes from the collective memory. "The deyiş and
nefes on this album are among the most significant aspects of Alevi cultural heritage," Saltık
observes.
Cemil Koçgün, a Kurdish Alevi musician in Germany, also released an album titled Heya
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on Kalan Müzik (2008). He made a point of highlighting his goal by subtitling the album, “Songs
from Qızılbaş,” the cover of which has a dede sazı, which was used by elderly dedes (for more
discussion, see Chapters 3 and 5). The album is comprised of tracks in Turkish, Kurmancî, and
Zazakî, recorded in Cologne and Istanbul. By releasing albums with pictures of dede sazı on the
covers, Kurdish Alevi musicians want their audience to associate their music with a religious
symbol from the past.

Figure 4.8. Heya, Songs from Qızılbaş by Cemil Koçgün released by Kalan Müzik.

Published in Germany and disseminated via the Internet, one of the visible examples of
this movement is the monthly magazine Kızılbaş (see Fig. 4.4).
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Figure 4.9. Kızılbaş, Quarterly Magazine, issue 14, 2012

The subtitle of the magazine (Kızılbaş Alevilerin Sorunlarının Tartışıldığı Demokratik Kürsü)
suggests (in Turkish) that it provides a democratic platform for discussing the problems of
Kızılbaş Alevis. The sample here includes reports on Xızır, a significant figure in Alevi
spirituality; a current debate on the Dersim region and its significance in Kurdish Alevi life; and
the situation of the Western Anatolian Kurdish Alevis in the context of assimilation attempts of
the Turkish government in both religion (Alevi to Sunni) and language (Kurdish to Turkish).
Kızılbaş has sections in three languages, Turkish, Kurmancî, and Zazakî, regarding political
discussions or current political events. The magazine is published in Germany.

4.3. Organizations, Alevi Identity, and Alevi Music
During my fieldwork and constant correspondence with my informants, I aimed at
understanding the influence of organizations on Alevi communities in Germany and Turkey
through the music Alevis have experienced in religious and secular occasions. I tried to
formulate the religiosity of Alevis and the political power of the religious organizations. As I
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tried to demonstrate in Chapter 1, many organizations active in Germany among Kurdish Alevis
operate as religio-political parties whose leaders have created and maintained a new transnational
field.
Almost all Alevi organizations in Germany and Turkey have titles with the word
“culture” attached. One reason for this label stems from the first homeland, where establishing
organizations with religious titles has been almost impossible for many as doing so was against
the Turkish constitution. Thus they coalesced around hometown associations, with organizations
as “cultural centers” seen both as a reference to an understanding of Alevism as a culturally
distinct mode of belonging, and as a cover for the proxy religious education emerging from those
centers (Çelik 2003). I would argue that another reason for the use of “culture” has developed
through the adaptation of culture as a collective leitmotif of such organizations, as most leftleaning Alevi youth have been comfortable with the label “cultural,” as opposed to religious
titles. Alevi cultural organizations actually coalesce around different belief structures, political
leanings, regional differences, and even former tribal ties that direct them to organize individual
"cultural" centers. Outsiders have framed Alevism as either heresy or a cultural deviation from
the orthodoxy of both Shia and Sunni Islam. For Alevis themselves, the framing of Alevism
under the rubric of “culture” seems like part of the same political questioning. The fact that there
are dozens of Alevi "cultural" organizations in Germany reflects the diversity among members
who are involved in the Alevi religious and political spheres.
Political distinctions among Kurdish Alevis, and possibly other ethno-religious groups
worldwide, have sometimes overshadowed religious and ritualistic commonalities among
members of the community. The secularization and almost de-religionization experienced by
Alevis in Turkey has hindered participation in rituals that was expected of all able or pious
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Alevis in the past. I have observed in Germany and Turkey that some religious events and
services have come to be observed only by limited and clustered members of the community.
Today Alevi religion is more like what the head of the Almanya Alevi Birlikleri Federasyonu
(AABF) (Federation of Alevi Unions of Germany), Turgut Öker, said in a 2007 Toronto speech:
“Alevism is not a religious sect. Alevism, which recognizes man as its founding principle and
supreme value, is a culture, a doctrine, a way of life, a philosophy, and even a social reality”
(quoted in Erol 2012:843).
As the Alevi dede institution has almost been eradicated in the late 20th century, many
Alevi institutions in Germany have called for the help of experts and scholars who worked with
Alevis in the 1960s and 70s to reinstitute religious authority by training potential dedes to be sent
around Europe to revive Alevi religious teachings including music, prayer, and semah (see
Dinçer 2004, Erdemir 2005, Erol 2010, Dressler 2013). The discontinuity in religious authority
and teachings has caused Alevi religious practice to diminish among the younger generations
since the 1970s (Dressler 2006).

The transmission of this tradition has been hindered by the

secularization and politicization of Alevism as a collective identity around which to mobilize.
The demise of the Alevi dedes’ hierarchical religious authority within Alevi society has been
exacerbated by new agents, laid out in Chapter 1, who have used Alevi networks in order to
further their political agendas. Diminishing Alevi religious authority has made it hard for Alevis
to coalesce around credible representatives and institutions.
Another issue around using the term “culture” to cover up religious affiliation or
association is the competition among Alevi organizations in gaining member support as well as
funds from the German government. That fierce competition, also for money from Turkish and
other Alevis, is so rampant that claiming to represent Alevis becomes a chaotic space for
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competition among ideologies and cult personalities. One of the figures I met in Cologne was
Cafer Cebe, the AABF project coordinator on integration processes. He rightly pointed out that
Hacı Bektaş-ı Veli and other organizations and foundations were designed in part to receive the
political and strategic benefits of recognizing Alevis as a voting block with political mobility in
Germany. During my fieldwork, I met many ranking members (including the leader) of the
AABF that come from a radical leftist party background (gelenek, “tradition” as my informants
called it) such as Devrimci Yol (Revolutionary Path), one of the most popular radical leftist
movements in Turkish history.
Legal and political differences in Turkey and Germany led the way for the “Alevist
movement” to flourish initially in Germany and then gradually in Turkey (Massicard 2013). The
tacit denial of Alevis’ existence in the public space in Turkey was challenged in the new
homeland, as the public display of Alevism is not only encouraged but also more and more
institutionalized, thanks to funds and political support of German local and federal governments
(see Chapter 6). For the Kurdish Alevis scattered in Germany, being in a second or third
homeland, without the threat from the Sunni majority, has made it much easier to reveal their
identities, differentiating themselves from Sunni and Shi’ah Muslims. Alevis have begun
publicly declaring a difference between Alevis and Sunnis. Şehriban Şahin (2008) argues that the
politics of difference for Alevis who claim they should be treated differently from Sunni Muslim
immigrants has opened social and political opportunity structures for Alevis. Unlike other
institutionalized religions and denominations, the European Christian secular domain provides a
space where Alevis in particular, as opposed to Sunnis or Muslims in general, might feel more
comfortable in public appearances. Most of my informants claimed that religious freedom in
Germany is greater than in Turkey, in terms of state or public approaches to Alevism.
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Drawing on the findings of Østergaard-Nielsen (2002) and Kosnick (2007), I argue that
first-homeland politics are in play in Germany for Alevi and other political and religious
organizations. The politics of recognition for Alevis in relation to the Sunni-Muslim and mostly
Turkish organizations in Germany has followed a similar course to that of the struggle in their
first homeland. In Turkey, Alevis developed certain secular anxieties against the Sunni Islam
imposed by the state apparatus. The first-homeland politics of claiming secularism pays a
dividend in the second homeland in that this status labels Alevis as the good, or even better,
Muslims of Germany, preferred over other Muslim immigrants (Chapter 6).
Once a burden (and a reason to be cautious) in their first homeland, Alevi identity has
become a convenient exclusionary marker used against other Muslims (mostly Turkish) in
Germany by highlighting difference. Cultural and religious differences from other Turks and
Muslims have become reified in this identification. Differences from practicing Muslim Turks
became publicly articulated in discourses invoking secularism. By highlighting such differences,
the Alevis have played into the anti-Muslim rhetoric already rampant in Europe. The reification
occurs especially when Alevis introduce themselves to other Germans emphasizing their
differences from other Muslims; in fact, one of my young informants said he denied he was
Muslim at all to his German peers, as some Alevis in their first and especially in their second
homeland have done. By emphasizing the non-Islamic features and practices of their religion,
and by not practicing religion in public, Alevis affirm anti-Muslim sentiments among Germans,
claiming to know more about Muslims than Germans do. They reaffirm the legitimacy of
"Islamophobia" in Germany by providing a tangible and visible example of the problems
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Muslims have caused in their old and new homelands. A June 2013 conference titled “Salafism
in Germany,” 30 co-organized by the AABF, the Municipality of Cologne, and Bundesamt für
Migration und Flüchtlinge (Federal Office of Migration and Refugees), praised Alevis’ stance
against extremism and fundamentalism in Germany while seeing some Sunni Muslims as a
potential threat to harmony among its citizens. It is also important to point out that Germans have
found Alevis convenient figures to use in their exclusionary discourses, a point I discuss more on
Chapter 6.
An important event, a cornerstone of Alevi music and Alevi identity, was the concert
titled Bin Yılın Türküsü (The tune of the millennium), which was organized by the AABF on 13
May 2000 in Cologne Arena and repeated two years later in Istanbul. The concert, or “festival”
as the organization committee preferred to call it, was comprised of bağlamas playing Alevi
repertoire, and a massive semah show. Zafer Gündoğdu, a prominent Alevi musician, conducted
this concert. There were more than 2000 musicians and dancers on the stage, which put them in
the Guinness Book of World Records. As Poyraz argues, this concert “was organized to fulfill the
need Alevis have been feeling to demarcate the existence of Alevi identity” (Poyraz 2007: 143).

__________________
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Figure 4.10. A scene from the performance of Bin Yılın Türküsü (www.pirsultan.net)

Figure 4.11. AABF Headquarters Visit, June 2010, photo by author

4.3.1. Wuppertal Alevi Kültür Merkezi (Wuppertal Alevi Cultural Center)
An important organization for promoting Alevi music and identity in Germany is the
Wuppertal Alevi Kültür Merkezi (WAKM), which was established in 1992. WAKM is affiliated
with the AABF in organizing important events, demonstrations, and concerts, such as those put
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together for the Sivas massacre anniversaries with other organizations affiliated with the AABF.
According to the directors of the WAKM, there are 7,000 Alevi people registered in Wuppertal,
of a total population of 100,000. The organization has 550 member households, as they register
household membership instead of individuals (statistics from Wuppertal Stadt). The
organizational structure of the center is divided into three subdivisions: the belief commission,
women’s division, and youth division, each sending representatives to the executive committee.
The director explained to me that the three main objectives of the foundation are to serve needs
of the Alevi community in Wuppertal for "belief, culture, and music." Again, it seems to be
imperative for any Alevi organization to include culture and music in one way or another in the
title or branches of the organization.
In the hallway of the WAKM when I visited, two large-screen TVs were turned on, one
showing Euro Star and the other Habertürk; both satellite TV channels broadcast in Turkish, one
the Turkish Star TV's European edition, and the latter a Turkish news channel. The men gathered
were playing card games just as they might at any teahouse in Turkey. The designated dede of
the center, Turan Koluaçık, sat in on the game when he was not guiding his congregation. I
recognized him later, when he introduced himself as the belief commissioner of the WAKM. He
received a “dede certificate” from the Alevi Akademisi (Alevi Academy) established by the
AABF in 1997 (for more on the Alevi Academy see Dressler 2006 and Sökefeld 2008). The dede
was also in charge of all religious affairs at the WAKM. He gave his business card to me,
showing “Alevi Dedesi” as his profession.
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Figure 4.12. Business card of dede Turan Koluaçık

In the early years of immigration to Germany, as Turan Dede told me, in the whole
Cologne vicinity there were only four or five people who could play the bağlama, nor were there
knowledgeable people who could direct religious services. One of the managers, Şevki Abi, from
Başak (a predominantly Kurdish Alevi village in Malatya), also told me that in recent years
picnics and occasions like solidarity nights (Chapter 3) had helped expose youth to Alevi music.
The WAKM organizes group music classes on the guitar and the bağlama, as well as
"folklore" (folk dance in Turkish) designed primarily to teach Alevi semah and some other local
line-dances from Anatolia. Some parents who send their children to the bağlama classes told me
that they demanded that they learn Kurdish songs alongside the general repertoire of “bağlama
music” or “Alevi music,” which comprises predominantly tunes in Turkish, from both Alevi and
türkü repertoires. I recorded sessions of the instructor teaching eight girls how to play basic türkü
repertoire and how to read notation. Once a week, Ercan Şahin, a relatively famous bağlama
player and a good friend of mine, was invited to teach the "essence" of the Alevi feeling. In the
classes I observed at WAKM, Ercan taught fast and lively tunes associated with Alevis or Alevi
repertoire. According to Mr. Koluaçık, the class opens "the door of Alevi music to the young
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generation, thus Alevism." The bağlama kursları (schools), also known as dershane (Stokes
1992), have been important gateways for Alevis to teach the young generation to appreciate
Alevi music and the values of Alevism. The students, when I asked, expressed their dismay
about some Turkish tunes that are associated with the Sunni-Turkish repertoire. There was a
strict, small group of eight to ten students, to whom only Ercan would teach advance techniques
of bağlama within the Alevi repertoire. The organizers were somewhat dissatisfied with the
current instructor, Mehmet Hoca, who had been teaching for the last five years, and the number
of his students was dwindling slowly. Among the continuous attendees, 70 percent were girls,
showing a growing trend in all Alevi organizations I visited.
The WAKM also offers German language classes and tutoring sessions to aid the youth
in integration into German society. Managers from all three divisions organize music and poetryreading events, and evening sing-alongs featuring leftist poems and protest literature in Turkish
as well as tunes to "rekindle the spirit of old times," as Mr. Koluaçık told me. The "Marxist
literature" used in those reading sessions, as my 18-year-old informant put it, still has a strong
impact on how the older generation indoctrinates the new with leftist values similar to those
practiced in Turkey. This classic "Marxist literature" contains works of Turan Feyizoğlu, Che
Guevara's Life, and Karl Marx’s Das Kapital, among others. On a personal note: as a child who
grew up in a household with these books, it was striking for me to revisit the same literature, as
the heroes and theorists of the left have remained the same.
The WAKM also organizes monthly brunches and events to commemorate Mothers' Day,
Women's Day, May Day, and other important dates celebrated or commemorated by Kurdish and
Alevi political organizations. Under the auspices of the belief section, the WAKM organizes cem
ceremonies twice a year. The center helps people to observe the fasts of Muharrem and Aşure as
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well as assisting for funerals. Along with cem ceremonies, the center organizes lokma (sacred
food distribution) services and 40-day services for Alevi families to mark the 40th day after the
death of a member or relative. WAKM organizes large cultural nights every six months
attracting hundreds, along with public events commemorating days with significant social
meaning for Alevis, such as the Sivas massacre or other religious dates. The managers of
WAKM have also been instrumental in establishing the Cologne-based international satellite
channel Yol-TV. They occasionally send guests to appear on Yol-TV if needed.

4.3.2. Pazarcık Cultural Center in Cologne
One of the organizations I visited in order to get a better understanding of religious
musical practice in cem ceremonies in Cologne, was the Pazarcık Cultural Center. Many Kurdish
Alevis from the Pazarcık district in Maraş live in the Bergisch Gladbach district near Cologne.
The Cultural Center invited the Kurdish Alevi families in the vicinity to their annual cem
ceremony directed by a dede whom the organizers brought from Turkey, a common practice for
many local Alevi organizations. Most of the families who attended were Kurdish Alevis, and one
could hear both Kurdish and Turkish spoken. There was no way to recognize the dede at the
beginning, though I learned that he was one of the men who arrived in a fancy Mercedes Benz.
The cem ceremony was held in an arena-type building, where a large gap existed between the
dede and the attendees. Some of the elderly attendees asked for chairs in order to avoid sitting on
the ground. The dede refused to give permission for chairs to the elderly and said, "the cem
service cannot be observed on chairs." The cem lasted seven hours, during which the dede
blended the religious repertoire with some Arabic and Turkish prayers, which left many
attendees dissatisfied, and he left out traditional Turkish and Kurdish prayers and hymns.
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Cem ceremonies in Germany have begun to be held more frequently since the 1990s in
large cities like Cologne, which has resulted in more opportunities to expose younger
participants coming from non-practicing households to Alevi teachings. In contrast to the
religious experiences of older generations of Kurdish Alevis, this development provides more
opportunities for the "professional" dedes to find employment and increase their earnings from
the state and NGOs. Reinstatement of these rituals de-secularizes some non-practicing Alevis by
providing more venues in order to reconvert them to Alevism or even Islam.

4.3.3. Köln ve Çevresi Hacı Bektaş-ı Veli Alevi Cem Evi
Another organization I visited was Köln ve Çevresi Hacı Bektaş-ı Veli Alevi Cem Evi
(KHBVCE) [Hacı Bektaş-ı Veli Alevi Center of Cologne and Environs], which has become,
according to many Kurdish Alevis, the bedrock of the Turkish nationalist movement among
Alevis. This organization, I was repeatedly told, has become the central organization in
promulgating a mythic history, arguing that Alevism is the first and only Turkish religion.
Scholars have debunked this claim, but it is still used as a historical argument against Kurdish
and Arab Alevis. The KHBVCE is located in the Keupstrasse district of Cologne, which is very
close to downtown with a dense immigrant population from Turkey. Inside the KHBVCE, the
first striking view was pictures of Atatürk alongside Hacı Bektaş-ı Veli (The founder of the
Bektaşi Order and a figure revered by all Alevis) and Hz. Ali (son-in-law of the prophet
Mohammad) hanging on the walls of the hall. But the most venerated picture was unmistakably
that of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (the founder of the modern Republic of Turkey) next to Ali and
HBV. When I met Kemal Gültekin, the secretary of KHBVCE, he seemed to be defensive and
guarded in response to my questions on Kurdish or other Alevi groups, thereby revealing that his
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foundation's stance was close to the official Turkish ideology of denying Kurdish language
rights. Like many other Alevi organizations I visited, KHBVCE does not organize cem
ceremonies during the summer, as it is hard to persuade people to join them during the summers
except for occasional gatherings on Thursdays.
Testimonies from my fieldwork in Cologne demonstrate that members of the Kurdish
Alevi communities never attend KHBVCE, the closest cemevi in their district, which has
organized regular cems and other religious ceremonies. The KHBVCE is associated with the
Turkish-based organization called CEM Vakfı, which has tense relations with pro-Kurdish
members. Mr. Gültekin told me that there are some Kürt kökenli Alevi (“Alevis with Kurdish
background”) in this organization who do not claim a Kurdish identity and refuse to attend
events of their fellow Kurdish Alevis if there is a slight implication of Kurdish "separatist"
politics involved with that event or organization. These instances of avoidance confirm the claim
that politics supersedes religious rituals in many situations. In this way, the religion and its
rituals become clustered according to the political loyalties of the members of each organization.

4.4. Music and Alevi Identity in Transnational Space and Social Media
The spaces examined in this study of music-making included bars, homes, cemevi,
festivals, Internet, radio, TV, Facebook, and the cars of my informants. In these spaces Kurdish
Alevis listen to live music, dance with it, drink alcohol, or listen to their cassette players, iPods,
computers, or TVs (Chapter 5). I investigated Internet forums, popular websites, and Facebook
posts and notifications in order to understand musical learning processes. I found that those who
wish to learn tunes on the bağlama or guitar usually ask for sheet-music notation or akor (chords
to accompany popular songs). I gathered almost a hundred songs popular among this group, in
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that they are in demand on Internet forums, requested and performed regularly at türkü bars, and
listed on Facebook profiles of my respondents. The majority of these songs belong to the türkü
repertoire and are sung in Turkish. With few exceptions, the musical aesthetic of this group
resembles that of their fellow Turkish Alevi immigrants and refugees in Germany. The presence
of Kurdish songs, constituting twenty percent of all songs, plays a significant role in the social
and political lives of this group, as most song texts have political implications.
I was impressed in my fieldwork in 2010 and 2011 by the increasing role of Skype and
other digital communication media in the dissemination of Alevi religious practices. Now
everyone can observe the once-exclusive religious gatherings in a small town of their first
homeland, either on satellite TV, the Internet, Skype, or other software. Most of these are
broadcast from Turkey, and occasionally from Germany, to the rest of the world. The exclusive
cem ceremony was originally meant to be attended solely by pious believers from the
community, members who were supposed to follow certain rules and do good deeds in order to
get the dede’s permission to attend. Broadcasting those intimate gatherings on satellite TV or on
Internet sites such as YouTube, changes the whole dynamic of intimacy and exclusivity of
religious practice.
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Figure 4.13. Screenshot of a TV in a living room of a Kurdish Alevi household, Istanbul 2010.

The transnational space with all new tools has resulted in a modern and open practice of
using new media to reconnect disenfranchised Alevis and using new-media platforms to
articulate political demands for recognition of the religion. The main goal of broadcasting such
religious gatherings, some of my informants claimed, was to address people of Alevi-Atheist
practices, and to remind and reconvert them to being practitioners of the religion. Having these
practices widely available makes the religious practice more visible. For non-Alevi Turks who
might want to view Alevi ritual, the demystification serves to legitimize the specific forms of
Alevism that the organization wants to promulgate. Many Kurdish Alevis I interviewed
articulated their concerns on the danger of the religion's dilution by opening up spiritual and
exclusive space to the rest of the world. Being open to foreigners changes the setting of the cem
ceremonies, as well as affecting the actions and reactions of people who attend these broadcast
events.
This is another form of missionary politics of specific Alevi organizations. Thus those
organizations broadcasting weekly or annual cem gatherings have certain political and economic
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agendas. The events broadcast are theatrical, rehearsed, and highly stylized. New-media
opportunities and modernized versions of spiritual messaging have provided tools used to reconvert Alevis without religious affiliation towards particular organizations with nationalistic,
pluralistic, or more neo-spiritualistic political agendas. Among those political and social agendas,
the Kurdish and Turkish nationalistic agendas compete in the same realm of finding historical
roots. One side claims Alevism was originally a Turkish religion, and the other claims it is
indeed a Kurdish religion; some argue that it has been an Anatolian religion. This competition
might be resolved more by political struggles of the parties than by historical facts.
As observed by Ayhan Erol and other scholars, many activists, scholars, and religious
leaders care about the Alevi religious repertoire and prevent it from being performed in secular
or even "profane" venues such as türkü bars. Some members of Alevi organizations who visit
these türkü bars ask musicians not to play pieces from the Alevi religious repertoire. Some
organizers from the AABF also asked Yol-TV and other TV stations located in Cologne not to
broadcast music videos of religious tunes on TV, along with other music video clips. One can
observe the link between wedding salons and türkü bars, as both venues host the same kinds of
entertainment activities (see Chapter 5). Now, especially after the concerted efforts of the Alevi
dedes and organizations, it is not possible to hear Tevhid and Duaz-i Imam (sacred tunes for the
Alevis) at türkü bars. Ironically, there is no regulation over displays of religion in a public space.
Video clips of sacred religious tunes are played less on Yol-TV (though still possible), but on
other TV stations such as Cem TV (which Turan Koluaçık from Wuppertal Alevi Cultural Center
calls “Şeriatçı TV” in reference to the TV’s close ties with Sunni Islam) it is possible to
encounter such religious video clips. Some of these media outlets have increased their viewer
ratings with no resentment from Alevi viewers for the abuse of Alevi sentiments. Some of the
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dedes I interviewed were proud they had warned the religious committee at the AABF not to
include sacred music in the repertoire.
The dissemination of religious music in the public sphere without the control of religious
authority is a significant point. The religious sermons, music, and dance that were purportedly
exclusive to a small group of devoted Alevis have become available via satellite TV and the
Internet. Non-Alevis can also reach, view, and even comment on these programs and events,
previously the sacred properties of the Alevis in exclusive settings. Prior to the mass media, if
Alevi members of the village behaved wrongly, one punishment was to exclude them from the
cem ceremony. Now, however, the once-exclusive gatherings of Alevis are open to everyone,
even those who might have otherwise been punished and excluded from participation. Through
the exploration of the distinctions my informants made with respect to Alevi religious music and
secular türkü repertoire, I came to understand the difficulty of identifying the fact that there have
been blurry lines between "sacred" and "secular or ethnic" music among Kurdish Alevis (see
Conclusion for more discussion). This understanding has implications for how we analyze the
way the music works to constitute different kinds of audiences, and thus, different kinds of
communities.

4.4.1. A Kurdish Alevi Facebook Group: Platforma Kurdên Alawî
One of the recent changes in the social formations through the transnational space is the
emergence of online communities. A recently formed online community on the most popular
social media site (Facebook) is worth analyzing. One of the dozens of Facebook groups
significant to my discussion is Platforma Kurdên Alawî (the Platform of Kurdish Alevis), which
serves Kurdish nationalists who also seek to claim an exclusive Kurdish Alevi identity, through a
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constructed title KurdAlawi.

Figure 4.14. Female guerillas (presumably members of PKK) during a semah,
from the Facebook group of Platforma Kurdên Alawî.

The platform's mission statement reads in both Turkish and Kurmancî-Kurdish, "We are
neither Turkish nor Muslim; we are KurdAlawi. We are here to understand and own the history
of the Kurdish Alevis." Some of my informants from Cologne and Istanbul are among those who
"like" the Facebook page, an act that I interpreted as an endorsement. Essentially this group is
formed around claiming both Kurdish national and Alevi religious identities defined against
Kemalism and Islamism. This was made clear by a picture shared widely in which the road to
Kurdistan is split from the roads that connect to Islamism and Kemalism (see Figure 4.14). The
pictures and information shared among the members serve the purposes of the Alevi branch of
Kurdish nationalists with secular and anti-Turkish overtones. Among the 2900 members of this
group (as of June 2013), there are also some younger members, a sign that Kurdish nationalist
Alevis are reaching out to recruit disenfranchised youth through opposition to the undemocratic
policies of their utmost enemy: the Turkish state. In its conversion attempts as well its continuing
practice of denying religious spaces for Alevis in public, this enemy “not only denies Kurds
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autonomy and language rights but also religious freedom for Alevis” (www.facebook.com/
/pages/Platforma-Kurdên-Alawî). The musical examples that the members of this group shared
include Kurmancî-Kurdish and Zazakî Alevi tunes from musicians like Aynur, Mikail Aslan,
Metin and Kemal Kahraman, and Ahmet Aslan.

Figure 4.15. A sign summarizing the main ideological stance of the Group
(www.facebook.com/pages/Platforma-Kurdên-Alawî)

The Platforma Kurdên Alawî Facebook group does not define Alevism with theological
presumptions, concepts, tools, and ritual traditions; rather it relies on recycling pro-Kurdish and
anti-Kemalist ideological and political arguments. In February 2013, Platforma Kurdên Alawî,
along with Demokratik Toplum Kongresi (DTK) [Democratic Society Congress, a pro-Kurdish
organization] and a couple of other Kurdish Alevi organizations, held the first international
"Kurdistan Alevi Conference” in Diyarbakir (Turkey), a city populated overwhelmingly by
Sunni Kurds and “the capital of independent Kurdistan,” as some Kurds would like to see it. This
conference is probably the first of its kind to combine “Kurdistan” and “Alevi” in its title.
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4.5. Summary and Conclusion
In this chapter, I laid out the transformation history of Alevism as the most prominent
mode of belonging among Kurdish Alevis in Turkey, Germany, and transnational space. I
examined the current state of the relationship between Alevi music and Alevi identity in Turkey
and in Germany. In my research, I observed the recent realignment of religious authority within
Alevi religious organizations as Alevi religious authority was claimed by various new
organizations. The Wuppertal Alevi Culture Center (WAKM), among others, exemplifies how
Kurdish Alevis teach religious and secular tunes in "cultural centers" that serve the religious,
cultural, and political lives of Alevis in the second homeland. I have related the changing social
structures of the Kurdish Alevis in terms of how they have utilized the opportunities acquired
through the transnational space created by cultural entrepreneurs along with other religiopolitical agents in recent years. My examination of the changing religious meaning of the sacred
Alevi ritual called cem demonstrates how it was transformed in the transnational space, reaching
different audiences via the Internet and mass media. The presence of the bağlama and depictions
of it in all forms of media constitute a significant aspect of Alevi sonic and visual memory.
I explained the significance of the bağlama, which is considered a sacred instrument for
the Alevis. For the Alevi case we need to look deeper into the question of representation of a
religion and/or an ethnic or cultural identity by examining groups coalesced around specific
religio-political parties (Chapter 1). Thus, the fact that some groups claim they can speak in the
name of all Alevis should not lead to the conclusion that all Alevis follow the same religious
principles. I argued that the history of Alevism, real or imaginary, and the atrocities Alevis faced
informed Alevi musicians’ cultural, poetic, and artistic expressions. The bağlama player or
zakir’s kissing the bağlama and applying it to his head before he starts playing hymns marks the
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Alevi religious rituals called cem, and the bağlama plays a key part in both folk music and the
sacred music of Alevi rituals. In the competition between two bağlama tuning systems I
reaffirmed that the bağlama düzeni has dominated the kara düzen in the last thirty years and that
Alevi musical practices have long existed alongside the folk music of Anatolia. The shared past
between those two makes the boundaries between the religious and secular music among Alevis
blurrier than ever, a subject I talk about more in Chapter 5.
I have argued that a significant example of the recently shifted claims-making process for
Kurdish Alevis is the strategic essentialism attached to the term Kızılbaş, and its implications for
their identity. Kurdish Alevis who would like to highlight their differences from other Alevis in
an exclusionary way have embraced the Kızılbaş label to declare their Kurdish identity while not
limiting themselves to Alevi identity (which includes Turkish or Arab Alevis). In Chapter 5, I
investigate one of the key venues for Alevi music and especially for the music of Kurdish Alevi
youth: the türkü bars of Cologne.
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Chapter 5: Türkü Bars in Germany
5.1. Introduction
Türkü is a generic term used for all folktunes with Turkish. 31 Thanks to a substantial
cultural industry in Turkey and Germany, türkü experienced a revival especially during the
1990s and the 2000s. The use and sale of türkü albums and the process of marketing ethnic and
religious tunes to the masses have been significant developments in the history of popular and
folk music in Turkey. In the last two decades, new producers, with particular political and
economic agendas, began to sell and propagate folktunes to the masses in new and old
packaging, responding to the demands of consumers. This revival and the development of one of
türkü’s newer iterations, a genre I call alebesk, 32 deserve more scrutiny, especially given the
marketing of ethnic or religious tunes to communities, or henceforth, consumers. This era of
marketing folktunes––or türküs––and other forms of alebesk, demonstrates a pluralistic
patronage of music production and dissemination. New cultural entrepreneurs have attempted to
occupy the domain formerly controlled by previous nation-state agents, such as Turkish Radio
Television (TRT).
Türküs became symbols of resistance and in Turkey were among the most-performed
tunes of leftist movements in the last quarter of the 20th century. In the 1990s, the türkü became
a popular commodity as the country entered a less regulated cultural and political era. Neoliberal
economic policies and the opening of the Turkish markets to foreign goods accelerated the
production and dissemination of all kinds of cultural products, along with some formerly
__________________
31
32

Some publications apply the term to Kurmancî folk songs as well.
I introduce the term and discuss alebesk in Chapter 1 and 2.
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marginalized tunes. The highest-selling musical product of marketing campaigns aimed at Alevis
and Sunnis alike was the türkü, as it was part of the music already consumed by Alevis. In the
early 2000s, türkü contests appeared on newly established private TV and radio stations. Since
playing the türkü repertoire has become a popular activity within both Alevi and Sunni circles,
attending türkü bars has become one of the most popular entertainment activities. This chapter
describes the musical scene in venues called türkü bars in Kurdish Alevi communities in
Germany. I compare the sonic and material qualities of this leisure activity with those of türkü in
the Kurdish Alevis’ first homeland.

5.2. Türkü Bars as Businesses
In Türkü bars, two or three musicians perform covers of folk, protest, and popular songs.
These venues have been established in cities such as Istanbul and Cologne, with large Alevi
immigrant populations. The closest American equivalent of türkü bars would be country music
bars where cover bands primarily perform requests from the audience. In türkü bars, musicians
are required to perform requests (istekler); in most cases, türkü bar groups might be categorized
as cover bands. People choose the türkü bars to see live performances, to mingle with others, and
to participate in the action and the music. Onstage, it is quite common to hear Turkish jokes
flying around. Musicians drink alcohol for free if they want, and almost all drink before they go
onstage. For my research, I focus on Cologne and its vicinity, and draw on interviews with
musicians, owners, and the audience/customers in the türkü bars Dudu Café, Ley Lim Türküevi,
and Prestige Türkü Bar.
Many businesses owned by Kurdish and Alevi immigrants and refugees in Cologne—
restaurants, bars, and coffee shops—appear to have cordial and seamless relationships with
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German and non-German customers alike. In business locales catering to customers from all
walks of life, background music runs the gamut from Latin and pop to jazz and other genres. In
some restaurants TVs broadcast Turkish satellite channels, as many consider such access a part
of the touristic ambience of such enclaves as “Little Istanbul” in Cologne. In restaurants and
especially bars and coffee shops, background music is almost the same as that in German
establishments. When it comes to türkü bars, however, one can hardly overlook the exclusive
nature of music selected to cater to Turkish and Kurdish immigrant communities.
Replacing former downtown bars and nightclubs, venues filled with well-dressed mixedgendered customers, with entrance fees as high as ten euros and beers at five euros, türkü bars
are not cheap venues for an evening’s entertainment. Almost all türkü bars I attended have
clientele consisting of men and women (represented almost equally depending on the location)
who are between twenty and fıfty years old. A handful of owners and managers of türkü bars I
talked to stated that the clientele of their bars used to consist of a mainly male audience
compared to its current almost equally represented demographic. Other factors that influence the
make-up of the audience include economic and political constraints that could prevent certain
groups or individual from joining this expensive enterprise. The location of türkü bars can also
make a difference in terms of gender breakdown of attendees. Among the audience members I
talked to for this study, most had at least high school or higher degrees. Among the attendees
near the University of Essen, almost half of the attendees were college students. Birthday parties
are common at the bars. Whereas the majority in Istanbul stay open almost every night, most
türkü bars in Germany are open only on Friday and Saturday nights. Business hours conform to
the German working-class schedule; just like the general population, those attending türkü bars
abide by rules of engagement and conventions of leisure at these entertainment venues. One of
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the most relevant spatial components of the türkü bars is the dominance of cigarette and hookah
smoke. Some türkü bars allow their customers to smoke and provide hookahs for rent,
establishing other sources of revenue.
Türkü bars, though they are a recent phenomenon, have become part of the aesthetic of
not only the Kurdish Alevis but also the others including those who attend them.
Although türkü bars are not designed solely for Kurdish Alevis, many owners and managers I
met come from Kurdish Alevi backgrounds, and most of them have clientele from different
groups in Turkey. Türkü bars are part of the same larger group of the transnational exchanges
that occur between Turkey, Kurdistan, and Germany. Türkü bars not only reenact the nostalgia
of an imagined space and time for customers, but also provide a space designed to be thoroughly
practical for capitalistic exchange. Most türkü bars have minimum covers billed individually,
known in Turkey as Alman Hesabı (Dutch Treat, lit. German). Each person pays his or her share,
unlike their counterparts in Turkey where the establishment bills each table separately, and
people either share the total amount, or in many cases, only the men at the table pay. This
difference of custom marks a critical point regarding the changes in the economic regimes that
immigrants have lived through. For immigrants navigating across nations with transnational ties,
it marks the transition to a European liberal and cosmopolitan mode as opposed to a formerly
more patriarchal one.
The political economy of the transnational movement of music, the modes of
performance, and the transition of listener from audience member to customer in türkü bars
happen in the context of this adaptation to modern modes of transaction. To this end, each person
paying individually (after drinking mostly German beers) at the end of a long night of
entertainment and commiseration accomplishes simultaneously the adoption of German modes
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of consumption and the reenactment of an imagined place inside the türkü walls.
Türkü bars have transcended standard entertainment venues and become perhaps the only
viable spaces that welcome most immigrant groups from Turkey, including leftists,
conservatives, Alevis, Sunnis, Kurds, and Turks alike. All sociopolitical identity labels are
welcomed in the bars. Inside those I have visited in the Cologne vicinity, I have seen traditional
garments and artifacts on the walls, all exhibiting the aesthetic of şark odası (eastern room, see
Chapter 2). When asked why they hang these garments on the walls, the owners generally said
that they help the customers feel “comfortable and closer to home, and even to their village.”
These garments and artifacts, the owners and many customers believe, represent the living room
of a village house, and give attendees the comfort of a familiar living room while in Germany; it
is not inconceivable for patrons to feel contented in their second homeland in a village livingroom setting at 3am, drinking alcohol and surrounded by dancing. In other words, the eclecticism
in this setting represents a form of appropriation that combines German modes of entertainment
and leisure with Kurdish Alevi music, garments, and language.

5.3. Aesthetic of Şark Odası (Orient Room)
The şark odası is an old practice of exhibiting personal items, such as oriental rugs and
pottery, in one’s living room. It reflects the sensibilities of the şark feel in the modern world.
Kurds and Armenians in Istanbul, and in other large cities in Turkey, tend to have a site at home
set up to remind them of their origins. Many of my informants both in Turkey and Germany have
at least a section of their living room, if not the entire living room, dedicated to exhibiting items
from the şark. In Object of Legacy: Material Objects of Displaced People (2008), Zeynep Turan
analyzes the value certain artifacts, such as pottery and silverware, hold for Armenian transplants
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and others of the diaspora in their recreation of space. Similarly, the owners and managers of
türkü bars have recreated areas designated for playing music that purportedly comes from an old
place where garments and artifacts on the walls originate. The irony is that, in many living rooms
of those villages, people have barely worn those garments nor do they listen to the music of
modern türkü bar musicians. Instead, a mediated link exists between the cultures and these items
symbolically carry the idea of that link, with nostalgia for the old times when “everything was
fine” in the village and people might enjoy the companionship of their own kind. As currently
implemented in living rooms and spaces such as türkü bars, the şark odası has become a
nostalgic symbol of values not often seen, if at all, in the places with which they are associated.
The şark odası decoration in türkü bars creates a space for the audience to feel comforted
and at home. It also reenacts an imaginary place and time as the audience engages with modern
music, which can also represent older, innocent, imagined times. By invoking a şark
odası taste in türkü bars, or other restaurants and businesses, owners and designers of these
venues attempt to make their spaces appear Kurdish, Anatolian, Turkish, or oriental. Svetlana
Boym (2001) has written extensively and brilliantly about immigrant interiors of homes in terms
of the “nostalgia” they feel and share with other community members in diasporic settings. The
şark odası concept, like other aspects of what Boym (2001) calls the “diasporic intimacy” in
which the immigrants or members of the diaspora communities live, has been utilized as a
marker of cultural identity that does not factually relate to the places those artifacts putatively
represent. The Comaroffs (2009: 2) claim that “cultural identity, in the here-and-now, represents
itself ever more as two things at once: the object of choice and self-construction, typically
through the act of consumption, and the manifest product of biology, genetics, and human
essence.” This self-exoticizing of traditional settings caters more to the members of these
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immigrant populations than to outsiders. Therefore, the marketing and remaking of space to look
“authentic” or local perhaps works in the immigrant setting, regardless of the profiles of the
consumers. As Boym (2001) and Özyürek (2001) remind us, much of the memory-work of
migrants occurs not in the public sphere (from which they are often marginalized or excluded)
but in the private sphere, for example through the display of valued photographs and objects of
the homeland in the home, or in the intimate settings.
The şark odası also helps musicians in their endeavor to make (or at least to feel they can
make) music that is more authentic, traditional, Turkish, Kurdish or Anatolian. It provides an
imaginary spatial connection in circumstances that otherwise might become totally disconnected
from the actual music in its village context, even as musicians on the stage do not necessarily
perform traditional music. In order to retain the music’s traditional characteristics, they may
choose not use synthesizers and electric or “effect” guitars. I would argue that this şark odası
aesthetic provides a “traditional” mask for the modern performing practices of the musicians, one
that appeals to the audience, who may be comfortable in a şark odası while listening to alebesk
and dancing as if at a wedding. Though not a complete imitation, which would fail to convince in
most cases, the cover of a preexisting song exemplifies the practice of modernization for
immigrant communities, one that relies on the bricolage of spatial and sonic eclecticism
(Hebdige 2002).

5.4. Audience and Repertoire at Türkü Bars
Almost none of the musicians are full-time musicians; in fact many have other fulltime
jobs. Shêxo is a mechanical engineer, Ali Baran owns a restaurant, and other musicians work at
full-time jobs, which are usually not related to music. The performance process at the türkü bars
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is related to the other places and occasions where musicians perform as well. Türkü bar
musicians perform at weddings as well as political rallies and fundraisers in Germany, which
they call programs. Türkü bar musicians in some occasions also perform at those venues if the
political party that organizes the event hires them. Thus, the political/cultural events and rallies
are where politics influence the musical aesthetic most. Then come the türkü bars where political
stances are contested through the audience requests, and finally the least politicized venues are
weddings that are designed to entertain the attendees. Wedding repertoires consist of local dance
and entertainment songs from regions that the bride and bridegroom come from. I attended a
couple of weddings, which are highly localized and exclusive entertainment events for a specific
group of attendees. The weddings are by definition designed as entertainment activities closed to
those sad and melancholic alebesk songs. Although line dances and göbek dansı exist in other
places, türkü bars are unique in the sense that the collective melancholy happens only in the
türkü bars. The customers sing along with musicians. Some cry while engaging with the imagery
of the homeland reproduced in those venues. Common aspects between all three venues are the
line dances. The bodies moving together exhibit similar qualities in all three locations. The most
significant feature distinguishing türkü bars from weddings and political events is the presence of
alebesk.
Unlike political events and weddings, türkü bars are open to everyone. Some nights,
members of the audience make requests (istekler) of arabesk, Turkish songs of pop stars like
Ajda Pekkan and Tarkan, or Turkish nationalist songs, most of which the musicians on stage
ideologically oppose. In some türkü bars, an “extreme” request (or one from a politically extreme
member) might come from the audience. “We try to play it down so that there would not be any
problem for the venue, and we try our best in those cases,” said Suat, one of the musicians I
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interviewed. Though some request political or symbolically powerful songs by musicians such as
Ahmet Kaya, generally the subjects of requested songs are love and loneliness.
People who go to türkü bars, like many of my subjects, seek sonic and visual
environments resembling both the intimate muhabbet gatherings at home and the traditional
weddings where people dance together. This urge calls to mind the rituals used to make a group
part of a community. Continuous collective activities at these türkü bars––the secularized ritual
and ritualized secular musical practice of collective singing and dancing––compensate for a lack
of “traditional” weddings and entertainment in Germany. The musicians, for instance, rely on
reenacting the actual wedding settings, where people join in line dances. It became evident in my
research that audience members were able to sing along to those happy or sad songs,
remembering the lyrics sometimes far better than the vocalists onstage, an important quality of
türkü bars that bears further study.
Türkü bar-goers in Istanbul, which for most of the Kurdish Alevis is the second
homeland, also miss the first homeland. I did research in türkü bars in both countries and the
music they requested was similar, proving the relevance and dominance of the transnational field
maintained by those cultural actors. In that sense the western European mode of entertainment
meet with the nostalgia for the old and first homeland in both homelands. As Ayhan Erol
observed at türkü bars in Izmir, the repertoire performed in those bars includes tunes full of
Alevi-Bektaşi musical codes if not direct references to Alevism.

5.4.1. Istekler
Different codes and messages are transmitted through audience requests, istekler (request
written on papers or napkins), which are as part of the negotiation between the audience and the
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musicians on stage all the while as all of those present reconstruct the cultural memory together.
The attendees and those who paid to be able to request particular songs from musicians, in most
cases anonymously, can tell how cultural memory is mediated at those venues. Those requests
helped me understand the power dynamics in that kind of environment, in which the artistic,
aesthetic, political, and cultural priorities intertwined. When a member of the audience wanted to
make a political statement, he or she could send an istek to the musicians so that they would play
a song associated with a particular political stance. Alternatively, if one of the audience members
wanted to signal his or her local pride, he or she could do so by requesting a song associated with
a specific place of origin in the first homeland. These requests are one of the best cultural texts in
understanding the intimate modes of exchange happening in second homeland entertainment
venues.
Istekler are narrative texts that give an unfiltered perspective of what those making the
requests would like to share with their peers. They also affect the repertoire selections and
performance settings by pressuring the musicians on stage through constant negotiation. The
customers send istekler, through which the negotiations occur between not only musicians and
their audience, but also between audiences from different identities and political stances. Some
of the istekler I collected have phrases like “Yeter artık Türkçe şarkılar, Kürtçe yok mu?”
(Enough of Turkish songs, can you play a Kurdish song), “Halaya geldik, çok yavaş şarkılar
çalıyorsunuz” (We came to dance, enough with those slow songs), “Kurdish halay,” “Any song
from Malatya,” and “Maraş türküsü.” Through these requests members of the audience try to
shape the direction of the night as much as they can. In fact, there is a lot of appeasement that has
to go on to make the evening work because there are in fact political and social factions,
frictions, and contestations. Alongside the negotiations taking place between the leaders of the
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community organizations and musicians and bar owners are real-time negotiations at türkü bars
with musicians and other members in the audience through istekler that shape the actual musical
process.

Figure 5.1. Two examples of istekler from the LeyLim Türkü Bar

As is documented in many social science studies, in many instances including my own
survey, there is an inherent discrepancy between what participants say in public and what they
would declare in their intimate or personal spheres. I observed that, as part of understanding the
cultural memory of those who attend the türkü bars, the istekler provide insight into what the
audience actually demands from their musicians. Türkü bar musicians try to cover the most
popular and frequently requested songs even before the audience requests them. Even then, in
most cases, members of the audience would not stop requesting repeatedly the same songs. In the
list I compiled, the song “Şaçlarını Taramışsın” was requested seven times in one night,
sometimes with different titles taken from different sections of the lyrics. The following (Figure
5.2) is one of the most popular versions, from a bağlama kursu (bağlama school) located in
Cologne. I analyze one version of this song in following section.
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Figure 5.2. Notation of “Saçlarını Taramışsın” (“You combed your hair”)

An analysis of the songs requested by the audience yields a number of songs of 60-70 per
night. More than 80 percent of the songs are in Turkish. Not all songs are necessarily performed
that night. The nights I attended as participant observer, the musicians played almost 90 percent
of the requests, a sign that the audience for the most part was getting what they wanted from the
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musicians. A melodic analysis of the songs requested suggests a melancholic picture in terms of
emotional qualities of the tunes requested. Almost all are sung within a couple of melodic scales
or modes, and the majority are in line with folk music scales of Turkish music Sometimes the
musicians have to follow certain melodic patterns in order to stay within the same scales, so that
they can easily connect songs in a medley. A connection to the next song without interruption is
especially pertinent for the line dance sequences, where musicians have to connect songs to each
other so that there will be at least 20 minute-long dance intervals that would keep the audience
dancing. Most dance tunes have happy themes and lyrics sometimes calling for action or
involvement in a struggle for peace.
Prolonged social events and hours spent in türkü bars have become locations of collective
melancholy for Kurdish Alevi immigrants. These events and performances have helped to
maintain the group’s ritual and spiritual unity. In this context, “spirituality” refers to a more
modern form of a non-practicing but collectively accepted solidarity within the Alevi
community. The rather cheerless ritual in a smoke-filled room—with collective singing of
emotionally charged tunes in common remembrance—might seem an unhappy event to
outsiders. As an insider of the culture to a certain extent, I view türkü bar events as symptomatic
of a cultural and generational melancholy and nostalgia similar to that which overtake the
participants in original Alevi spiritual rituals (Chapter 4). Technically these events lack the
amusement of an entertainment, and might perhaps even be defined as the opposite of
entertainment.
Musicians usually follow a certain path when they perform at türkü bars, as they respond
to the audience requests as part of the negotiated practice to make that night possibly go along
with minimal problems. Most nights, audience members start sending their requests from the
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beginning of the night. On certain occasions through the night, türkü bar musicians announce
that they are open to requests from the audience members. With the melancholic repertoires full
of nostalgia, türkü bars work almost like laboratories for longing, nostalgia, and melancholy.

5.5. Alevi Music, Türkü, and Alebesk
Both religious and secular repertoires of Alevi musicality, as elderly Alevis perceived them
previously, are incorporated into the folk-music practice of the second and third homelands,
along with the officially sanctioned Turkish türkü repertoire. I argue that the religious music
associated with sociopolitical Alevi identity has continued in the form of this secularized music.
Performing music with the saz and singing a few Alevi hymns with other folk tunes has become
the sole practice, musical or other, that all Alevis share. One possible explanation for this
transformation from sacred to secular is that aspects of the religious ritual were long ago infused
into the folk music. Another explanation is that folk music has always been a ritualistic pillar of
religion in Kurdish Alevi practice. A distinction between the secular and sacred may thus not be
applicable to the music Alevis listen to and associate with their identity. The Alevi repertoire
appears to have an inherent sacred status for Alevis regardless of their individual piety. Thus, the
music plays a more significant role in presumed Alevi modes of living than any other religious
symbol or practice associated with Alevism. The Alevi repertoire has become part of singing in
public for financial or other benefits, and has survived in gatherings in which alcohol is
consumed as well. For some Alevis, especially the elderly, cem ceremonies continue to hold
social significance, while for others this religious gathering has no meaning. The music that elder
generations are accustomed to hearing in cem ceremonies has now been recycled in secular
contexts. Alevi religious repertoire has become part of the Turkish musical vernacular, and
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listeners have ceased to associate the music with Alevis: thus, the music has become
decontextualized from its Alevi ethos.
The categorical distinction between “sacred” and “secular or ethnic” music among Kurdish
Alevis has become particularly problematic. Inspired by Martin Stokes’ work on arabesk in
Turkey, I have coined the term “alebesk” to designate a musical genre in which the old Alevi
musical ideas and taste, sacred or secular, are infused with the lyrical imagery and content of
arabesk (Stokes 1989, 1992). This new secularized and popular genre was propagated among
Alevi circles in the last two decades—first among immigrants in Germany and then in Turkey.
The lyrical domain of this Alevi-arabesk hybrid genre draws on worldly expressions of
belonging, loneliness, and other painful experiences common among immigrants, which are also
articulated in arabesk songs. The viability of this genre stems from the strong support of those in
Germany; most of its performers have gradually transported it back to Turkey. Such
circumstances of exchanges are likely true for many genres and forms in the musical world of
immigrants, and remain an imperative for the growing popularity of hybrid genres like alebesk
among Kurdish and Alevis living in their second or third homelands. Alebesk and other folktunes
have begun to be perceived as the sole representatives of a culture belonging to a different time
and place, even as the lyrics have no spiritual or ritualistic content. Sonic references to the
religious repertoire, severed from its religious meanings, might be key factors for the many
Alevis who embrace alebesk. The relatives of the Kurdish Alevi families I met in Cologne also
love this music; they share many YouTube links, pointing to these songs on their Facebook
pages with relatives dispersed throughout the world.
When audience members request a folk song they usually call it a türkü or if it is a pop
song they call it a şarkı, whereas when they request an alebesk song, they usually ask for a parça
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(piece), an unspecified reference to all genres. In some instances, I saw alebesk songs requested
as türküs, which led me to believe that this genre is occupying a space in the folk music domain.
After conceptualizing the name of the genre as alebesk, I asked the opinions of my sources
including Shêxo, Ali Baran, and Ulaş Özdemir, who all agreed that alebesk is an informative title
for the music that has become popular among Türkiye’li people.
Alebesk tunes have become among the most preferred songs in türkü bars and other kinds
of gatherings. The sonic proximity of this repertoire to the türkü repertoire became more evident
to me when I was asked for the first time to perform with a group in a türkü bar in Germany; my
hesitation disappeared the moment the vocalist began singing. The musical framework and all
aspects of the performance were identical with folk music that might have been performed, and
often is, along with alebesk. This genre managed to appeal by capturing the experience of the
people living in their second or third homeland. There are no significant sonic boundaries
between religious repertoire, folk, and alebesk, especially for those living in their second or third
homelands. Another quality of alebesk is the vocalists’ timbre, imitating the arabesk vocalists of
the 1980s.
The appeal of alebesk among Kurdish Alevis does not necessarily minimize the
significance of this genre among other Turks or Alevis as they are part of the same transnational
space and the same social field in which the cultural entrepreneurs and political agents are active.
This new second homelander aesthetic exemplified by alebesk features such qualities as: a)
bağlama düzeni is dominating over the kara düzen, b) elektrosaz is not as common as it used to
be, replaced by the bağlamas with pickups, c) dede sazı and a search for other forms of saz tınısı
(timbre) become more common practice, d) the classical guitar has become an even more
dominant instrument than it used to be. Alebesk features elements of folk music or türkü,
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arabesk, and popular music. Guitar chords and tablatures have become indispensable elements of
compositions, recordings, and performance practices.
Most recognizable examples of alebesk genre belong to Kıvırcık Ali. The following song
named “Isırgan Otu” (Stinging Nettle) is probably the most popular song about nostalgia for the
village life, a direct critique of urban life in both Istanbul and Germany, thus the gurbet (the
condition of living or working outside of hometown or homeland). Kıvırcık Ali was born in a
small Alevi town in central Anatolia, and then migrated to Istanbul where he worked at lowpaying jobs while learning how to play the saz from a music dershane in Istanbul. In fact,
Kıvırcık Ali’s 2001 arrangement of “Isırgan Otu” musically inspired many of the arrangements
of folk, pop, and protest albums released in Turkey. The same arrangement templates can be
heard in many other alebesk albums. The lyrics, though not exclusive to alebesk, are about the
problems of modernity, migration, being exiled, and urbanization.
The folk musical elements make these kinds of song hard to classify as arabesk, which is
already an established genre with an Arab-inspired sound. Following are the lyrics of “Isırgan
Otu," which is available on the online music store iTunes under the category of pop music. This
category can be interpreted as another sign of the popularity of the song as well as the unease of
those who categorized this song under the folk music or other categories.
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“Isırgan Otu," lyrics and composition by Kıvırcık Ali (2001) 33

Yaylalara veda ettik, ve de dağlara
Yatağı yorganı alıp, düştük yollara
Gülü çemeni değiştik, kör betonlara
Köyü düşündükçe anam, içim yanıyor
Yanıyor da ciger aney, yürek kanıyor

Burda dost bildiğin anam, ısırgan otu
Elini tuttun mu bil ki, elin yanıyor
Şeref ekmek bulamazken, şerefsiz budu
Götürdükçe ciger aney, içim yanıyor
Yanıyor da güzel anam, yürek kanıyor

We bid our farewell to the valleys and mountains.
We took our beds and sheets and hit the road.
We exchanged roses and grass for damn concrete.
My heart aches as I think about our village.
Oh mother, my heart is burning, it is bleeding.
__________________
33

Kıvırcık Ali, “Isırgan Otu,” http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KCUCANkVipI
Another famous example by Kıvırcık Ali called “Üçüncü Gurbet,” [The Third Gurbet]:
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HLJQt6ejnTE
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Here, those you thought your friends are stinging nettle.
As you touch them your hands burn.
While the honored remains hungry,
The dishonored eats chicken breast.
Oh mother, my heart is burning, it is bleeding.

The syllabic meter present in the lyrics affirms folk music or türkü, and to some extent
Alevi background, lyrical and metric frameworks. This syllabic meter is a common one used in
both Alevi poetry and 19th and 20th century Turkish folk and urban poetry. Each verse consists of
a group of eight and a group of five syllables with a durak (breath or pause) in between. The
name and the themes suggest a pastoral nostalgia shaping the social memory of the immigrants.
The gaze is from the perspective of a visitor to a new place reporting to those who stayed in the
old home or village. The metaphors are rural and full of nostalgia for the village and the values it
entails. In his vocal delivery, Kıvırcık Ali uses local or “broken” Turkish versions of some
phrases that I indicated in boldface. Grammatically incorrect Turkish or Kurdish lyrics and
inappropriate application of syllables have been among the unmistakable features of this new
aesthetic.
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Figure 5.3. Staff notation of “Isırgan Otu," lowered one and a half step to A. The B-flat2 is
between B and B-flat.

The main melodic phrase is performed by the instruments including the mey (double-reed
aerophone). The bağlama provides the downbeats with the şelpe (playing bağlama with bare
hands) strokes as a sign of incorporation of the search for the new saz tınısı (see below). The
bağlama opens the way to the vocals, which are throughout the piece accompanied by piano,
classical guitar, and multiple bağlamas. The bağlama’s main function in this arrangement is to
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provide the answers of the melodic phrases the vocalist sings as a call-and-response between the
vocalist and the accompanying instrument. While Kıvırcık Ali is singing we hear accompanying
piano, guitar, synthesizers, and bağlamas. The dede sazı and şelpe sound is invoked by the
strokes of the downbeat in the interlude where most instruments join the unison performance.
The chords of each stroke follow the following pattern:

Figure 5.4. Bağlama “chords” marking the down beats.

The downbeats of each melodic sentence are marked by the şelpe strokes providing a rhythmic
framework marking the beginnings of measures. The rhythmic structure and the values of each
cycle have been part of the same emotional qualities that those songs invoke: nostalgia for a time
and place that do not exist anymore, an imaginary location. In the vocal repetitions and refrain,
Kıvırcık Ali sings in octaves. He resorts to improving the emotional message and thickness of
the vocal section, an ambiguous reference to the strained high register male vocals. This practice,
I would argue, is an aesthetic remnant of essential compositional elements of arabesk songs
(Stokes 1992). “Isırgan Otu" is one of the quintessential examples of the alebesk genre with its
aesthetic features that exemplify frequently used melodic, harmonic, and arrangement qualities
and techniques. Singing in the higher octave is part of breaking the monotony of the aesthetic
understanding of the musical progression. When he sings the refrain, we hear the higher octaves
accompanying the main vocal line while other instruments join the vocals in a unison fashion.
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Featuring similar compositional and performance qualities with “Isırgan Otu,” Kıvırcık
Ali’s “Yanımda Sen Olmayınca,” [“When You Are Not With Me”] is probably the most visible
example of alebesk. 34 As of January 21, 2013, more than 7.6 million people have viewed the
link on YouTube. It features all aspects of the folk music with lyrics about modern problems
stemming from migration. Ali’s vocal style resembles that of the late Ahmet Kaya (Chapter 3).
Historically, artists and musicians in their second or third homelands have been able to
bend first-homeland aesthetic norms through their cultural and political acts. In some cases,
artists have managed to create their own aesthetics, sending these back to the first homeland like
cultural remittances (Flores 2009). For musicians, channels of such transactions include releasing
albums in the first homeland, broadcasting music videos on satellite TV channels, sharing songs
and videos on YouTube and other digital media, and performing in the first homeland. For
musicians with Turkish or Kurdish roots living in their second homeland, some of these cultural
remittances are articulated in once taboo or unexpected ways: writing lyrics that contain
grammatical errors; inappropriate use of vocables, words, or sentences; and eclectic submerging
of ideas within musical sentences.
The broken Turkish resulting from interaction with German and other languages in
Germany is not the same broken Turkish spoken in regions where Kurds, Alevis, or other
minorities used to live. "Broken Turkish" may be another way to resist assimilation in both
countries by not assimilating to the "proper" Istanbul dialect of Turkish. Some of alebesk

__________________
34

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TfHbykwLEJI
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musicians and singers, who would like to "authenticate" their music, compose and sing songs
with broken Turkish.
As Martin Stokes has observed, "Halk [folk music] and arabesk must be seen above all as
different ways of talking about music, rather than different ways of performing or experiencing
music" (Stokes 1992: 50). I would extend his observation to include the context of alebesk and
halk/türkü. The form of this genre is identical with the türkü. The main issue, one could argue,
has been what Harris Berger (2009) calls the stance of alebesk tunes that distinguishes them
from others. The alebesk musical framework, taken from folk music melodies, follows a similar
pattern in terms of its melodic trajectory. Usually there are two and sometimes three distinct
sections, but in most cases (80%) the songs analyzed have two principle melodic sections with
distinguishable themes. In some cases, major themes are either the same as the refrain or slightly
modified versions of it.
One might speculate that the emergence and popular appeal of this aesthetic arises from a
political reaction against first-homeland practices, such as an educational system that enforces
Turkish-only regulations in public spaces. In opposition to this policy, musicians have perhaps
expressed their outrage in any form they wished, disregarding the grammatically correct forms of
singing in Turkish. One might think that the decades of national teaching of “Our Beautiful
Turkish,” 35 emphasizing “correct” pronunciation of modern Turkish in all official radio or TV
(TRT regulated) broadcasts, informed this new aesthetic. A more convincing explanation is that
the new aesthetic results from changes in the daily language of practitioners, who have been
__________________
35

An official policy of forcing students of other mother tongues to speak “perfect Turkish” in
order to assimilate them (Zeydanlıoğlu 2007, 2008).
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using German along with their mother tongues. In the second homeland, assimilation has shaped
their expressive aesthetic into a more German mode of articulation. Unorthodox use of language
and music seems to be a common trait among the recordings of musicians who live in their
second or third homelands. Good examples of this practice in the realm of Alevi music are found
in the songs of the late Kıvırcık Ali, who in his lyrics expressed his dislike of “perfect Turkish.”
One of the most prominent protagonists of the alebesk genre, Ali passed away at an early age
while touring in Turkey.
Another popular example of the alebesk genre, for which I provided the notation above,
is Saçlarını Taramışsın” (“You Combed Your Hair”) composed by Ozan Vural. The most
popular version of it, also available on the iTunes online music store, is the one by Turgay
Başyayla, whose YouTube page of the song had more than two million views as of January 21,
2014. The inclusion of his song in the mainstream folk music scene in Turkey is a sign that this
aesthetic has found its way through the musical world of the folk musicians in Turkey and
Germany.

“Saçlarını Taramışsın” (“You Combed Your Hair”) (With guitar tablatures)

Em

Am

Saçlarını taramışsın,
G

D

Sarı renge boyamışsın,
Am

You combed your hair

Dyed it yellow

G

Haberin varmıydı benden,

Have you ever noticed me?
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D

Em

Beni bana gomamışsın.

Em

Am

Keşke seni görmeseydim
G

I wish I never fell in love with you

G

Lal olaydı ağzım dilim
D

I wish I had never seen you

D

Gönül verip sevmeseydim
Am

You never bothered.

I wish my mouth would not utter a single word

Em

Keşke çirkin demeseydim.

I wish I had never said that you were ugly.

The arrangement begins with classical guitar and şelpe bağlama arpeggios, bendir (frame drum),
and bass over a duduk (double-reed aerophone) solo improvised in a pre-composed manner. This
kind of introduction with a reed instrument has become part of the folk music recordings made in
both Istanbul and Cologne. The guitar tablatures are significant tools for the learning and
performance processes of the music that is being produced in the German-Türkiye’li
transnational space. The increasing appeal of the guitar in Turkey and Germany undoubtedly was
influenced by its global appeal. The arpeggios provided both by the guitar and the bağlama are
constant elements of this genre. Other melodic instruments follow similar patterns in a
heterophonic manner. The dede sazı sound is more audible in the interlude, which is a repetition
of the vocal melody. The syllabic meter of the lyrics follows those in Turkish folk tunes with a
division of 4+4, which is one of the most common versions of the 8-syllable meter, also called
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sekizli hece ölçüsü. Examples similar to this one go back to older times in Turkish folk poetry.
This form shows a strong affinity with the lyrical qualities of türkü with quatrain structures.
The artistic domain that musicians living in their second homeland have created and
occupied has been fluid in terms of the cultural, social, and financial resources they have relied
on. Support mechanisms in the second homeland have been unreliable in that the “formal” ways
of making music, or even of being a musician, have been financially and culturally challenging,
if not alienating, to these musicians. Experience of this fluid space and unreliable support has
come with early exposure to the multiplicity of cultures and practices in the second homeland.
These de facto musicians, therefore, have seized opportunities to bend first-homeland rules,
boundaries, and borders of performing, creating, and reproducing. Those musicians might not
have had the same status in Turkey. In the second homeland, with its political and economic
agendas, they have felt comfortable and intrigued enough to make music in unorthodox ways
that would be impossible, or at least unusually daring, in the first homeland. This does not mean
that the music created in the second homeland has been completely unique or different from that
of the first homeland, as musicians have not re-invented the wheel; however, it is significant that
the second homeland has provided an adaptable space they might navigate more freely, which in
many respects appears more complex than the first homeland’s cultural space. In many instances
musicians have performed the same repertoire in their two worlds. It is telling that audiences
have been prepared to understand what such musicians have provided and enjoy it as much as
they have.
Most musicians I met for this study with roots in Turkey and/or Turkish Kurdistan have
partaken into the creation of a political aesthetic, which at times resulted from a distaste for, and
in some cases resistance to, the official or authorized modes of making and performing music,
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thus for a policing of culture. This practice of resistance to orthodox music-making in an entirely
different environment from that of their country of origin could be viewed as a reaffirmation of
the failure of republican control over the aesthetic choices of its citizens. The government has
failed to convince the entire population of Turkey as it has sought to impose particular ways and
forms of playing, spelling, writing, articulation, and pronunciation.
The transnational networks and flow of people, and with them cultural forms, between
homelands has contributed to the appeal of the new aesthetic in the new homeland, and
eventually in the old. The acceptance of second homeland musicians’ aesthetic has gradually
created a space for appreciation in the first. This space has been negotiated and mediated
between the two homelands. The aesthetic cannot be excluded from the political in either
homeland, for political actors have functioned as harbingers or enablers in the process of this
transnational transaction. Such political influence may be seen in musical aspects and audience
attitudes, as discussed below.
Among the concepts that could be used in describing cultural production and
consumption in the second homeland are bricolage, syncretism, hybridity, and assimilation. In
examining Alevi music, one of the best concepts to describe the internal medley of musical form
and repertoire performed in türkü bars is that of the potpourri. Türkiye’li musicians have
acquired terminologies used by the TRT, which has been the dominant institution in musical
performance and education. Musical terms such as potpori have come from the terminology TRT
musicians and educators of the conservatories have used for decades. Türkü bar musicians
extend and modify the term potpori to include Kurdish songs with similar tempos and rhythms as
opposed to the TRT’s standardized repertoire of potporis.
Musicians and the attendees of türkü bars use the term potpori in reference to a musical
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medley that is usually associated with juxtaposed dance tunes with similar rhythms and tempos. I
believe that the concept of potpourri can capture the cultural approaches of the musicians and
attendees alike in the second homeland. Thus, I extend the potpourri concept to all genres and
tunes performed with minimal distinction made among them by the musicians, an egalitarian
take on all of the songs from the first homeland. Performance of Kurdish, Turkish, and Alevi
religious and other songs associated with various regions of Turkey where immigrants originate
might be best described as a form of potpourri. Musicians creating potpourris would not claim to
be doing something unique; instead, they aim to present as many examples as possible of songs
from first homeland, in order to embrace each group or entity. When the türkü bar musicians
perform a potpourri they combine songs with similar rhythmic features from different regions.
Usually those medleys are more specific and short, playing four or five consecutive halay songs
from different regions of the first homeland.
The metaphor of potpourri helps clarify the eclectic juxtaposition of “local” cultures from
the first homeland with those of the second. The potpourri concept captures the transformation
process and modes of cultural expression for many communities around the world.
The juxtaposition of distinct and hyper-local cultural practices associated with the first homeland
is an essential cultural move. Many songs are juxtaposed and performed non-stop, not only in the
türkü bars and muhabbet gatherings, but also at weddings. The aesthetic of potpourri best
manifests itself in türkü bars. Potpourris are not limited to one language; a Turkish song can be
followed by a Kurdish song and vice versa. It is important to note that the earliest (and probably
the only) venue where both Kurdish and Turkish tunes might be enjoyed by Turks and Kurds
together has been in türkü bars. The relatively recent but significantly inclusionary spaces, in the
form of türkü bars, have been crucial as they create a venue for gathering folks from all lifestyles
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and all parts of the first homeland.

5.6. Politics at Türkü Bars
Most türkü bars have background music played from jukeboxes filled with alebesk, the
general türkü repertoire, and Turkish pop music. The most popular songs are those performed by
musicians such as late Kazım Koyuncu, a Laz musician who released Laz folk music albums
along with Turkish, and compilation albums such as Yedi Karanfil (Seven Cloves) and Türküler
Sevdamız (Türküs Are Our Love), among others. The music of türkü bars illustrates ideological
choices of owners and producers, based on profiles of the customers they serve. A band enjoyed
by a particular person may constitute an identity marker she desires to associate with. Some
politically active musicians or bands are either associated, or perceived to be associated, with
certain political movements or parties active in Turkey and/or in Germany. Engagement with a
musician or band entails strong political choices for the people I interviewed. An affinity to
music groups like Kızılbayrak (Red Flag), Kutupyıldızı (Polaris), koms (Kurdish music groups),
or individual Alevi musicians, in many cases goes beyond aesthetic listenership to signify a
political identification with the parties with which those particular musicians or groups are
associated. Even the musicians and groups who were able to transcend those barriers, like Şivan
Perwer or Mahsuni Şerif, could not escape criticism from other political parties for their
engagements with political issues.
Those who prefer listening to music in the Turkish and Kurdish languages come to türkü
bars in order to enjoy, participate, and dance. I encountered almost no native German person at
concerts that Kurdish Alevis organized or at türkü bars generally. Türkü bars are
not exclusively for customers who drink alcohol, though almost all attendees do. In rare cases,
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there have been pious Sunni or Alevi türkü lovers who drink non-alcoholic beverages, such as
the energy drink Red Bull. Such pious customers have tended to hide their nonalcoholic beverages; I discovered their secret from interviews with owners. Meryem, the owner
of a bar in Essen, said that some Muslims want to be viewed as socially integrated with their
peers who drink alcohol. Such customers constitute less than five percent of türkü bar customers.
In Germany, modern modes of socializing that include drinking alcohol have become normalized
in immigrant life. Many perceive drinking alcohol as a daily social activity.
Most of those who attend prefer to listen to folk and other popular alebesk tunes, mostly
in Turkish but also in Kurdish. A small Kurdish, Sunni Muslim group associates themselves with
the ideological framework of multiculturalism and, at the same time, practices piety by not
drinking alcohol when patronizing türkü bars. Thus, they manage to socialize with other Kurds
and Turks with whom they share political and cultural interests and background. Türkü bars also
represent a prominent place where they might, like others, listen to Turkish and Kurdish tunes
and dance as they do at “authentic” weddings.
Active transnational political organizations have had a strong impact on the lives of
immigrants from Turkey; however, in my excursions to türkü bars, I saw that Kurdish Alevis
have gradually become more immune to the political directives of the organizations than they
used to be. A possible explanation might be that, as many leftist organizations have demonized
the bars, these venues have subsequently been spared the attention of the most active members of
Marxist and Leninist organizations, as well as those who criticized owners for serving alcohol
and providing “corrupt” spaces serving as “venues for prostitution.” Kurdish nationalists have
also condemned alcoholic beverages, advocating instead a more sterilized Kurdish platform and
space, far from "corrupt" Western forms of living. For example, I was told that a popular
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Kurdish Alevi singer, who was supposed to perform, was so drunk he could not speak or hold his
saz properly. I also heard things like, "these … were the main places for prostitution; they were
selling Kurdish girls here.” My impression is that this image is changing and türkü bars are
becoming more accepted as sites of social entertainment. Some bars held political affiliations
that used to matter much more. Munzur Türkü Bar had a more Kurdish stance and nationalist
Kurds preferred spending their weekend nights there, listening to a more Kurdish-intensive
repertoire, that still included tunes in Turkish and other languages.

5.6.1. Melancholy and Intimacy in Second Homeland Türkü Bars: The Şark Odası Effect
People who spend hours at these places, mingling with their peers, friends, and family
members, share recognizable traits that define their collective belonging to the immigrant
community with origins in Turkey. Political and social transformation in the lives of my
interviewees has become more visible through my theoretical inquiry into the collective intimacy
these bars witness. The türkü bar, as I have seen it, is a unique place where gender tensions
interconnect with both first and second homeland social and collective intimacies. For those who
search for such intimacy, the location of türkü bars serves as a strong emotional reflection of
second-homeland sociocultural changes in their current iteration. Customers in türkü bars,
mostly between ages twenty and forty, know each other well. The place hosts their encounters
with friends, peers, and relatives. Türkü bars also play a significant role as locations for dating
and mating practices of young Turkish and/or Kurdish Alevis. Among my respondents, many
highlighted the fact that they can find dates at the bar—or after, or at least spot potential dates
while singing and dancing together. The türkü bar as a place to find possible mates recalls the
village wedding, which, in its traditional form, served not only as the venue to entertain families
196

of the bride and groom, but was also where youths might find their future mates.
A few türkü bars had bouncers waiting outside, confirming that they had had security
issues in the past. People get drunk and, just as at village weddings, a few drunken men begin to
harass women while they dance, which happened a few times while I was there. The türkü bar,
thus, is a stage for exhibiting masculinity, and gender roles are in play. Especially after 2:00am
on crowded dance floors, there was almost constant fighting. It has become virtually impossible
to avoid embarrassment of the insiders and a macho display in the bars, in which what Michael
Herzfeld has termed “cultural intimacy” is at play. Herzfeld (1997) defines cultural intimacy as
the aspects of a culture viewed as embarrassing vis-à-vis outsiders. These embarrassing actions
and simultaneous attempts to conceal them constitute the pillar of cultural intimacy of TurkishKurdish-Anatolian immigrants, in both old and new homelands. From my observation, the
friction and display of gendered tensions have been more prominent in the second homeland than
in the first. The social auto-control mechanisms at play in the first homeland have virtually
disappeared in the second, probably due to the dispersed structure of immigrant lives, which
prevents them from building a critical mass that would activate first-homeland social controls.
Such controls manifest as warnings by elder members or by collective suppression of the
problematic behavior of drunken males of the community. The lack of such societal warnings
and prevention mechanisms is also crucial in understanding “honor killings” in new homelands
such as Germany or Sweden (Wikan 2008). These aspects of cultural intimacy deserve more
scrutiny in future studies.
Türkü bars also witness social tensions and divisions among the audience members due
to the political or social or cultural or economic factors. Those divisions can precipitate
discussions and fights among the members of the audiences. In order for all to get along in that
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space, some kind of balance needs to be achieved to allow for different ethnic, political, and
religious identities to be represented, contested, and negotiated. Some members with Kurdish
and Alevi backgrounds claim their identities, differences from, and similarities with the larger
Türkiye’li population through articulation of the existence of Kurdish and Alevi music in order to
be accepted by all Türkiye’lis in attendance. Other salient social, economic, and education
divisions are being overlooked thanks to the music’s dominance and nostalgia mediated in
“living rooms” of those people.
I also want to make the point that the main motive behind establishing türkü bars has
been a commercial one. There has been an incentive for the owners and the musicians of those
clubs to negotiate with the political and religious party members as they want to increase the
number of people who attend their establishments. For example: once Alevi religious songs were
part of a negotiation between the owners and musicians of türkü bars with the religious leaders.
There are strict divisions between communities from Turkey, namely Kurds and Turks,
especially in different locations.

5.7. Case Study: LeyLim Türkü Bar and the Performers of MyHosch
Meryem, the owner of the LeyLim Türkü Evi in Essen, invited me to meet musicians
who play regularly at her bar. On the entrance of the türkü bar were pictures of patrons taken
with owners, musicians, friends, and families. The weekly and monthly programs were posted
outside, handwritten in Turkish. The bar is located close to the University of Essen campus,
next to two erotic shops and a popular gay bar, but this location seems not to have bothered the
ever-increasing number of customers. The hidden or underground nature of the place has not
discouraged customers, either; instead, it has probably helped to conceal it from outsiders and
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intruders who might alter the innocence and intimacy of the place and the music performed
there.
The bar has standard bar tables. When I checked out the audio equipment, a mixer and a
couple of amps, I found they were made primarily of cheap or secondhand devices.
Interior lighting is quite dim in almost all türkü bars I visited, both in Germany and Turkey. The
bars operate in venues previously run as bars or discothèques. Meryem had started another
business, but apparently it had failed. The drinks listed are not cheap by German standards. The
background music was consistent with typical türkü bars in Germany. The schedule of music at
the bar was:
Fridays: Grup MyHosch (Suat and Ferhat)
Saturdays: Grup Leylo (some Saturdays Grup MyHosch takes the stage).
Once in a while, members of the local law enforcement came to check the noise level
following complaints from local residents. This was not a common experience; the complaining
neighbors called the police only on rare occasions. Since the bar owner had a noise and liquor
license, she managed to deal with the disgruntled neighbors. The last time I talked to Meryem, in
September 2011, she told me they had moved to a new space in Düsseldorf and are apparently
quite happy with their new neighbors and customers.
Suat, the guitarist and vocalist of MyHosch, asked the other musician to reduce the
volume, offered me a cigarette, and joked about the bar being a workplace, not a hangout, for
him. Then Ferhat, the bağlama player and vocalist, joined us and the interview began. They both
smoked cigarettes nonstop even though both would sing for hours into the night. Ferhat and Suat
are both Alevi and Suat comes from a Kurdish Alevi family. I got the impression that they felt a
little intimated by my background and role as interviewer, as if I were going to judge their talent.
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I tried to reassure them that what they do was my research topic, not how well they did, and that
I respected their efforts and experiences. When I asked what was behind the name of the group,
Ferhat told the story. One night they were drinking, like this, and were looking for a name. They
decided on the Turkish mayhoş (sour, cool, strained), twisting it by replacing the Turkish may
with the English My, and the Turkish hoş with Hosch, which has no meaning in German but the
sound of sch is equivalent to the ş sound.
Suat is originally from Siverek, Urfa, but was raised in Mersin as an internal immigrant
in Turkey, a typical experience for many Kurdish and Turkish musicians. He told me that he
migrated to Germany from Turkey ten years ago. Ferhat has been in Germany for about twelve
years. All band members and almost everybody speak in Turkish and all the dialogues and
background discussions are in Turkish. He plays the bağlama while Suat plays the classical
guitar. For a couple of days they had a drummer accompanying them. Suat said that the third
musician, the rhythm player, would join them later. Both Suat and Ferhat complained about the
business owners, who, for the most part, were not willing to pay more for "extra" musicians. The
musicians are paid about 100 euros each per night, and owners of türkü bars are unwilling to pay
an additional 100 euros. Suat said they were pushing the owners to allocate money for at least
one other musician. Sometimes MyHosch includes a bass player. Sometimes for large gigs, he
said, they had even a fourth musician, which made him smile.
Like many other türkü bar musicians, Suat complained that business and financial
constraints overwhelmed the necessities of musical aesthetics. On many occasions, musicians
were not paid enough to include more renk (color) instruments, drums, and in some cases even
extra vocalists. He compared the conditions in Germany with the venues in Turkey, where four
or five musicians might play onstage; here in Germany, he said, it was extremely hard to
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convince owners to pay for an additional musician. It was better for musicians in Turkey, he
claimed. Nevertheless they managed to convince Meryem to include a third musician on the
payroll, at least at most gigs. In another bar where I conducted fieldwork, the Prestige Türkü Bar
in Wuppertal, only two musicians were hired; one on the saz and the other on the organ, playing
the altyapı (basis or frame) rhythm, and sometimes melodic instruments based on samples and
synthesizers. Altyapı is a significant musical concept in Turkish music and pedagogy; in many
cases, it comprises the rhythmic frame and melodic infrastructure, or both. Sometimes it provides
the drones, or even the major part of the musical arrangement, on top of which one or more
melodic instruments might be played. When MyHosch had the opportunity to include an organ
player, they had him play similarly: altyapı, organ, and percussion, as well as sometimes
color instruments. In the first phase of MyHosch, they had saz and guitar, both
providing rhythm as well; therefore, they had no need for a rhythm player. Gradually they
included new members. Their tenure at Ley Lim had lasted more than two years, since the
inaugural day of the bar.

5.7.1. “Değişmedik ama dönüşüyoruz” (“We have not changed; we evolved”).
It is pertinent to compare and contrast the repertoire of the türkü bars in Istanbul with that
in Cologne. The most significant differences lie in the non-musical aspects of the settings. More
than the repertoire, the days and times of the music played in türkü bars are different. In Istanbul,
which has clusters of türkü bars, one might go out every night of the week and choose from
many options. In Cologne, however, customers can hear live music on only a few nights and at
fewer bars. When immigrants in Germany manage to go out on weekends, they demand fullscale entertainment with music and dance for long hours, well into morning.
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Suat insightfully remarked that, "I was criticizing other musicians playing popular tunes
to appease the crowds, but then I realized that here people work at an exceptionally hard pace
and our audiences deserve what they demand, not what we want." Thus, common practice for
türkü bar musicians in Germany changed to accommodate the needs of audiences—their
customers. Türkü bar musicians like Suat feel they should consider their customers’ requests
when selecting repertoire. Therefore, the audience shapes almost the entire repertoire of the gigs
with requests. At times, some members of the audience complain about song selection. I heard
many musicians express their discomfort at not performing the music they prefer to play. Even
so, it was difficult, they told me, to judge harshly people who could come out for entertainment
only one night a week. Suat observed that insisting on performing repertoire musicians preferred
hurt business, and that ultimately no one would hire musicians who would not satisfy audience
requests. The bar owners want to sell alcohol and make money. Thus, shaping the repertoire of
the türkü bar amounts to a business decision as much as an aesthetic one. The end product
becomes a mere juxtaposition of songs that might satisfy customers from various backgrounds
and expectations of their türkü bar night. Essentially, then, the choice of repertoire results in a
potpourri.
In responding to audience requests, the members of MyHosch formerly had stricter rules,
Suat said. He summarized his feelings and the stance of so many musician and non-musician
immigrants alike when he remarked that “we have not changed, we evolved” (değişmedik ama
dönüşüyoruz). Change in this case is distinct from the stable state of mind associated with
evolution, which entails adaptation to the new conditions of the second homeland. Değişmek (to
change) entails a more concrete rupture from a political stance, and it has historically had
negative connotations, such as “to convert” or to lose one’s former character. Dönüşmek (to
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evolve), on the other hand, concerns evolution, a more acceptable state of being from a leftist
point of view. Dönüşmek also entails a more adaptive nature, such as that of musicians and
immigrants, in which many constraints might complicate their lives unless they adapt to
conditions by evolving. Thus, Suat, like other musicians, describes a mindset that has
transformed certain qualities of their existence and beliefs while holding “core” values intact. In
thus framing his condition, Suat tells others that he struggles to stick to his principles and core
beliefs. By adapting to the conditions in Germany and in venues where his group performs, he
claims that his musical aesthetic has evolved in order to incorporate, for example, the requests of
customers.
LeyLim Türküevi, unlike the majority of türkü bars in Germany, is run by a woman.
Meryem is a popular business owner––many musicians would prefer to be hired by her––as she
takes good care of her employees. Her manner was easygoing and extremely helpful for my
research. The group MyHosch was playing on Saturdays in Dortmund and Bochum, and once a
month on Saturday, at Ley Lim. “This place is a free place and more comfortable for demokrat
people,” as Suat put it, “Good people come here and we try to satisfy them.” Suat, like many
other musicians I interviewed in both Germany and Turkey, uses leftist discourse, emblematic of
the fact that musicians have adopted the language of the political groups they favor. The term
demokrat is a generic word in the leftist vernacular used to describe mostly the leftist, liberal,
socialist, and other democratic people in Turkey. Their use of leftist jargon, such as kitle (the
masses, the people, or the crowd), was evident on many occasions, and, I believe, signifies that
musicians see their audience through a leftist lens as, generally, musicians hail from
leftist communities of Turkey. I observed in musicians and non-musicians alike the adoption of
the leftist line, primarily in formulations and articulations of ordinary conversation. Musicians
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constantly use the term kitle when they refer to their audience, just as the “enlightened activists”
or “organic intellectuals” describe the masses that must be guided as kitle. Thus, this highly
politicized group can hardly escape current terminology.
I eventually concluded that the configuration of repertoire and length of performance
in türkü bars was very formulaic. Usually the program started around 10:30pm, depending on
attendance. At the bars I attended, the formula below was more or less followed, with slight
modifications. In Prestige and Ley Lim türkü bars, musicians started with türkü and alebesk
songs, and then played fast-paced songs for line dances, followed by çiftetelli or göbek dansı
“belly dance” 36 tunes to which people dance in traditional dance forms from Central and South
Anatolia. The line-dance tunes were generally from the folk music repertoire of the TRT and
some Kurdish folk tunes, whereas the alebesk comprised compositions with closer resemblance
to türkü, albeit with lyrics similar to those of arabesk. The following diagram shows the timing
and repertoire of the sessions, similar to those at weddings, with the exception of the emphasis
on the alebesk repertoire at the beginning of each cycle.

A. 20 min (6-7 songs) – türkü and alebesk, Slow, Turkish, Bağlama, Drum Synthesizer.
B. 30 min (5-6 songs) - halay-govend, Fast, Turkish and Kurdish, Instrumental and Vocal
C. 15 min (4-5 songs) – göbek, “belly-dance” Tunes from Central and South Anatolia

__________________
36

Çiftetelli or göbek dansı can be used as a generic term for regional and some cases urban
dances for couples or mix gender groups from Western, Central, and South Anatolia. In those
dances, the dancers raise their both hands and snap their fingers while dancing through figures
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After the initial performance program, different versions and combinations of this sequence
ensue, such as B-A-B-A-(C), and different permutations of these, until 6:00 in the morning. After
this basic starting pattern, musicians might pick various options regarding the order or length of
the sections. Depending on the enthusiasm of the audience and how much people dance onstage,
or sing along with the vocalists, the length and the order might vary. In certain cases, the
musicians refrain from taking a break in order that customers dancing onstage will keep doing
so. Some music groups use no predetermined sets whatsoever. When hired for türkü bars and
especially for weddings they usually perform tunes the family members who hired them prefer.
Other musicians have pre-composed sets they follow for each gig. A learning curve for
musicians concerns what tunes are requested by the attendees or owners. By responding to
audience requests as much as possible, and adding repertoire they themselves prefer, musicians
learn to both appeal to and negotiate with their audience so that both parties might be satisfied.
Responding to my question “what would you ideally like to play at türkü bars?” one
musician told me that he loved the folk music, what people actually listen to in their authentic
settings, which he thought could be done only in villages, not in those bars. One of the most
common notions articulated by musicians I interviewed was their attraction to the great folktunes
from each city of Anadolu (Anatolia), with its rich culture and music. Ferhat from MyHosch told
me his ideal would be a thoroughly “authentic” performance, but he was also pleased with
synthesizing the modern with the authentic as long as the source was “not destroyed.” If the kök
(root) was preserved, it was good enough for him.
__________________
imitating birds like a partridge. Figuratively and contextually, those dances differ from what is
known and marketed as belly dance from the Arab world.
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Most of the musicians I interviewed had not collaborated with German or other worldmusic musicians in Germany. Some had been invited to perform in local festivals for a broader,
predominantly German audience. On certain occasions, such as the world music festival in
Kemnade, where each year performers gather and enjoy music from around the world in a small
town near Bochum, some of the musicians I spoke with performed as representatives of either
Turkey or Kurdistan. Thus, it is safe to argue that these musicians have limited opportunities to
reach German audiences. Given this limitation, they cannot make a living from performances
alone. They also cannot rely solely on their music to make a living in Germany. Thus, the
majority of musicians also have other jobs, most of which are fulltime. “I handle cases for a
beverage company,” Suat said. Ferhat was working as a freelance wholesaler who finds cheap
products for resale in Cologne and environs.
Many türkü bar musicians have had some formal musical training. Suat had taken a few
private lessons at Gazi University in Ankara. He mentioned that he is now forty years old and
wishes he could have attended more lessons, but it was not his “kısmet,” his fate or
destiny. Ferhat had taken individual saz classes from an instructor from Turhal in Tokat for only
one month. From there, he said, he practiced at home and improved his technique on his own.
Ultimately, it is significant that these musicians try to fulfill their own artistic needs onstage,
while also catering to their audiences’ wishes.
The text of the majority of songs covered and performed by the türkü bar musicians has
been in Turkish, followed by Kurmancî, then Zazakî. The Alevi deyiş, almost exclusively in
Turkish, are also among the indispensable tunes in the request repertoire. Group MyHosch
generally refrain from playing and singing Alevi semah because they believe these to be
sacred tunes, therefore not appropriate for the bar scene. Most of these musicians have either
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direct or indirect ties with political parties in Turkey.
In general, there seems to be a natural selection process transpiring in repertoire in terms
of shifts in audience demographics, as the music and repertoire gradually starts to eliminate
certain groups of people with so-called extreme requests. Suat said that “we show our respect
but we have our own lines we draw in the sand,” by which he meant they categorically refuse
to play Turkish nationalist songs and arabesk tunes known to be sung by Turkish nationalists.
Suat also told me that he began playing music quite late. “I think we are the hammals
(busboys or porters) of this music,” later adding, “those musicians are doing the groundwork for
musicians who make a lot of money.” The busboy metaphor is poignant, as türkü bar musicians
basically learn and play songs other popular musicians wrote or made popular. Most türkü bar
musicians will not play even a single composition of their own. Thus, they comprise cover bands
of the türkü repertoire. They keep such songs alive by repeatedly performing them upon request.
Later in my interview, Gökhan, the drummer of MyHosch, joined us. He plays a
synthesizer drum machine. He had come from a “program,” where he played drum set. A
“program” is an event such as the Kızıldere'yi Anma (Commemoration of the Kızıldere
Massacre) and most of these musicians play on such “solidarity” nights. MyHosch, like many
other türkü bar groups, did not need a sound check. The rhythm set was a brand new Roland
drum kit, apparently a very compact instrument. In some concerts, Gökhan plays the Turkish
davul (double-sided large membranophone). He also owns an acoustic drum set.
The songs were performed in keys such as D, E, B, and A, according to the range and
timbre of the solo vocalists. Usually the groups decide to stick to one key when they perform,
especially when they play in medley format. Suat and Ferhat’s pieces were primarily in D. When
Ferhat sang, they transposed the saz with a capo to E, or sometimes G. Most türkü bar musicians
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play the bağlama düzeni, the most common tuning system that is also associated with Alevi
performance practice (Chapter 4). Musicians usually avoid the use of staff notation or notes of
any sort; some vocalists carry booklets to recall lyrics. In some cases, poorly prepared musicians
forget the lyrics and fumble on stage, but if the rhyming is correct, Suat said, no one seems to
mind. Some musicians try to memorize the lyrics rather than reading from the booklets.

5.8. Sonic Diversity and Estrangement from the Saz Tınısı (Timbre)
Apparent on many albums of the last decade that türkü bar musicians have been listening
is a pronounced search for the “soul” of the bağlama via distinct interpretations of its sound.
Muting the instrument, adding or dropping various strings, or employing different sound effects,
achieves a total shift in the arsenal of bağlama timbres of these albums. Is this a search for the
authentic version of the bağlama sound, or a reaction against the sonic and emotional symbolism
attached to its timbre? The sound of bağlama has long been associated with the traditional and
local, or to put in another way the first homeland, aesthetic, which some of my informants called
the “authentic” timbre. This sonic and emotional symbolism has been promoted by prominent
Alevi musicians such as Arif Sağ and Musa Eroğlu in the last four or five decades (see Chapter
4). It is an important question that also relates to developments in amplification that provide
multiple options for highlighting frequencies, tones, and timbres extracted from the bağlama.
On recent albums of many composers and arrangers, such as Barış Güney, Ulaş Özdemir,
and Erol Mutlu, it is striking to hear multiple explorations of the sound of the saz. Until this
recent shift, the most common saz timbre was associated with either one seven-stringed bağlama
or a couple of them performed in unison. This “clear bağlama sound” has become more popular
since the 1980s thanks to musicians like Arif Sağ. A “clear” 7-stringed bağlama with both bam
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(thick) and ince (thin) strings sounding together has a powerful and thick timbre compared to
those with six or three strings without the bam (Fig 5.5). Recent versions of the dede sazı and
other kısa sap bağlamas, which are used more frequently for the şelpe technique as well, sound
thinner than the bağlamas with seven strings. Below are three different courses (“old” vs. “new”
versions) of strings from top to bottom for right-handed performers:

Figure 5.5.Old (left) and new (middle and right) arrangements of strings used on the
bağlama resulting in different timbers, saz tınısı.

In the search for newer timbres, players usually tend to use fingers instead of plectrums resulting
in more arpeggios and softer timbres as opposed to the “traditional bağlama timbre.” One reason
for this search might be that previously timbres were associated with particular political, social,
or organizational identifications of performers or consumers. I argue that specific connotations
of particular saz tunings on individual tracks map specific cultural codes. Thus, the coding
of cultural, social, and political stances occurs, at least for some artists, in the timbres they
choose to highlight or to hide. The use of saz in specific ways and in particular roles tells us
much about the cultural cohort the musicians are catering to and are in turn fed by. Thus, the
dede sazı timbre in this new iteration points to the fact that there is a shift in the aesthetic that
musicians project in this new era more geared towards the search for a new sound, distinct from
those “ancient” or “authentic” sounds, as sound engineer Ömer Avcı called them. In just this
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particular instrument, so vital for some, are the contrasting forms and articulations of
sounds. The function, timbre, arrangement styles, interaction with other instruments and vocals,
frequencies, framing, and individual use of tapping, hands, and plectrum, among other variables,
are all identifiers of the cultural cohort the individual musician seeks to please.
For other instruments used in Turkish and Kurdish music such issues become even
more complex. In the past, the use of an instrument as the lead or melodic lead held
particular cultural connotations that remain obscure to the public sphere. For instance, among
some Alevis, the ud and ney used to, and to some extent still do, represent Sunni music, or at
least the Ottoman or Arabic music their secular ideology reputedly rejects. It is still uncommon
to hear individual instruments such as the ney, ud, or violin in arrangements of some Alevi
musicians. Some Alevi musicians, and especially older ones, conveyed to me that this is because
such arrangements are: 1) “not familiar to our audience,” 2) “not part of our music,” 3) “are
Classical Ottoman instruments and have no place in Alevi music,” and 4) “I have not even
thought that we can use them,” among other reasons.
A wholly separate kind of dissatisfaction and search for new sounds is also apparent,
either in bending the timbre of the bağlama, adding functions in the arrangement, or adding
instruments to imitate the sounds of the bağlama or other instruments. Therefore, bağlama has
become an instrument that Alevis and non-Alevis alike experiment with in order to acquire new
functions and timbres that fulfill specific needs of musicians in their arrangements and
performances.
The introduction of the elektrosaz on the music scene in Turkey, and its prominent use
among musicians, signifies much about the extent to which modern modes of entertainment and
musical adaptation of new technology occurred in Turkey in the 1970s (Stokes 1992). I observed
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stark differences between current uses of the elektrosaz in multiple settings and those of the early
1970s. Once the instrument of the pubs, nightclubs, and weddings, the elektrosaz has not been
heard in türkü bars, as musicians had assumed it would be. As a loud and electromagnetically
amplified instrument, the elektrosaz might easily have been played in türkü bars with its
powerful sound. Instead, it is mainly heard at weddings. In türkü bars, where almost exclusively
türküs are performed, most musicians I talked to reiterated their concerns about the necessity of
conveying the türkü timbre, which they argued cannot be conveyed or expressed via the timbre
of the elektrosaz. One might infer an aesthetic decision made by musicians and audiences in not
including elektrosaz in türkü performances, at least not in the repertoire of Alevi-oriented tunes.
Thus, the amplified saz with DI-box, clearly amplified by eşik altı (a built-in magnetic
amplification), and otherwise difficult to hear, has remained the main melodic instrument of
türkü bars. The timbre of elektrosaz is not welcome in most of the türkü bars and avoided
by musicians playing there.
As seen in Appendix A, some alebesk songs are learned with guitar chords
accompanying the main melody. These notations, in most cases downloaded from the Internet,
provide the main pedagogical tool for learning to play the music at home, then in the bars. This
pedagogical route is no different from folksong pedagogy. Folksongs, alebesk, and other popular
songs are learned through this pedagogical approach. Using guitar chords is a newer
phenomenon of learning and teaching folktunes and alebesk songs. This practice relates to the
guitar pedagogy used among guitar students with a primary interest in popular and protest songs
in Turkey. It began in the 1980s when music groups and individual musicians employed the
guitar as an alternative to other melodic instruments, including the saz and the ud, for the main
melodic and rhythmic accompanying instrument. A remarkable shift in instrumentation, the
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prevalent use of the guitar exemplifies the modernization of music pedagogy, embodied in the
rise of guitar accompaniment in the 1990s and 2000s, and disseminated with the help of new
media tools. Starting from the inclusion of guitar in the music of individual songsters such as
Selda Bağcan, it is not uncommon now to see guitars used by protest musicians.
In recent years, a new movement in the music scene catering to Kurdish Alevi
communities suggests a revival of the use of the guitar. This resurrection is noteworthy in that its
transformation of instrumentation coincides with an increased emphasis on neo-spiritual
identifications of the musicians. In Chapter 6, I provide examples of the new imaginings of
Alevism among young musicians who yearn for new forms of spirituality encountered in their
second homeland.
This revival of the guitar in musical and aesthetic configurations does not come without
changes. Its recent widespread inclusion in music of Kurdish and Alevi communities calls for
more investigation. In particular, the latest albums of Metin and Kemal Kahraman, Ahmet Aslan,
Mikail Aslan, and Hüseyin Koçgiri 37 demonstrate a strong reliance on the guitar, not only as
accompanying instrument within their arrangements, but also as a melodic instrument replacing
the bağlama, whose timbre is no longer fashionable. Even in new albums, the styles of the older
singers are sometimes imitated.
Maraş-born Alevi rock musician Kıraç is one of these recent musicians who adopted the
guitar as a substitute for the bağlama in the 2000s. Kıraç, whose songs are played frequently in
the türkü bars, has used the classical and electric guitar as both a rhythmic and a melodic
instrument as he played both functions through imitating melodic movements of the bağlama. In

212

his Garbiyeli album, Kıraç has featured almost exclusive türkü repertoire on the guitar, which is
the mere instrument playing all of the melodic and rhythmic parts of those türküs.
Musicians are also becoming more involved in creating older sounds with new instruments,
as seen in reproductions of nearly extinct instruments, such as the dede sazı, a trend my friend
Ulaş Özdemir has lately advocated. The dede sazı has yet to be utilized in türkü bars as it
represents a quası-religious past and “a symbol of tradition that should not be used to make
money” at those bars, according to Suat. This does not mean that those bağlamas will not show
up in near future at those bars.

5.9. Conclusion
Türkü bars in Germany have several functions, from providing leisure and performance
spaces, to serving as virtual laboratories of longing and nostalgia where attendees exchange and
negotiate political, religious, and social attitudes and stances through their requests and acts. The
music and acts in the bars have become performative: not only expressing emotional states, but
creating states and tensions through reenactment of living rooms in the old homeland. The music
and the selection and construction of repertoire of second homeland musicians might usefully be
conceptualized as a potpourri of local forms previously performed by individual groups in
various settings such as weddings, solidarity nights, and, most prominently, türkü bars. A
distinguishable second homeland aesthetic is prevalent among musicians who do not subscribe to
the curated form of Turkish music and language, and who feel comfortable performing at venues
where they perform for bar attendees, as opposed to their audience, who have become
__________________
37

See Appendix for the pictures and Discography for albums.
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consumers. Türkü bars are venues where the patrons have become consumers of the musical,
spatial, and social practices based on an imagination of the first homeland.
In Chapter 6, I discuss further the neo-spiritual movements among the Kurdish Alevi
musicians in their second homeland. The association of spirituality with folktunes, in most cases
türkü, forms another phenomenon that might constructively be dealt with in the framework of
manipulating the aesthetic of Alevi musicality. Such a discussion might demonstrate that both
the elder and younger generations of musicians and audiences embrace the spiritual undertaking
of the Alevi sonic world for different ends.

214

Chapter 6: Music in the Integration of Kurdish Alevis in Secular Germany
6.1. Introduction
In Chapters 2 and 4, I looked at the Kurdish Alevi transnational space and its role in
boundary maintenance through music. In this chapter, I discuss Kurdish Alevi lives within
Germany in the context of integration into German society. I start with the locales of encounters
between Germans and Turkish immigrants (most of whom are Sunni) and the music they
consume. I argue that both Kurdish and Alevi identities and the music Kurdish Alevis have
associated with each one have helped Kurdish Alevi community members in their journey of
"becoming German."
I lay out the German context for the Kurdish Alevis in order to understand shifts in the
music they have consumed in the last four decades. The music that Kurdish Alevis have enjoyed
has been diversified by the addition of new repertoires and genres, initially from their fellow
Turkish immigrants and then from their fellow Turkish Alevi immigrants. Those alterations are
the result of a couple of important societal shifts within the immigrant communities in Germany
as well as in the German government’s policies of managing the integration of immigrants. In
that process, current discussions on Parallelgesellschaften (“parallel societies”) have shaped the
debate on immigrants, mostly Muslim immigrants, and their problems of integration into German
society. Paradoxically, Kurdish Alevis become more German by becoming Alevi and then by
becoming Kurdish, in opposition to the Turkish and Muslim categories they have been assigned
to by German scholars and politicians. As a result of hybridization and adaptation into German
culture, which one might call integration, there has been a constant emergence of hybrid musical
genres among the immigrants from Turkey, from alebesk (Chapter 5) to R’nBesk (see below).
For Kurdish youth, Kurdish rap has just recently been gaining momentum, a little bit later than
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Turkish rap 38 became popular among the youth. I have also observed that, like their German
counterparts, Kurdish Alevi youth have been enjoying dance and DJ-Müzik in dance halls since
mid-2000s. Through the lens of musical changes, one can see that, by attending türkü bars and
dance halls, third generation Kurdish Alevi immigrants are more integrated into German life than
their predecessors.
One of the main objectives of this chapter is to understand what their experiences in
Germany have meant for Kurdish Alevis, who have gone through a formative process with
respect to cultural citizenship in two areas. Members of this community have struggled against
being identified as Turks, immigrants, and Muslims. At the same time, many of them have
striven for certain modes of belonging and identities, including leftist, Alevi, and Kurdish. Music
has been an integral part of this process. The formation history of the identities of Kurdish
Alevis, an ethnic and religious "dual" minority, suggests that scholars should take a more
nuanced approach towards understanding the multiple affiliations of members of minority
immigrant communities. I aim to contribute to the debates around the cultural citizenship of
immigrants and refugees from Turkey with a focus on particular aspects of the Kurdish-Alevi
minority in Germany. To this end, I attend particularly to the literature on Alevis (Şahin 2001,
Sökefeld 2008, Göner 2005, Özyürek 2009) and Kurds as diasporas and minority communities in
Europe (Østergaard-Nielsen 2002, Wahlbeck 1999, Alinia 2004, Wikan 2008). Hence, this
research aims to find a common ground between these formerly two separate strands of study.

__________________
38

Ayşe Çağlar has observed that the rap music that Turkish immigrants enjoy has become more
commoditized and used to commercialize the “cultural differences” between immigrants and the
Germans. The middle and older generations of Alevis listen to the radio, and song lyrics are
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I distinguish two periods in the history of the Kurdish Alevi community in Germany. In
the 1960s, the first generation of immigrants from Turkey went to Germany as guestworkers.
They established networks based on family connections, places of origin, and kinship (Greve
2003). The second wave arrived in the late 1970s due to the political tensions that preceded the
military coup d'état of 1980 in Turkey. Their networks were different from those of the first
group; they were primarily identified with the leftist movements. The Germany they encountered
was experiencing economic pressures and systematic disinvestment. While the first group was
admitted as temporary guestworkers, the second group comprised refugees or asylum seekers.
Each form of entry into Germany had significant consequences for the group's way of relating to
Germany. The music that both of these groups enjoyed at times was in alignment with the larger
immigrant community from Turkey, and at other times was distinguished from it, as I discuss in
Chapter 2. I argue that two major factors have affected the integration processes of Kurdish
Alevis, or other immigrants from Turkey for that matter, in Germany: first, old homeland
political alignments: and second, social and political opportunity structures in new homeland in
Germany. Sökefeld (2003) argues that the Alevis in Germany were demanding equality while in
Turkey, and then they began demanding the acceptance of their difference from the Sunni
majority in Germany.

__________________
limited to tunes with gurbet and other traditional themes. The new generation listens to rock, rap,
pop, and arabesk (Çağlar 1998).
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6.2. Kurdish Alevis in Germany as Western Muslims
In this study, I approach the Kurdish-Alevi minority in Germany as one of the Muslim
minority communities in Europe, as they have been labeled and treated as such by their
neighbors and by the German government. The recent literature on the Muslim minority in
Europe focuses mainly on cultural citizenship (Nuhoğlu-Soysal 2000 and 1994, Bunzl 2005).
Following scholars like Abdelkader Sinno (2012), I approach the Kurdish Alevi community in
Germany as a Western Muslim community, even though many Kurdish Alevis might reject both
Western and Muslim categories. Approaching Turkish or Kurdish immigrants in the West as
Western Muslims helps us better understand their images and representations by the German
public. Non-religious members of Muslim minorities are defined as “Muslims” by the media, by
Muslim organizations, by religious leaders, and in the speeches of many politicians. Non-Muslim
European politicians talk of “Muslims” in their countries nowadays more than of “Pakistanis” or
“Turks.” (Sinno 2012: 166).
Although I occasionally generalize the policies of all branches of German government
(including federal, state, and local institutions), there needs to be a certain level of
differentiation. Many immigrants perceive those institutions as one body. I am aware that no one
in practical terms deals with “the German government”; instead, they deal with some federal
organizations or those of the municipalities or states. Kurdish Alevis who deal with
governmental agencies, in one form or another, do not think all of those governmental
institutions constitute the same “German government.” Multiple levels of engagement with the
“German government” exist. As opposed to the strictly centralized Turkish nation state, the
policies of which have been determined and implemented by the central government, Germany
has multiple layers of governing bodies. There are significant differences in practice and rhetoric
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between local governmental agencies and the federal government, the head of which, Chancellor
Angela Merkel, infamously claimed on October 16, 2010 that the multiculturalist experiment
was a failure in the history of Germany. 39
More tolerant municipalities like that of Cologne or local boards like that of Keupstrasse
in Cologne implement inclusive policies towards Muslims and Alevis. One important reason for
this difference is that in cities like Cologne, where there are sizable immigrant communities,
there is more engagement with the local government at all levels, which then improves the
symbolic capital of the immigrants, most of whom are also German citizens (Haug, Müssig, and
Stichs 2009). In cities where there is a significant immigrant population from Turkey, Alevis
have a sizable constituency relative to the Sunnis; for example, as of January 2010, Cologne’s
population with Turkish origin was 6.3 percent of as opposed to a 4 percent national average.
Because of their numbers, immigrants from Turkey living in Cologne have more leverage than
their fellows residing in other cities.
A recent study of Muslim minorities titled Muslim Life in Germany, conducted by the
German Office of Immigration (2008-2009) and presented at the annual meeting of the German
Conference on Islam, found that the group of Alevis from Turkey has a special position among
Muslims, and that Alevi beliefs differ significantly from those of Orthodox Islam (Haug, Müssig,
and Stichs 2009). 40Although some Muslims deny that Alevis are Muslim—a claim that is also
shared by some Alevis—many consider themselves Muslims. If they are accepted as Alevi
Muslims, then this group constitutes 13 percent of all Muslims in Germany, the second largest
__________________
39
40

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-11559451, accessed on Dec 11, 2011.
http://www.deutsche-islam-konferenz.de/, accessed on May 13, 2012.
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religious group among immigrants after the Sunni Muslims. The total population of Alevis in
Germany is estimated at between 480,000 and 552,000, almost all from Turkey. About threequarters of the Alevis have personally experienced migration. Slightly more than half have
German naturalized citizenship or they obtained it at birth. 41 Sökefeld documents that the
number of Alevis who have obtained German citizenship is disproportionately higher than the
number of Sunni Turks who were granted citizenship in 2000. That number was 55.6 percent for
Alevis compared with 37 percent for Sunni Muslims with ties to Turkey (Sökefeld 2003: 135150).
Among the reasons for some immigrants not to become German citizens has been that
they had to recuse their first homeland citizenship. There is no dual citizenship agreement
between Germany and Turkey, which prevents many Turkish citizens who want to keep their
Turkish citizenship from becoming German citizens. As Deutsche Welle recently reported, the
German federal government will begin granting dual citizenship for a small group of Germanborn descendants of immigrant parents as a result of the coalition agreement between the
Christian Democrats (CDU), their Bavarian sister party, the Christian Social Union (CSU), and

__________________
41

Since the new Nationality Act was signed into law on 1 January 2000, German citizenship has
been acquired by birth not only by those born to German parents (principle of parentage, “jus
sanguinis”) but also by those born in Germany to foreign parents (principle of territoriality, “jus
soli”). Since this reform in the law, in accordance with the principle of territoriality such persons
acquire German citizenship by act of law in addition to the foreign citizenship of their parents
when one of their parents has lived in Germany for at least 8 years and possesses permanent
residency (Nationality Act, Section 4 (3), sentence 1).
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the Social Democrats (SPD). 42 According to this recent agreement, the German-born citizens
could become citizens of both Germany and Turkey provided that they were under the age of
twenty-three, which was the age limit to accept the German citizenship and recuse their Turkish
citizenship. Compared to the U.S immigration system allowing dual citizenship, lack of dual
citizenship for immigrants from Turkey in Germany might have exacerbated the worries of
immigrants in their new home country.
The average age of Alevis living in Germany is 33.2 years, which is higher than that of
the Turks and other Muslims in Germany. More Alevis arrive in Germany on family
reunification visas or as marriage partners than by other forms of entry. Nearly one in three was
recruited as a guestworker. A significant number of Alevis in the same survey said that they
came to Germany because of the risk of persecution in Turkey. The educational level is relatively
low. Their employment rate is similar to that of all Muslims in Germany, though the Alevi male
employment rate is higher than that of females; however, gender difference in employment rates,
surveys indicate, is lower among Alevis than for all Muslim immigrants in Germany. The 20082009 study also suggests that, compared to all Muslim immigrants in Germany, Alevis are less
religious. One in five Alevis reported being an unbeliever or agnostic. Not surprisingly, few
Alevis observe religious services and rituals or prayers. Moreover, they rarely follow dietary
laws or fast during Ramadan, and Alevi women usually do not wear headscarves. In summary,
Alevi religiosity is less visible compared to that of other Muslims and, as a consequence, they are
more readily accepted by German society and other faiths.
__________________
42

http://www.dw.de/dual-citizenship-plan-leaves-turks-disappointed/a-17258643, accessed on
December 22, 2013.
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The Alevi communities' relatively “secular” lifestyle (exemplified by their lack of public
display of religiosity as opposed to Sunni Muslims’ visible presence) was welcomed by German
society, starting from the early years of migration and increasingly in the 1990s (Özyürek 2009).
Alevis embraced a secular practice of life and demanded personal, social, and organizational
rights more than their Sunni counterparts did in the 1980s and 1990s. For Alevis, struggles to
educate the public about their religion as contrasted with Sunni Islam, to demand religious rights
and religious education in public schools, and to form cemevis have become important
enactments of secularism within the public domain in Germany.
In line with the findings of scholars like Kaya and Kentel (2005) among others, I
observed that Alevis believe, and act accordingly, that compared to other Euro-Turks they have
fewer integration problems. I also concur with the assessments of the scholars who have
observed that freedom of religious expression in Germany has led the Alevi religion to be
practiced, as many have attended religious ceremonies in Germany for the first time in their lives
(Özyürek 2009). Another fact Kaya and Kentel pointed out was that the Alevis in Germany
converted some churches into a cemevi as their religious space, which was given as the ultimate
example of integration by one of Kaya's informants (Kaya and Kentel 2005: 145). One of my
informants argued in the same vein that "Alevis are open to change compared to Sunni
immigrants. Alevis can be viewed as natural-born Europeans compared to other Muslims."
While comparing two homelands for these immigrants and refugees, one of my
informants told me, "in Germany we have many more opportunities that my people are not
using." As an example, he said, "one person should not eat only Turkish food for his entire life,
as we have so many other options here." The participation of this immigrant group in German
cultural life is limited, though broader than that of Sunni Muslim Turkish immigrants, as most of
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them do not go to cinemas, theaters, or music events and do not participate in local politics, even
though they follow politics closely. The inherent cultural differences with Germans are not as
significant as the lack of immigrant participation in the state apparatus, which demands certain
responsibilities alongside the rights and privileges it provides. When asked who constitutes a
foreigner or alien to a German, one of my informants said, "the person who doesn't pay their
income tax is the foreigner.” If you do not share the burden of the state with the rest of society,
you are the alien; "you are the Fremde (foreigner)," according another respondent. Thus, one
could argue that the whole idea of “parallel societies” would be irrelevant once those immigrants
paid their income taxes and obeyed German modes and codes of living. This avoidance of
German modes of living with certain responsibilities underlines the differences between the
immigrant groups and ‘native Germans.’

6.3. A Musical History of Immigration from Turkey to Germany
Very little collaboration has taken place between German and Kurdish and/or Alevi
musicians; thus the integration process cannot be scrutinized solely on the basis of concrete
collaborations of musicians with a different cultural and historical upbringing. A limited number
of collaborations have occurred, particularly in regard to political solidarity. Albums, rallies, and
concerts have featured German musicians alongside Alevi and Kurdish ones. The participation of
Turkish immigrants in the labor movement and other oppositional movements made them easy
targets for coercive policies of the federal and local governments, as they were organized around
labor unions such as the Federation of Workers from Turkey in Germany (ATIF, established in
1976). Compared to other Turkish organizations established later like the hometown associations
and religious groups, German labor organizations are the longest running and most powerful
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organizations with a popular immigrant membership (Çelik 2011). I observed from my
interviews with many Kurdish Alevis among the first two generations of immigrants that the
earlier integration process had started on the level of the proletarian consciousness that
developed in the factories where immigrants worked with their fellow Germans as low-paid
workers. The increased level of solidarity regarding integration is evident in the establishment
history of the first workers' and solidarity organizations in the 1970s, which promoted an
internationalist ideal from the beginning. Practical integration, it can be argued, began with these
international organizations.
The integration process that began with proletarian solidarity was later in the 1980s and
90s transposed into the "social," "religious" or "cultural" milieu, especially among blue-collar
workers from Turkey and elsewhere. During the early years of migration, immigrant workers had
to work in hard conditions with lower salaries than their German counterparts, which could be
considered the first phase of discrimination against immigrants. One of the most active
organizations in the 2011 celebration was the ATIF, which organized events on different dates in
different cities such as Duisburg, Hamburg, and Stuttgart (Chapter 3). The International Cultural
Center (a sub-section of the ATIF dedicated to immigrants from Turkey) has members from
among Turkish, Kurdish, Armenian, and Assyrian immigrants and refugees from Turkey.
For the Türkiye’li (people from Turkey) population, sharing public spaces with others has
created a common esthetic in the new homeland. The following is a list of locations that Kurdish
Alevis share with Germans and other immigrants; the music that was present in those venues is
underlined:
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A. Locations where Kurdish Alevis Interact with Germans:
Airports (Relatives waiting for their guests to arrive or to bid farewell, especially
in the terminals of Turkish Airlines, Onur Air, and Atlas Jet)
Public Offices (Schools, Municipalities, Federal Offices)
Türkiye’li-Owned Workplaces (Cellphone Stores, Imbiss (Diner), Cafes, Kiosks,
and Restaurants) (Popular music from Turkey)

B. Locations With Minimal Interaction with Germans:
Cultural and Political Centers (Turkish and Kurdish protest music)
Dance Halls (DJ-Müzik, Turkish, Kurdish, and Western Popular Music)
Weddings (Turkish and Kurdish regional and dance tunes)
Türkü Bars (Alebesk, Alevi, Türkü, Kurdish, and popular Turkish)
Homes (Music in the form of muhabbet in Turkish and Kurdish)
Cemevi (Alevi in Turkish and Kurdish)

Figure 6.1. List of primary locations in Germany and the music that can be heard

Among my informants, some perceive that strong walls that seem insurmountable were
built over the last 40 years between their first homeland and their second- or third-homeland
lives. As one of my informants in Bochum put it, "they [second homelanders] want both worlds;
but for some there are barriers between those worlds that were built over decades." Among those
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barriers, which could be interpreted as a local affirmation of the parallel societies narrative of
some German scholars, are limited engagements with Germans. However, Alevis are more likely
to have intermarriages than their Sunni counterparts from Turkey. The rate of intermarriages
between Alevis and Germans has been higher than that of Sunni Muslims and Germans. In fact, a
2009 study shows that adult Alevis with immigrant background are married to Alevis with the
rate of 56.1% as opposed to that of Sunnis with 81.4% Sunni spouses (Haug, Müssig, and Stichs
2009: 275). Shêxo, one of the most important sources of this study, was married to a German
woman with whom he has a twenty-two years old daughter.
Kurdish Alevis and other immigrants from Turkey have similar kinds of lack of
interaction with Germans, as they do not want to open their houses, cemevis, and other places
that "Germans would never appreciate." One of my informants, Hatice, wanted to pursue a career
in acting at a theater company in Cologne. When she got involved with the companies near the
vicinity of Cologne, she applied to and was accepted by a couple of them. After several attempts,
she decided that acting in the German language was not satisfying her. She claimed that she did
not "feel" the words she was uttering. Feeling in another language and showing your feeling in
another language is not easy, she said to me. It was impossible to express her feelings in German,
even though she is fluent in German and has been a naturalized German citizen for 15 years. The
emotional boundaries are real even for the diasporic experience; certain things cannot be
expressed in diaspora in another language. Hatice feels a barrier of emotional exclusion, and she
wants to act in Turkish, not German, but the Turkish theater companies around the Bochum area
are not open and active; thus she is seriously considering returning to Turkey to take acting
lessons in Istanbul. There will be other problems waiting for her in Istanbul regarding integration
to the Turkish landscape and acting world.
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The conversation started with her question, "Can a Turk or Kurd sing a German folksong
as well as Germans do, with the same level of emotion?" She went on, "Can you translate a türkü
into German and keep the same level of emotion?" The question seemed flawed at first, as there
is no concept of türkü in German culture. The türkü is an Anatolian concept that has ties with
Central and West Asia. The question is an important one nonetheless; it marks the limits of
integration. There are certain boundaries that even the most integrated people will not be able to
overcome. One of the many reasons for this is the endurance of certain emotional qualities that
are inherited from the older generations via collective performances and other modes of
transmission. The modes of learning and integration have limitations: the political and social
baggage that comes with the immigrants to their second homeland. This liminal group has yet to
leave behind their baggage of expressing emotions the only way they know how and appreciate
singing in their own language, whether Turkish or Kurdish, but definitely not German.
I have been exposed many times to the discourse of dislocation that is sometimes given
as a major excuse for failures in the adaptation or integration process. Their journey from the
village all the way to the suburbs of Cologne, by way of Istanbul, was a difficult trip, which
exacerbated the disorientation that the immigrants experienced. Aside from the unwillingness of
German society to accept the differences among all citizens and residents, there are some
immigrants who do not want to integrate, which makes it harder to reconcile the differences. The
unwillingness of some immigrants to participate in German society is a result of the strength of
the social, political, and cultural organizations' interests and ties to Turkey. Compared to older
interviewees, my younger informants have greater access to and interest in new German
imagery, with successful role models among immigrants from Turkey such as Fatih Akın
(winner of a Golden Bear for Best Director at Berlin Film Festival, the most prestigious movie
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award) or Mesut Özil (one of the best soccer players in Germany). Maybe the unwillingness or
stillness can also be interpreted as part of a claim-making process.
My research on the music albums consumed by Kurdish Alevis since the 1980s identified
four major cultural cohorts with respect to musical repertoires. I call the first cohort the
traditionalists. Their music is characterized by "longing and belonging" (Greve 2003) for a time
and place where Kurdish Alevis shared the same musical repertoire as many of their fellow firstgeneration guestworkers from Turkey. In the traditionalist cohort, diaspora musicians have
continued to play the music they were accustomed to in Turkey. Contemporaneous with the first,
the second cohort reflects the leftist movements in Turkey. Many Kurdish Alevis were members
of these groups in Turkey and retain ties to them. The lyrics and musical forms and sources of
their songs were appropriated from their Turkish leftist counterparts. The third cohort evolved in
the mid-1980s, when the Kurdish nationalist movement was influential among Kurdish Alevis.
The fourth cohort reflects the era of Alevi revival since the late 1980s, which was embraced by
all Alevis (Sökefeld 2008). Kurdish Alevi individuals do not necessarily belong to only one
cohort; as they engage with others their stances and degrees of membership in each cohort may
change along the way. In the last five decades of migration from Turkey to Germany, the major
change in the music immigrants have consumed and produced happened in the transition from
the gurbet-based themes of the 1960s and 1970s to more complex, urban, challenging, and
hybrid genres, as immigrants from Turkey including Kurdish Alevis have gradually felt more
comfortable with the fact of living in Germany and more confident about their place there.
The earliest immigrants from Turkey arrived as temporary workers. As Greve (2003)
points out, they had enormous language problems in their communications with Germans, and
work conditions were unbearable for so many that they found refuge in sad folk tunes.
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“Adventure, at first, for so many immigrants turned into a disappointment,” Greve points out
(2003). As he argues, the initial songs of migration (mostly in türkü form) were almost
exclusively about hasret, longing, a strong emotional state that is about yearning for family and
friends in the first homeland. Those songs were about the people who yearn to return to their
homeland and who miss their soil and family. The first examples of these türküs were those of
Yüksel Özkasap, who is originally from the city of Malatya. An iconic example from this period
is the song “Nasıl Oldu Yolum Düştü Kölün’e?” (“What Went Wrong That I Ended up in
Cologne?”) that made her famous as the “Nightingale of Cologne.” 43 Her numerous songs about
migration, hasret, yearning, longing, and pain in Germany are emblematic of this period’s
emotional world.

“Nasıl Oldu Yolum Düştü Kölün’e?” [“What Went Wrong That I Ended up in Cologne?”]

Ne mektubun gelir ne de selamın,

Neither your letters nor your greetings arrived,

Hasret kaldım bizim evin gülüne.

I am longing for the rose of our home.

Gözleri görmüyor anamın,

My mother lost her eyesight,

Nasıl oldu yolum düştü Kölün’e

What went wrong that I ended up in Cologne?

Bir Alman kızına gönlümü verdim,

I fell in love with a German girl,

Bir sarışın mavi gözlü geline.

A blond bride with blue eyes.

__________________
43

http://www.trt.net.tr/televizyon/detay.aspx?pid=31737
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Ağlayı ağlayı tükenmez derdim.

My pain does not go away even as much as I cry.

Nasıl oldu yolum düştü Kölün’e?

What went wrong that I ended up in Cologne?

Sevdiğim dilberin dilin bilmeden,

Without knowing the language of my beloved,

İşim yaklaştırır beni ölüme.

My dangerous job nears me to death each day.

Anacığım selamımı almadan,

Without receiving the greetings from my mother,

Nasıl oldu yolum düştü Kölün’e?

What went wrong that I ended up in Cologne?

Ayhan Kaya, who has written extensively on the migration and music of Euro-Turks in
Germany, points to historically significant examples of hybrid forms early on during the
immigration period. An iconic example of this kind of hybrid form, combining both the fantezi
müzik style and traditional folk narrative style, is the music of Derdiyoklar, whose album titled
Disko Folk became the name of a genre (see Appendix for three YouTube links of Derdiyoklar’s
music). 44 Fantezi müzik is an iteration of the arabesk genre, which is sometimes used
interchangeably by lay people to refer to the “more modern” and “more hybridized” version of
arabesk. After that period, as Kaya points out, protest music before and after the military coup
d’état in the 1980s became popular among the highly politicized segments of the immigrant
population.

__________________
44

It might be relevant here to quote from the liner notes of the re-issued 1979 LP called Disko
Folk: “Anadolu pop doesn't get weirder than this! Back in 1979, two Turkish guys armed with
electro-saz, guitar, drums and synthesizers were hitting the Turkish market in Germany where
they lived, playing their sets of traditional-flavored electro-folk in weddings and circumcision
feasts for Turkish emigrants in Germany. That's their crazy story, and that's their crazy sound.”
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The 1990s in Germany witnessed a diversification in the music created for and consumed
by the immigrants. Along with traditional forms, during this period hip-hop became an important
vehicle for second- and third-generation immigrants to express their frustration with the
“German society” that looked down on them, discriminated against them, and excluded them
from the mainstream. Hip-hop provided a space for the youth to express problems stemming
from the class differences that they were exposed to along with the racialized separation from
German life (Kaya 2000). The youth had problems not only with German society but also with
the traditional societal norms of their family members. Their songs foregrounded their workingclass struggle with the other problems they had with their family and traditional lifestyles
(Nuhoğlu-Soysal 2000). Youth of the second and third generations engaged with hip-hop and rap
through graffiti in subaltern spaces.
The emergence of satellite TV in the 1990s changed the means of communication
between those who live in two lands. Greve argues that the most significant change in the lives
and transnational networks has been the emergence of satellite TV and then cable TV among
immigrants. The TRT-international broadcast, the first from Turkey, provided an opportunity for
immigrants to watch live news and other programs. This development is responsible for most of
the transnational relations and changes in the two homelands by improving the “Imagined
Turkey” in the minds of immigrants (Greve 2002).
In the documentary Uzaktaki Şarkılar (Distant Songs), directed by Pelin Asal and
produced by the TRT in 2013, a Turkish-born German musician, Sema Mutlu, says that when
she first started performing music, her German producers and friends always emphasized her
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Turkish origin instead of her music, which made her feel as if she was trying to stay in-between
two chairs in a balanced way. 45 The two chairs represent two identities or backgrounds that she
tries to maintain. Ultimately, she says, “instead of staying between two chairs she says she sits
on two treasures.” In an interview I conducted with her when she was in New York in 2010,
famous Berlin-based DJ İpek İpekçioğlu told me that the new generation of immigrant musicians
are trying to make music to gain acceptance among their German peers as well as their fellow
immigrants. She went on, “he makes music that could change according to the needs of the
environment where he has been. He would like to appeal to the world audience by singing in
English or German or Turkish or sometimes all three languages in the same songs.” For the new
generation it is significant that they speak perfect German, and “even dream in German,” as one
of my informants reminded me. Raised as German and keeping the Turkish spirit in them all the
while, they still feel the music of their families’ sonic codes, melodies, and musical framework.
In the 2000s, as immigrants from Turkey increasingly embraced Germany as their
homeland, there has been a decline in the presence of rap and hip-hop within the immigrant
community. Kaya argues that this period has been about the emergence of hybrid styles in the
forms of fantezi müzik. One of the most recent hybrid genres, with German lyrics, melodies
inspired by folk and popular music from Turkey as well as Rhythm and Blues, and arrangements
informed by the arabesk genre, has been “R’nBesk,” a name coined by producers and marketers
in Germany.

__________________
45

http://www.trt.net.tr/televizyon/detay.aspx?pid=31737
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Figure 6.2. Muhabbet’s R’nBesk album cover

Muhabbet is the most popular singer of R’nBesk. 46 For the first time with R’nBesk,
Germans could listen to and understand the music of their fellow immigrants from Turkey, with
melodies from arabesk and lyrics intelligible to them, with meanings attached to the emotional
state of immigrant youth.

“Du hast geschworen,” (“You Gave Your Word”) Muhabbet’s 2007 album R’nBesk In Deinen
Strassen (In Your Streets)

Ich hab dich tausendmal angefleht

I begged you a thousand times,

das es nicht gut ist diesen Weg zu gehen.

This is not a good route to take.

Hier kennen viele deine Eltern

Here, many people know your parents

wir würden auffliegen wenn sie uns sehen.

When they see us we will run away
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Schau nach links Schau nach rechts

Look to the left, look to the right,

Schau nicht zurück Blick mit mir nach vorn.

Don't look back, together we look forward.

glaub mir süße was ich weiß

Believe me darling, I know that

wir bleiben in ihren Augen nur ein Dorn.

We remain only a thorn in their eyes.

Sie begegnen uns nur mit Zorn

they encounter us only with anger

denn sie haben noch was

Because they still have something

wir haben auf Liebe geschworen.

We have sworn to love.

…
Though I have no information about the size of its German audience, it is one of the first steps
from the immigrant community from Turkey toward German-language music. Though it is not
the first hybrid genre, it is significant that the German audience can understand the meaning of
those “sad songs” for the first time.

6.3.1. Kurdish Alevi Youth and DJ-Müzik
My aim in this section is to explain social practices regarding Kurdish Alevi integration
into German society through music, laying out the details of integration, and giving some recent
examples of adaptation to the German modes of entertainment by the younger generation among
the Kurdish Alevi communities, especially in the form of DJ-Müzik (see below). Kurdish Alevis,
like other immigrants from Turkey, rarely go to German popular music events, let alone concerts
of classical music. As my informant Metin Kalaç, a producer and sound engineer for Hunerkom
__________________
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The URL for his most popular song on YouTube “Du hast geschworen” (“You Gave Your
Word”) can be reached at: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XNbMILTlG4Q
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Music Production based in Cologne, told me, musicians are no exception to this fact. Musicians
and some of my other informants never criticized, nor saw any problem with, their ignorance
regarding classical and popular music events in Cologne.
One visible sign of the music that Kurdish Alevi youth enjoy is what multiple informants
of mine called “DJ-Müzik,” which can be described as dance hall playlists combining popular
dance songs from the West with some local or traditional songs in Kurdish or Turkish, along
with instrumental dance tracks (see Appendix for YouTube links of DJ-Müzik). If one looks at
the music of the DJ culture at the venues I visited, one cannot distinguish those youth from their
Turkish counterparts or other immigrant friends. The youth spend their days with Germans in
limited spaces and places. Moreover, the youth are engaged more with German life than with
their own immigrant communities when it comes to participating in cultural activities. In most
instances, they have friends among immigrant and lower-class German young people. My
informants told me that lower-class Germans like to hang out at DJ parties and discotheques.
Those entertainment forms are common in this part of the world, shared especially by the lower
class. Stating the fact that Germans go regularly to classical music concerts, operas, and ballets,
one of my young informants put it, “but in our society it is totally DJ-Müzik, çepki (recently
popularized Kurdish line dance form), halay (generic name for the Turkish line dances), and
türkü bars.”
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Figure 6.3. Sample flyers of invitations to different events in Summer 2010 which
Kurdish Alevi youth could attend

Compared to its Turkish equivalent’s recent decline in popularity, Kurdish rap has
recently become more popular among the Kurdish Alevi youth that I interviewed. Concurrent
with this development is that these youth participate more in German popular culture as they
become increasingly consume German as well as Turkish and Kurdish traditional and nontraditional music. One of my young informants told me that his parents listen to “old music” or
“traditional music” at home. “My parents respected our traditional music so much,” he went on,
“because they find camaraderie with those songs that they share with their fellow first generation
immigrants. They cry to the same song” (personal communication with Roni Azad Altay, 18,
born in Cologne, Summer 2010).
In an interview he gave to Kurdish journalist Mehmet Aslanoğlu, Kurdish rapper Serhado
argues that hip-hop is the music of struggle. Born in 1984 in Sweden, Serhado is a secondgeneration immigrant whose parents settled in Sweden in early 1970s. He creates music with
politically motivated lyrics calling on Kurds to unite. As I argued earlier, Kurdish hip-hop lagged
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in popularity among youth in the second and third homelands. One reason is that Kurdish hiphop lacked the institutional push and support Turkish hip-hop had, which led to a delay until proKurdish production companies realized its potential and growing popularity among Kurdish
youth. Those pro-Kurdish production companies were losing their audience to their Turkish or
other counterparts (Solomon 2012).
It is vital to point to the difficulties that Kurdish Alevi immigrants from Turkey have
gone through in Germany regarding the transmission of values, norms, and identities from one
generation to the next. Limited and inefficient transmission stems from the fact that the first
generation comes from an uneducated and rural background; the only thing they could bring to
the table was their life experience, which was limited to the village life they brought as bluecollar workers. As my most important informant, Shêxo, puts it,

The previous generation did not provide a solid ground. The previous generation’s
reasons for being here were clear and crisp, and limited. Their presence has been not
problematic as they were supposed to be leaving by then. For a very short period of time
and just to make a little bit of money, and then their return ticket was deferred and
deferred. Thus there was a cultural genocide (kültür katliamı) in the process of this delay
and uncertainty. (personal communication)

The new generation has grown up without "cultural anchors" they can rely on in their
quest to find their identities or affiliations, as opposed to the first generation of immigrants who
cling to their past in the search for their own identities. Having spent their formative years in the
first homeland, their search for "self" became less urgent for the first generation in Germany
237

especially when compared to the second and third generations. Since they arrived as temporary
guest workers anyway, they had less appetite to adapt to German culture compared to the second
generation. The third generation, born in Germany, is "struggling, vacillating, and stumbling,"
according to one of my respondents, a man in his early twenties who included himself in the
same category. The new generation's affinity with DJ-Müzik, çepki and halay dance parties, and
türkü bars is no coincidence. It is a result of the search for the "self," which, in many cases, takes
place in those safe venues where the inescapable search for belonging becomes less painful
among friends or relatives, where they feel more comfortable by not losing contact with the sonic
references mediated in “those ‘Germanized’ but comfortable places” (personal communication
with nineteen-year old Kemal Alim from Bochum). In those collective spaces, they could share
the burden of the search for belonging and form new associations with their fellow secondgeneration friends with the same historical ties. They dance together with the people they want to
feel close to.
The language of the songs that the new generation has on their iPods is usually English,
not Turkish or Kurdish. The young generation is unfamiliar with classical Turkish music, which
is another significant point that could be explored further. The new generation is not happy with
the genres that their parents rejected such as Turkish classical music, but they also cannot exhibit
a close affinity with the genres their parents liked such as türkü. The tunes that the parents
excluded, or at least dismissed, are not on the playlists of the young generation.
Finally, I observed that the identity question for the Kurdish Alevi young generation
becomes more germane because in their daily lives they interact more with Germans who
demand specific identities from their peers and friends. The young immigrant generation feels
more inclined to show some cultural signifiers and symbols, such as wearing T-shirts of Che
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Guevara, an idol among the resistance movements, or wearing the necklace of Zülfikar, the
sword of Ali. I have not seen older Alevis wearing any object like the necklace of Zülfikar,
though in the corner of the şark odası in their living rooms they might keep objects reminding
them of the homeland.

Figure 6.4. Kurdish Alevi Youth wearing Che T-shirts (left) & Zülfikar necklace (right) in
Cologne in 2011.

The Kurdish Alevi youth want to show their differences from other Muslims or Turks in public
by communicating with those symbols.
One of the most significant observations I made with respect to the young generation of
Kurdish Alevis is that they communicate with older generations through those symbols. Almost
no direct communication occurs between the two generations about how to transmit cultural and
social values. As they have been engaged with German modes of living, the regular means for
communication such as music, stories, and poetry have gradually weakened. Through those
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objects and symbols, the young generation attempts to communicate with the elderly generation
with the only means they have. They pick the most obvious choices that could fit well with their
household identity, such as Zülfikar and the depictions of other politically or historically
significant figures.

6.4. Integration Debates and Western Muslims in Germany
The challenges Kurdish Alevi youth face in their integration into German society need to
be understood in the context of public debates surrounding how they were located in the public
sphere. Current public debates on Muslim immigrant communities in Germany have been shaped
around the discourse of Parallelgesellschaften (parallel societies), meaning communities living
next to mainstream German society and its so-called mainstream culture or Leitkultur (Tibi 2002;
Ceylan 2006). The concept of Leitkultur emphasizes the values that all Germans must share, like
those core values that immigrants must know and embrace to pass the German citizenship test.
However, the term is problematic in its assumption that there are clear “mainstream German
values and culture” that are not subject to change. Bassam Tibi, who coined the term Leitkultur
in 2002, assumes that German society, and other European societies for that matter, is secular
while Muslim minorities evolve around that secular core as parallel societies (Tibi 2002). In his
view, the one mainstream culture and many parallel cultures coexist, providing contexts for
resisting assimilation to the mainstream culture. This discourse spread from academia and
political circles to the general population, members of which then used it to stigmatize other
communities. The discourse of parallel societies seems to be internalized even by some of my
respondents. Shêxo spoke of parallel societies multiple times in our conversations, referring to
the Sunni Muslims living in Germany who live parallel lives isolated from their German
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neighbors.
The parallel societies narrative against certain Muslim groups implicates some Kurdish
and Turkish immigrants who have yet to be integrated into “German society.” As one of the
supposedly relatively well integrated and accepted communities, Alevis in general, and Kurdish
Alevis in particular (Kaya and Kentel 2005), have experienced rigorous secularization processes
rendering them more sensitive and open to modern and/or cosmopolitan values and aesthetics
(Stokes 1994, van Bruinessen 1992, 1997; Gezik 2012; Shankland 2003, Gürdal Aksoy 2006).
However, the discourse of parallel societies within "German society" is problematic in
major ways. I observed that many members of the Kurdish Alevi community strongly believe
and demonstrate that they are integrated into German public life, more than other immigrants
from Turkey; by becoming Alevi, they become German (Chapter 4). Yet in certain other ways
they remain “parallel.” For example, they usually do not listen to the same music as their
German neighbors and friends. The discourse of parallel societies therefore complicates the
actual integration process by failing to offer any clear-cut recommendations for how to approach
different immigrant communities about the possibilities of integration. All immigrants I have
conversed with reminded me that they have strong roots in their second homeland that would
prevent them from "packing up and leaving." Within the politics of recognition, they are
searching for members of communities who can mobilize with them to convince German society
and its institutions to accept them as they are.
First-generation Muslim immigrants with problems concerning their participation in
modern German society and those with less education in Germany find their religious otherness
exacerbated by socioeconomic marginality because of a vicious circle of decreasing levels of
opportunity. José Casanova (2006) argues that Muslim immigrants in Europe have entered a
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second homeland of low religiosity and limited religious diversity. In this uniquely secularist
context, the decline of religion, as Casanova argues, is seen as normal, progressive, and modern,
while serious religiosity per se and Muslim religiosity in particular are widely viewed as
reactionary, fundamentalist, and anti-modern (Casanova 2006, see also Brubaker 2013).
European populations that had previously been identified and labeled using national,
demographic, legal, or racial categories have been increasingly identified and labeled in religious
terms. In part, as in the UK, this reflects a movement of self-identification, a deliberate assertion
and embracing of Muslim identity as an alternative to other frameworks of identification. But it
mainly reflects a top-down discursive shift in the categorization of others, regardless of how the
categorized populations identify themselves. 47
The dynamics of urban marginality and inequality do not turn primarily on religion, but
on other forms of social closure and marginalization. Grouping immigrant populations under a
religious rubric is, as Brubaker (2013) argues, potentially distracting and misleading. In that
sense, the tensions surrounding the Muslim immigrants' integration process may actually be
overlooked and be reduced to "cultural differences" by politicians like Thilo Sarrazin, who has
criticized Turkish and other Muslim immigrants in Germany for not being willing to integrate
__________________
47

Casanova (2006) argues that globalization influences the formation and transformation of the
boundaries between religious communities, members of which self-identify as distinct from other
groups. Anthropologist John Bowen (2012) argues that in an era of the globalization, religious
identifications "create and imply the existence and legitimacy of a global public space," which
cannot be reduced to a dimension of migration or of transnational religious movements. He goes
on to examine the ways that Islam is reinterpreted in the diaspora. Mandaville (2001) presents a
detailed picture of changing Muslim subjectivities in the diaspora (2001). Recent studies on
contemporary migrant experiences focus on the ways Muslim identities and subjectivities are
constructed in relation to different places and communities (Göle and Schäfer 2008, Gökarıksel
2009).
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into German society (Sarrazin 2010). Another example of this cultural difference dilemma
resurfaced when a Cologne court deemed circumcision as unconstitutional on 26 June 2012. As
for Jews and Muslims, circumcision has been a significant social and cultural practice for the
Alevis, who traditionally celebrate circumcisions with large festivities. I believe that those
politicians and commentators miss the underlying political, social, and economic accommodation
problems that migrants face, leading them to label the actual social differences as merely
cultural; this is clearly explained by Mahmood Mamdani in his critique of “culture talk” (2002),
in which all historically contentious issues are explained by cultural differences, overlooking the
underlying political, social, and economic factors.
Immigrants and politicians alike have approached integration into German society by reessentializing the Muslim parallel societies narrative, which has meant adding a second sentence
in Kurdish Alevis’ daily encounters with Germans. Right after telling where they are from, e.g.
Turkey, they go on by consciously pointing out their differences from Sunni Turks, adding their
Kurdish and/or Alevi identities and backgrounds. As Nancy Foner and Richard Alba (2008)
argue, religion is treated as a barrier rather than a bridge when it comes to models of integration,
particularly in Europe. Justin Gest, in Apart: Alienated and Engaged Muslims in the West, argues
that young Muslim immigrants may be more accurately thought of as hybrids that connect
multiple sociopolitical attributes across different identity forms that may not necessarily conform
to each other (Gest 2010:100).
The German government has increasingly had to deal with the representatives of the
religious communities. Bowen (2012) observes that religious representations have become more
visible markers of separation for the members of any religious community than they were a
couple of decades ago. This rise in the religious representation and public visibility of religion
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has resulted in religious organizations overpowering or dominating previous political alignments.
Therefore, in my current research in Germany I observed a competition between the religious
organizations and the political parties from Turkey and Germany, trying to convince the new
generation to join their struggle. As post-9-11 era security policies have dominated policies
toward citizenship and individual citizens, German policies have created new problems for the
nation’s Sunni Muslim immigrant population. Immigrants, as many Germans have seen them,
will remain as immigrants, not fully accepted as Germans. Gest argues that, as more engaged
members of the society, the second and third generation young Western Muslims are not only
treated as somewhat apart from other immigrant communities, there is also a tendency to “trap”
in the immigrant frame people who have actually been outside of it for one or more generations
(Gest 2012: 191). This framework has been mentioned a couple of times in my research as some
Türkiye’lis have raised concerns about the future of their place in their new homeland.

6.4.1. Integration of Immigrants from Turkey in Germany
Interviews I conducted, especially with elderly informants, suggest that problems of
integration for the immigrant communities usually stem from the actions and discourses of all
societies involved. Sixty-five -year old Hasan Kartal told me "it was a collective fault, going
beyond the responsibilities of the German government, it was the fault of the immigrants who
never pay taxes, and it was the society's fault leaving room for neo-Nazis to survive among many
others." I attended several multicultural or integration-oriented events, which were putatively
designed for Germans who were present to remind everyone that Turks and Kurds are indeed
still immigrants (see Chapter 3). As Shêxo told me once, “in its immigration discourse, some of
the workers of German local and federal governments are still not willing to let those immigrants
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forget their status as immigrants even though they might have been born in Germany and have
German citizenship and a passport.” Even for second- and third-generation professionals, it is
always significant for the German federal governmental officials, especially in public discourse,
those people are and probably will remain immigrants, even though they have invested in their
new homeland much more than they have done in their first. Even the most peaceful and
multiculturalist events are held under the shadow of being reminded that those immigrants and
refugees are not fully German even though they claim a German identity more than any other
they could claim.
I heard many different migration stories, from being political refugees to being hired as
cooks for high-end restaurants. Each one is unique. Each one is powerful. I once met a "storymaker" for the political asylum seekers, who would write fictional stories for each person to use
in requesting asylum. In most cases, I heard, his stories were successful. In many interviews I
had, I realized I heard the word zorunluluk (obligation, necessity, and exigency) as the main
reason for their migration from the first homeland to the second or for staying in the second or
third homeland. "The difficulties (zorluklar) in your own country force you to move to another
one," said Hakan Akay, a Kurdish Alevi musician and sound engineer who worked and lived in
Cologne for a decade. After the Agreement of 31 October 1961 between Germany and Turkey,
many workers from Turkey who came to Germany as guestworkers could not leave as they
earned much better social security and economic advantages in their second homeland. They had
friends and neighbors, and they "gave" and "received" brides from other emigrant communities
in Germany, which would prevent them from being reintegrated into the first homeland had they
decided to return immediately.
In the 1980s and 90s the German federal government applied a policy of scattering
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refugees as much as possible in different sections of the same city or even in some cases to
neighboring cities, in order to prevent the ghettoization of the immigrant population. The main
motivation of German governmental policies with regard to the settlement issues of immigrants
was to discourage political mobilization and representation of the immigrants, who might end up
clogging the streets and workplaces of the cities. This policy, however, did not prevent refugees
along with immigrants from establishing their own communities in cities like Cologne and most
visibly in Berlin. The policy with regard to the settlement of political refugees has been a little
bit different from that toward the other "economic" immigrants, as the government had more
leverage in where to locate those refugees. In many cases, the existence of enclaves exacerbated
the lack of integration and assimilation with other groups in Germany. It is still possible to work
and live in Cologne without speaking a single German (or English) word.
The city of Cologne is presented as a great example of multiculturalism by the German
authorities and by my informants in Germany, one of which at least some Germans are proud. I
heard a German woman in Cologne saying, "I don't like the sound of church bells but I really
love the Muslim call to prayer that I can hear in the city." Some Germans are quite progressive
when it comes to integration, even though the discourse of parallel societies has been prominent
not only among Germans but also among the immigrants I interviewed. The parallel society that
Alevis criticize is that of the conservative Sunni Muslims who refuse to integrate into German
society, but for many Germans all Muslim and other immigrant societies are included in this
discourse.

6.4.2. Problems among Immigrants from Turkey in Germany
This section locates Kurdish Alevis and their musical lives in the German context to the
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extent that it involves the integration process of Alevis into the German society while they deal
with other Turkish immigrants. Among Kurdish Alevis, sounds like the music coming out of the
TVs and radios as well as daily conversations surrounding immigrants from Turkey have some
affinity with the Turkish soundscape, specifically that of different sections in Istanbul.
Immigrants and refugees in Germany buy unlimited phone plans that they use in excess.
Although unsubstantiated, one urban legend suggests that a couple of cell phone companies went
bankrupt due to the overload from those unlimited plans. Housewives, specifically, spend
enormous amounts of time on the phone and some do not participate in German daily life. Like
many other immigrants around the world, some immigrants prefer being isolated from real life in
Germany, instead spending time on the phone or Internet with their relatives and friends in
Turkey or other parts of Europe.
Most musicians I conducted interviews with identify themselves as Kurdish, Türkiye’li,
Kızılbaş, or Alevi. Many of the Kurds and Alevis subverted Turkish nationalism by referring to
"people from Turkey" (Türkiye’liler) instead of "Turkish people" (Türkler), implicitly decentering Turkish citizenship and creating a political space for others to be recognized and
represented. Of course, the Türkiye’li population has never been homogenous.
Among the members of the Türkiye’li communities, it has been very common to
encounter diverse discourses regarding the labeling of immigrants. “Türkiye’li” is used instead
of “Turkish” in order to include people from all ethnic groups in Turkey, as well as being an
identity marker used in Germany by the people who have ties with Turkey and Turkish
Kurdistan. In the same vein, another term has also been used: Anatolian. It is revealing to read
how Cem Özdemir, former co-chair of the Green Party and a member of the German Parliament,
locates himself in Anatolia in his book Ich bin Inlander: Ein anatolischer Schwabe im Bundestag
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(I am from here: An Anatolian Swabian in the Bundestag) (Özdemir and Engels 1997). It is
another form of discursive inclusion for the communities to geographically relate to Anatolia
instead of emphasizing ethnicity or nationality. By employing Anatolian, not Turkish, in his
lineage, Özdemir implies the inclusion of Turks, Kurds, Greeks, Armenians, and many other
groups from Anatolia.
I have not seen any Kurdish Alevi person in daily practice exhibiting or implying any
religious act or utterance publicly, such as praying five times a day like other Muslims. This has
been true for the Alevi immigrants in big and cosmopolitan cities in Turkey as well, where one
can hardly see in the public sphere any utterance of religious words or practices, since these are
done in private, in exclusive places where it is safe to exhibit religiosity, such as villages. There
is no public display of any religious action that would distinguish Kurdish Alevis, and many
Turkish Alevis, from the "secular" Germans. Daily life seems to be totally devoid of religious
practice, unlike that of observant Turkish Alevis or Sunni Muslims. Religiosity is limited to
demarcation of differences and signifiers in discourse, created when distinction from the rest of
the Kurds or other immigrants from Turkey is necessary. The historical mistrust of the Turkish
state against the Kurdish, Alevi, and especially Kurdish Alevi citizens of Turkey seems to
resemble the former fear that Jews would never become true Christians and citizens of Germany
(Kastoryano 2002, Mandel 2008, Yurdakul 2009). Alevis in Germany have been in a favored
position among all immigrants from Turkey to become “true” German citizens because they
were not fundamentalists. The anxieties of the Alevi citizens of Germany about the Muslim
challenges to the German secular public life have roots in the secularism of Turkish history.
Immigrant and first-homeland political activities cannot be separated when we consider
Alevi social and political mobility. According to its own publications, the aim of the largest
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Alevi organization in the world, AABF, is to work for the recognition of Alevism inside and
outside of Turkey (Østergaard -Nielsen 2003). As Østergaard -Nielsen argues, Alevis in
Germany urge the Turkish state to officially recognize Alevism and stay loyal to the secular
ideals of the modern republic of Turkey. Many Alevi organizations have pursued extensive
campaigns to portray Alevis as “good” and secular Muslims who are easy to integrate because of
their lack of adherence to Sunni traditions. Irrespective of their piety, the contrast between Alevis
and Sunnis in both homelands has given Alevis the upper hand in the religious integration
competition, as some scholars equate this with cosmopolitanism (Özyürek 2011, Stokes 2008).
Alevis, in opposition to Sunnis, have claimed to be more secular than other immigrants from
Turkey were. Thus, being in opposition to the Sunni Muslims who practice their religion and
who resist integrating into the German society has made Alevis "good" citizens or at a minimum
good immigrants to Germany. The lack of religious display and practice is an important factor in
the daily lives of the people I contacted.
In Germany, I observed the notion of non-veiling as a counter-narrative for Alevi women
in their other-ing of (Sunni or other) veiled Muslim women. The same question of secular
anxiety that they acquire in their homeland shows itself in their reaction to veiling in Germany.
One of my informants, frustrated by the hypocrisies of the local Alevis who live highly
conservative life-styles, said, "not veiling could easily be perceived as a sign of being modern
and enlightened (aydın)." Some Alevi women who are more conservative than Muslim women
have not hesitated to highlight the fact that they are different, as if by not wearing headscarves
they suddenly can become more modern and enlightened. Still, even though the level of
acceptance by their family members has been better than among their Sunni counterparts, Alevi
women continue experiencing difficulties in dating and eventually marrying German men. By
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virtue of not looking like conservative Muslim women, the relatively moderate Alevi image
gives the impression that Alevi women more closely follow the German lifestyle.
As Casanova (2006), Bowen (2012) and other scholars working on Muslim communities
in Europe have pointed out, there are clashes occurring in the public spaces in Europe regarding
the differences in the display and daily practices of Muslims with the other citizens of those
countries. In many instances the display of religion or other deviations from mainstream
appearance, attire, and sounds have become increasingly perceived as threats to the secular
lifestyles of Europeans. I am not the only person who observed that the secular domain with no
public religious display in Germany resists the practiced and publicly displayed religious
identities of Muslim immigrants. The secular public square in Germany thus helps Alevis to
show their differences from the practicing Muslim immigrants.
While continuously advocating for multiculturalism in Germany, many of the Kurdish
Alevi immigrants I interviewed opposed the construction of a large mosque in Cologne in 2010.
Some oppose the center not because they are afraid of a backlash against Muslims but because
the mosque represents more than a place for worship for them. For most Alevis who emigrated
from Turkey, mosques embody decades of semi-official Turkish pro-Sunni Islamic policies, in
which mosques were built in Alevi-populated villages without the consent or demand of the local
Alevi communities. Mosques have become the spatial and sonic symbols that resurface and/or
resurrect the secular anxieties of Alevis along with Islamophobic Germans. This is the
underlying reason for the opposition of the Alevi immigrants, whose secular anxieties in
Germany exhibit strong parallels with their homeland anxieties.
Considering that the cosmopolitans in Germany and elsewhere embrace secularism and
feel threatened by the non-secular (Mandel 2007), a deeper examination into the theoretical
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formulation in Germany as to the relationship between Alevis and Sunnis would be helpful. I
came to the conclusion that detaching the secular from the cosmopolitan can open a new horizon
for a theoretical inquiry on secularism, because “the cosmopolitan” in this case does not
adequately describe the roots of the friction between the Sunnis and Alevis, given their
treacherous history. It is also pertinent to mention that the Alevi understanding of the secular is
not fully cosmopolitan, as the cosmopolitans in Turkey have historically represented the elite of
Turkish society, which by no means has been exclusively Alevi. To put in another way, Alevi
anxiety over the public display of Sunni religious practices and symbols has stemmed more from
political causes than cultural ones, something that, according to one correspondent in Cologne,
has been “also true of the reaction of German cosmopolitans when it comes to the discourses of
‘tolerance’ and ‘multiculturalism.’”
The source of secular anxiety among Germans and Alevis is not the same. German
secular anxiety has historically emerged in forms of anti-immigrant (and in some cases neoNazi) movements against all Muslim and non-Caucasian immigrants. There are significant
symbolic and semiotic differences between what the mosque and muezzin represent for Germans
and for Alevis. The voice of the muezzin calling Muslims to prayer heard in Cologne could
result in different emotions depending on the religious affiliation of the listener. For some
Alevis, ezan (Muslim call to prayer) is a sonic reference to the historically problematic
relationship with the pro-Sunni Turkish state apparatus. On the other hand, it makes some
conservative Germans anxious because they see the mosque as a real or symbolic threat against
the German way of living.

251

6.4.3. Becoming German by Becoming Alevi
As most scholars of religion in the US and Europe have argued, unlike their counterparts
in Europe, from the early years immigrants in the USA have been able to become American
without changing their religion. It is significant to point to the fact that religion has served as a
framework in which other forms or modes of belonging could be reconstructed and redefined.
Brubaker (2013) argues that the distinctive legitimacy of religion in the American context
continues to provide a resource for immigrants to seek a place at the multicultural table. As
Kurien (2007) argues in her work, A Place at the Table: Multiculturalism and the Development
of an American Hinduism, by becoming Hindu many Indian American immigrants have become
American. In certain cases embracing a religious identity helped immigrants to feel at home in
their new homeland. In certain ways, the Hindu case in the US resembles the Alevi case in
Germany. Religious "tolerance" in European and North American countries has allowed
religious communities such as Hindus or Alevis to organize around a religious mode of
belonging. By publicly becoming Alevis in Germany and by organizing around their religious
identity, Alevi immigrants become non-Sunni, and thus can start to become "naturalized" and
ordinary citizens of Germany. As I suggest in Chapters 4 and 6, being Alevi has given Alevis the
opportunity of being excluded from the larger Muslim or Turkish labels. On the other hand,
Alevis are used as buffers against the demands of Sunnis as well.
Alevi identity in Germany has become the third party in the negotiations between the
German government and active Muslim organizations. Alevi religious education is one area
where the binary modes of religious belonging for Muslims in Germany are at play. The German
government has encouraged the recognition of Alevi institutions and the opening of schools for
Alevi religious studies, a position that is unheard of and even illegal in the first homeland. This
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process helped the binary (Alevi-Sunni) to be concretized. The political actors called for this
binary to be more visible, which actually resulted in Sunni dissatisfaction with the German
government (Aitchison, Hopkins, and Kwan 2007).
When Sunni political organizations such as Milli Görüş (IGMG, Islamic Community of
Milli Görüş [National Ideal]) and Diyanet İşleri Türk İslam Birliği (DITIB, Religious Affairs of
the Unity of Turkish Islam), the two largest Turkish Sunni Muslim organizations in Germany,
demanded certain improvements in the religious lives of their members, such as contributions to
building mosques or assistance in religious practices, the representatives from Hamburg and
Cologne municipalities agreed to negotiate with them if they agreed to include Alevi
organizations’ demands. While giving certain rights or privileges to Sunni Muslim Turkish
groups’ religious practices, German authorities used Alevi organizations’ demands to counter the
excessive demands of Sunnis, which made Alevis the third party in the negotiations. Alevi
demands for religious rights in Germany are taken into account as part of the larger dialogue
between two major actors, the German government and the Sunni organizations, gradually
making this two-part structure into a three-part relationship: the German governmental
authorities (states and municipalities), Sunni organizations (IGMG, DITIB), and Alevi
organizations (AABF, CEM Vakfı, FEK). Besim Can Zırh's recent work (2012) on this issue is
illuminating in its scrutiny of the funeral service problems between Alevi-Sunni organizations
and the German government's changing policies to accommodate Alevi demands.
Right after the official recognition of Alevis as “one of the religious groups” within the
city of Berlin in 2002, Alevis in Berlin were granted the rights of religious education there
(Sökefeld 2008). In four other states including North Rhine-Westphalia, to which the city of
Cologne belongs, Alevi religious education has been in place in public schools since the school
253

year 2006-07. On the other hand, in Turkey, Alevis are not only not getting Alevi religious
education, but to the contrary, they have been forced to take Sunni Islam classes starting from
ninth grade.
The 2012 laws passed by the local parliaments in Hamburg and Cologne suggest that the
government has agreed to recognize the religious holidays of Muslims (www.alevi.com). The
caveat for this decision was, as reported by German newspapers, that the German government
agreed to acknowledge not only the Sunni Muslim holidays, but also Alevi religious days. The
municipality of Cologne has sponsored concerts and cultural events of the Alevi organizations
including many of those associated with AABF. Municipalities also sponsor the spaces for the
religious and political gatherings. As a member of Kardeş Türküler, I have performed at concerts
partially or fully sponsored by the cultural or integration sections of the municipalities of
Cologne, Hamburg, and Stuttgart in 2000 and 2001.

6.5. Conclusion
As one of the Western Muslim communities, the Alevi immigrant community became
more integrated into German society by declaring themselves and becoming Alevi. Not only do
those Alevis want to be included in German multiculturalism (also referred generically to as
multikulti, a German shortcut for the multiculturalism that happened to be the name of a cultural
center in Wuppertal dealing with solidarity among Turkish and German workers), but they also
become Alevi in opposition to a more conservative Sunni Islam. Furthermore, the more they
become Alevi by declaring their differences from the Sunni Muslims, the more German they
become. The discrepancies in the policies towards the integration of Alevis and Sunnis into
German society have increased Alevi mobilization that stemmed from the inherent issues from
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the first homelands.
Many scholars argue that in Europe among Muslim immigrants, the shift from a diaspora
mentality to engaged citizenship has been much slower than in the United States and Canada, in
part because several European countries continue to encourage ties between Muslim citizens and
residents with their countries of origin (Glick-Schiller and Şimşek-Çaglar 2007, Bowen 2012,
Brubaker 2013). I argue, along with other scholars who have worked with Turkish immigrants in
Germany, that first homeland political issues have been as significant as those in the new
homelands, especially for the Alevis who have been active transnationally. There is also another
shift that has happened among the Kurdish Alevi immigrants from Turkey: namely, that from
temporary immigrant workers to legitimate cultural citizens of the modern world with multiple
ethnic and religious identities. Kurdish Alevis have actively tried to distinguish themselves from
the stigmatized Turkish Sunni immigrants, which in turn, helped them integrate into German
society faster. I argue that those identities opened some space for Kurdish Alevis in their
integration process as points of departure from the Turkish/Muslim labels. My informants on
almost all occasions made a point of emphasizing their differences from Sunni Muslims or
Turks.
During the five decades of migration from Turkey to Germany, there have been major
changes in the music Kurdish Alevi immigrants and refugees have consumed and produced. The
most significant one has been music’s transition from gurbet-themed folk music tunes to more
complex, urban, challenging, and hybrid genres such as alebesk, R’nBesk, and DJ-Müzik, as
second and third generation immigrants have gradually felt more comfortable with the fact of
living in Germany and more confident about their place in the larger German society. In their
quest for living like their German peers, Kurdish Alevi youth have engaged with German modes
255

of entertainment, modified to fit their aesthetic needs. As a result, they have been consuming
music in discotheques and türkü bars.
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Chapter 7: Epilogue
As I was concluding this work, four significant developments in Turkey and Germany
occurred highlighting the historical and social significance of Kurdish Alevis in Turkey and
Germany for the people of both nations. The events I lay out also highlighted, as I see them, the
relevance of the quest of the members of this group for multiple identities within the context of
accelerating political and social transformation in Turkey. The events, as I try to connect them to
each other within the Turkish context, embody the main research question of this work, namely,
the multiple and sometimes contradictory identities that Kurdish Alevis have been struggling for
and with. Recent events also clarified my main arguments, mostly in Turkey and but also in
Germany.
The first has been the set of recent public announcements by both sides of the conflict
between the PKK and Turkey, also known as the barış süreci (peace process). Kurdish Alevis I
have contacted have expressed their worries about the exclusionary Islamic rhetoric embraced by
both sides, clouding the possibility of an inclusive peace process for all Kurds and Turks. The
second is the set of public protests begun in Istanbul in June 2013, also known as the Gezi
Protests (Gezi Olayları), in which all of the casualties were from Alevi families, including a
Kurdish Alevi. Through social media and other means, I observed that almost all the Kurdish
Alevis I know got actively involved with the Gezi Protests. The third development was the
release of a report regarding the ongoing trials in Germany involving the National Socialist
Underground (NSU), in which the German authorities were criticized for their negligence and in
some instances total misconduct in their investigations of a neo-Nazi group indiscriminately
killing immigrants from Turkey, including one Kurdish Alevi refugee. The last one came in
September, when six labeling companies that release Alevi albums along with other repertoire
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decided to protest the suggestion made to radio and TV stations by the leader of the CEM Vakfı
(Cumhuriyetçi Eğitim ve Kültür Merkezi Vakfı, Centre for Republican Education and Culture
Foundation) that Alevis could pray at cemevis within a cami (mosque) along with Sunni
Muslims. Six labeling companies, led by Hasan Saltık, owner of Kalan Müzik, , have publicly
denounced this project as attempt to deny the differences between Sunni and Alevi religiosities,
and to convert Alevis into a Turkish version of Sunni Islam. I believe that these four events have
made the struggles of Kızılbaş Kurds or Kurdish Alevis more visible and relevant in terms of the
social shifts in the public sphere of Turkey and Germany.
In order to connect all of these events to Kurdish Alevi life in Turkey, Germany, and
transnational space, I now address historical divisions among the members of the groups
constituting the population of Turkey. Scholars like Fikret Başkaya (1991), İsmail Beşikçi
(1997), and Eric Zürcher (2004) have suggested, in different ways, that the Kemalist policy
makers of the Republic of Turkey have operated around ethnic, religious, and ideological
divisions that defined the Turkish nation around majorities: Turkish over Kurdish, Sunni over
Alevi, and Right over Left. The governing principles of Kemalism were implemented to create a
nation around all three majorities. In order to create a Turkish Sunni Islam, the Republic of
Turkey through its ideological state apparatus along with repressive state apparatus (Althusser
1984) utilized tactics of converting, suppressing, assimilating, and crushing (when necessary)
those who dissented from the projected nation-state. Alevis and liberals or leftists have always
acted as de facto secularists in opposition to others. Kurdish Alevis or Alevi Kurds have usually
been in the minority of the aligned ideological, religious, and ethnic configurations of the
Republic of Turkey as well as among the immigrant populations from Turkey in Germany.
As the recent challenge to the secular character of the republican project by the rise of
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Islamism has indicated, probably the republican project’s most successful suppression was its
policy of crushing the leftist movements in the country in the 1970s and 1980s. The absence of a
powerful left/liberal opposition that would protect the secular nature of the republic popularly is
a result of those tactics of oppression. The Alevi-Sunni Muslim division is still as active as ever;
the recent Gezi Protests re-introduced that split to the public sphere. The Kurdish-Turkish axis
has also seen transitions in the 1990s and 2000s. If Fikret Başkaya (1991) is correct, the Kemalist
paradigm is bankrupt and the assimilationist and oppressive policies implemented in Turkey
against its own citizens (such as assimilating Kurds into a Turkish identity and converting Alevis
to Sunni Islam) are doomed to fail. I would argue that the recent success of the Kurdish uprising
led by the PKK is evidence of the fact that the paradigm failed to assimilate all Kurds into
Turkishness. Thus, at least in the Turkish-Kurdish axis, Kurdish ethno-national identity does not
look like it will fade soon. Ultimately, according to Başkaya, the Kemalist paradigm wıll
eventually have to change and embrace all communities in order to resolve the resistance on the
part of those minorities to joining the secular Turkish national project.

7.1. Barış Süreci and Kurdish Alevis
Earlier in this work, I talked about the long history of the “Kurdish Question” in Turkey
and the extent to which it has shaped the lives of Kurdish Alevis. It is one of the most important
political issues affecting Kurdish Alevi cultural entrepreneurs as well. The ethnic or national
Kurdish identity of Alevi Kurds was worked on, emphasized as necessary, and in the last
decades or so taken for granted by other Kurds, especially certain political organizations like the
PKK. Reflecting the emotions expressed by most Kurdish Alevis I talked to, Shêxo told me on a
Skype interview on September 10, 2013 that:
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we [Kurdish Alevis] are among the least respected members of both the Kurdish family
and the Alevi family, both of which are already not respected by the larger Turkish
society. The least respected members of a very large family, Kurdish Alevis have been
treated as an adopted or unwanted last child.

The recently accelerated peace process (barış süreci) initiated a cease-fire between the PKK
guerillas and the Turkish army earlier in 2013. In order to increase the public profile of the
reconciliation process, some political parties and religious organizations, including the ruling
AKP in Turkey, have begun invoking the common religious bond between Kurds and Turks,
most of whom are Sunni Muslim. On March 21 2013, the jailed leader of the PKK, Abdullah
Öcalan, released a statement including the sentence, “Peace will come to Turkey under the flag
of Islam,” invoking an ümmet (Ar. ummah, Muslim community of believers) connection among
Muslims who belong to the larger community of believers. As he uttered those words in his
support for the peace process, he overlooked other religious groups within the larger Kurdish
population, which caused significant resentment among Alevi, Christian, and Êzîdî Kurds.
Kurdish Alevi villages have witnessed as much pressure, if not more, as Kurdish Sunni Muslim
villagers have. Many Kurdish Alevis I talked to, including Ali Baran and Shêxo, expressed their
frustrations with the tone of Öcalan’s statement ignoring the Kurdish Alevis and other Kurds
from different religious backgrounds. The statement highlighted a shift in terms of a diminishing
secular common denominator among all Kurds. Thus, the PKK and its leader seemed to ignore
the religious sensibilities of Kurdish Alevis in order to reach a peace deal with an Islamicmotivated AKP government. I observed that Öcalan’s pragmatically motivated decision made it
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harder for Kızılbaş Kurds or Kurdish Alevis to follow the peace process as closely as other
Kurds have done. Since its inception as a Marxist/Leninist organization, the PKK movement has
managed to be an inclusive organization for Kurds coming from all faiths and backgrounds.
There were many nonbelievers in the higher ranks. In addition, Kurdish Alevis had contributed
to the secular nature of the movement. Gradually it has turned into a Kurdish-Sunni majority as
the locomotive carrying its full weight.
The attempt to reach a solution to the “Kurdish Question” by connecting Sunni Muslim
majorities of Kurds and Turks, which would have been unimaginable until the mid-2000s, might
work if the alignment of the Turkish republic were defined in religious terms. Instead, as one of
the six core principles of Kemalism, laiklik (secularism) obligates, at least in theory, an inclusive
secular nation embracing all religious groups living in Turkey. By invoking the religious
connection between those two majorities, some religio-political parties have elevated the fears of
the ethno-religious minorities in Turkey, including Alevis, through an exclusionary discourse. I
argue that this puts Kurdish Alevis in a significant position, indispensable for the success of both
Turkish and Kurdish secular and nationalistic projects. As politically weak as they have been,
many times nationalists on both sides have tried to assimilate them as Turkish or Kurdish. Within
the secular formalization of the Turkish republic, this ethno-religious double minority can play a
significant role in mediating between the two majority groups. This has significant implications
for internal social peace and harmony in Turkey under the shadow of the “Kurdish Question.” If
peace and security in the country were defined through a secular framework, as a secular
republic would require, this group’s presence could advance a solution to the “Kurdish Question”
through a secular framework based on liberal ideals and policies. This double minority seems
able to effect the most visible and influential connection between two large sections of the
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society in the secular space assumed by the nation-state. The future of the secular republic will
most likely depend on reliable communication channels that Kurdish Alevis could provide, both
figuratively and internally, with both of the two large Sunni Muslim groups in the country.
Geographically, the first homeland of Kurdish Alevis constitutes as well the buffer zone between
predominantly Turkish and Kurdish populated cities.

Sunni Muslim Turkish
Turkish Alevi
Kurdish Alevi
Kurdish Sunni Muslim

Clues to this possible mediation lie in the music that has been shared in transnational
space and in Turkey among the four groups that I identified above. The musical and aesthetic
space that Kurdish Alevis have occupied is literally between two separate worlds that Turks and
Kurds have embraced. The music Kurdish Alevis have been listening to encompasses both the
Kurdish and Turkish musical worlds as well as its own traditional music developed in liminal
space. The music that Kurdish Alevis have been creating and consuming has reflected
sensibilities of all parties involved. Kurdish Alevi musicians have composed many songs in
Turkish. Not only musicians but also the lay people who listen can easily embrace Turkish lyrics.
Before a concert he gave in New Jersey in 2012, at which I performed on the bağlama, Delil
Dilanar, a famous Kurdish musician living in Europe, told me that he did not know how
extensive the liturgical and para-liturgical durik and türkü repertoires were among the Kurdish
Alevis of Maraş, Malatya, and Adıyaman. This region has produced many songs that are mostly
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dance tunes, so he thought that the only musical tradition from this region consisted of those
line-dance tunes. He said that his perspective had changed as he had listened to the songs of
Shêxo, Ali Baran, and Ozan Garip Dost.
Kurdish Alevi musicians historically provided resources for the Alevi repertoire that Arif
Sağ and other musicians utilized and later popularized. Of great importance to any discussion of
cultural hybridity, integration, and assimilation is the strong presence of Turkish words and
phrases in the Kurdish oral literature of Kurdish Alevis living close to Turkish communities in
Maraş, Malatya, and Adıyaman. The inclusion of Turkish words and phrases in the KurmancîKurdish of this region can be interpreted as a strategy of survival for this unique culture instead
of a sign of the death of the “true” Kurd. Bilingual Kurdish and Turkish songs have been
overlooked not only by Turkish cultural policy makers but also by Kurdish purists since this
group exhibited signs of “assimilation” more than other Kurdish communities did. Viewing this
co-existence and bilingualism as an interchange rather than an imposition may help us to
understand more easily the Kurdish Alevis’ hybrid nature. Here is an example of a KurmancîKurdish semah (religious tune) I recorded in 2007 with Turkish lyrics underlined:

“Axababa Semahı,” as sung by Hüseyin Alim on June 5th, 2007 in Elbistan, Maraş
Tu Tembûr î ez perde me

You are the lute, I am the fret

Tu Axa yî ez kole me

You are the ruler, I am your subject

Li ber derîyê we sêvî me

I am the orphan in front of the home

Ne kenîme ne şa bûme

With no laughter and no happiness

Gelir geçer dünya gamı

The pain in this world is temporary

Ox ox ox ox Axbabaye....

Hey hey it is Axbaba.
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Wa çi eşq û çi sevda ye

What a strong love is this.

Wa çi hale çi sevdaye

What a strong passion

Hudey hudey pir aşkına

Hudey Hudey for the love of Pir

Sen yardım eyle düşküne

May You help the fallen

On iki imam aşkına

For the love of Twelve Imams

Sen yardım eyle düşküne

May You help the fallen

The duriks 48 (short quatrains in Kurdish) and other famous songs originated in the geographical
triangle defined by the eastern Turkish cities of Maraş of this community have become the
trademark of famous Kurdish musicians like Şivan Perwer. Without falling into the trap of
melting pot rhetoric, I argue that the liminal state of the musical and other cultural creations
among the members of this group has proven to be one of the most significant cultural spaces
that members from all four groups could relate to in varying degrees. Turks have embraced many
Turkish and bilingual songs from this repertoire. Alevi and türkü tunes that made their way
towards the Turkish folk music milieu created liminal spaces that helped many to navigate in
between multiple homes and homelands.

7.2. Gezi Protests and Alevi Identity
The Gezi Protests (Gezi Olayları), named after the park in Taksim Square, Istanbul,
started on May 31, 2013 and were sparked after a peaceful protest against planned destruction of
the park and its replacement by a shopping mall. They have had significant implications for the
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Kurdish Alevis in Turkey and Germany. Those who lost their lives in the Gezi Protests, which
prompted spontaneous protests all around the world, are all from Alevi families: Abdullah
Cömert, Ahmet Atakan, Ali İsmail Korkmaz, Ethem Sarısülük, and Mehmet Ayvalıtaş. This
detail might have been missed in many political analyses, but many Alevis who participated in
the protests did not miss it. The Gezi Protests could be a sign that the Turkish republican secular
model is fracturing as the protesters (composed of Alevis and the secular elite) and their targets
(the conservative Islamic-leaning AKP government) represent two sides of the larger religiopolitical axis of division within the population in Turkey, i.e. Alevis and Sunnis. Protesters,
mainly secular constituencies from Kurdish and Turkish Alevi, Sunni Turkish, Armenian, and
Jewish communities, faced the non-secular majority and the state apparatus.
Most members of the Kurdish Sunni Muslim majority were hesitant to join the protests
with their friends from the Turkish left and the secular groups in Turkey. The political actors on
the Kurdish side did not want to jeopardize the ongoing peace process between the PKK and the
AKP government by engaging with the opposition. The only Kurdish group that was visible
among the protesters were Kurdish Alevis, whose Kurdish and Alevi identities were in
contradiction with each other in the context of the peace process and the Gezi Protests. Kurdish
Alevis have struggled with sticking to secular ideals while trying to maintain their separate
Kurdish loyalty. After the protests in tens of cities in Turkey, as observed by many journalists,
scholars, and activists, the AKP government began to crackdown on the protesters more harshly
in towns and districts where more Alevis resided than in Sunni-populated cities (Saymadı 2013).

__________________
48

For more examples see the Appendix.
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7.3. Discrimination in the New Homeland
Like other Western Muslims, Alevis in Germany have been subjected to discrimination
along with other Turkish immigrants, since anti-immigrant or Islamophobic Germans see no
visible difference distinguishing them from other Muslims or Turks. Although many Alevis
agree with those xenophobes, especially in their opposition to the construction of mosques in
large cities like Cologne, they have not been spared anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim rhetoric and
actions. Hate crimes like the murders between 2000 and 2007 have affected Kurdish Alevis as
much as they did other groups from Turkey.
A recently released official investigation reports the incompetence of German institutions
with respect to neo-Nazi organizations. It reveals that the German police and security services
suffered "from deeply rooted prejudices and a lack of cultural diversity, which allowed a neoNazi cell to carry out violent attacks against immigrants for more than a decade without being
detected,” according to a parliamentary committee report issued on August 22, 2013 (Eddy
2013). As the New York Times reported, “the inquiry concluded that prejudice often led the
police to draw quick and erroneous conclusions about certain murders, based on the ethnicity of
the victims, and it demanded changes in the 36 law enforcement agencies, including training and
recruiting more ethnic minorities.” 49 Nine known NSU-related murders were committed in
Germany between 2000 and 2007. At least one of the victims of neo-Nazi violence was a
Kurdish Alevi, Mehmet Kubasik, who was granted asylum in Dortmund and had lived in
Germany for a decade and a half. A Deutsche Welle (DW) article summarizes the sentiment
__________________
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http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/23/world/europe/german-officers-biases-seen-as-enablingneo-nazis.html?emc=eta1&_r=2&
266

shared by many Kurdish Alevis I interviewed: “as a Turkish-Kurdish Alevi and thereby part of a
religious minority, he had no longer felt safe living in southeastern Anatolia at the end of the
1980s. He applied for asylum in Dortmund, and it was granted. Mehmet and his family became
German citizens in 2003." His daughter, in the same DW interview, said "her father always
defended his new country, which he deemed was ‘democratic’” (Grunau 2013).
Earlier in the dissertation, I argued that Alevis have become more German by becoming
Alevi in the public order that they navigated in. Just as they were discriminated against like their
fellow Sunni Muslim Turks, in the German social context, Kurdish Alevis from Turkey can play
the roles of secular arbiters between other Sunni Muslims (Turks and Kurds) from Turkey and
the German state apparatus. The Alevi secular stance could serve as a model for the institutional
integration process that German secularity, or in a more general sense European secularity
demands, between different state and local authorities and Turkish and Kurdish religio-political
parties.

7.4. Cami-Cemevi Project
As a recent study by the oppositional CHP suggested (Hürriyet Daily News, December
17th, 2012), the main demand of Alevis in Turkey has been to have their own religious places
where they can worship, gather, and observe religious services and duties like funerals and other
events. Historical refusal, continued under the AKP government, to grant cemevis religious status
accelerated the disenfranchisement of Alevis from the republican project. The shift in the
policies of the AKP government towards a more religious (and less secular) agenda interferes
with the ideals of the republican secular project. A recent attempt at converting Alevis into a
unique Turkish Sunni Islam is the construction of a religious center that would include both
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mosque and cemevi, the Cami Cemevi Kültür Merkezi Projesi (CCKMP, Mosque Cemevi
Cultural Center), to be built in Ankara. It will have two sections, a cemevi and a mosque, so that
Alevis and Sunnis will be together and pray together. The leader of the CEM Vakfı, Izzettin
Doğan, who comes from a highly respected dede lineage, called this new CCKMP project the
best project for social harmony in Turkey in the last 900 years. According to an article that
appeared in Zaman, Doğan claimed that this project would be the most peaceful project that this
land has ever seen. 50
At first, the project seemed like a good attempt to seek peace among Sunnis and Alevis.
However, from its inception the CEM Vakfı’s mission was to establish a Turkish version of
Alevi Islam. Thus, Kurdish Alevi friends and relatives have seen this project as a gimmick, not a
sincere attempt at bridging the gap between Sunnis and Alevis. To the contrary, many have
interpreted this as the latest version of attempts to convert Alevis to Sunni Islam, or at least to a
different version of Turkish Alevi Islam. Some Alevi musicians and producers protested the
CEM Vakfı and organizations related with the CEM group.

__________________
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Figure 7.1 The memorandum sent to the CEM-Radyo and CEM-TV by publishers of Alevi
music in Istanbul.

The owners of seven major Alevi music labels in Istanbul also called this project a gimmick,
resembling problematic assimilationist attempts by the Sunni Muslim majority and the AKP
government. As the memorandum above indicates, they pulled all of their recordings and music
videos from the radio and TV channels associated with the CEM Vakfı. One of the participants
in this study summarized her anger on her Facebook page: "Now what? Are you going to convert
all Kurds and Turks to Islam?"

7.5. Conclusion
In this study, I have analyzed the music produced for and consumed by the Kurdish
Alevis in Cologne and Istanbul who trace their first homeland to the cities of Maraş, Malatya,
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and Adıyaman in Kurdistan or Eastern Turkey. I have aimed to shed light on how a group of
people within a predominantly Sunni Muslim majority relies on music to navigate and negotiate
religious constraints and secular contempt in Turkey, and with a secular German context in
which they were granted religious and cultural rights. In the discussion of culture, politics, and
religion in the lives of this immigrant community, I have approached Kurdish Alevi discourses
of belonging through music as an embodiment of all three at once. Kurdish Alevis have engaged
with the politics of recognition through multiple identities that at times contradict each other.
The contradictions grew as they moved from one homeland to the next. The meanings and
contradictions exist not only in terms of political realignments but also in issues of representation
of identities.
Until the establishment of the transnational space among immigrants in Turkey and
Germany, the Turkish ideological state apparatus controlled almost all forms of cultural
production in the public sphere (Kaya 2007). By censoring undesired content and punishing
artists and musicians who opposed the state’s demands, the nation-state had managed to shape
the cultural scape and the sonic world of its citizens. That dominance lost its power as other
political actors got more involved with alternative artistic, musical, and political productions.
Politically active musicians and artists have created alternative and protest voices, challenging
the hegemony of the Republic of Turkey. The hegemonic power of the political center gradually
diminished in the 1990s and 2000s as the new agents became more influential among their
audiences. Alongside state actors emerged religious, cultural, and hometown organizations that
have been maintaining and benefiting from the new transnational social field. The last iteration
of this shift came as the immigrants and refugees in Germany and internal immigrants within
Turkey established a new transnational social field. The other important development in the last
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two decades has been the formation of a new aesthetic in the transnational space and in the new
homelands among Kurdish Alevis. Almost all Kurdish Alevi musicians I talked to for this study
have taken part in the new and constantly evolving aesthetic as cultural entrepreneurs. In
conclusion, although some Kurdish Alevi musicians have occasionally resorted to militant and
politically salient music, they inherently may have felt themselves to play the role of arbitrators
or mediators between Kurds and Turks and Alevis and Sunnis, for which they wrote more songs
about peace and reconciliation than have their Sunni Muslim musician friends.
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Appendix A. Facebook Profiles of Select Informants
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Appendix B. Online Questionnaire (in Turkish) and the Translation of the Questions
1. Sizi en çok hüzünlendiren müzisyen ya da şarkıcı kimdir?
What musician or singer makes you feel saddest?
2. Sizi en çok mutlu eden müzisyen ya da şarkıcı kimdir?
What musician or singer makes you feel happiest?
3. Gün içinde ortalama ne kadar süre müzik dinlersiniz?
How much do you listen to music on average on a day?
4. Sizi en çok mutlu eden parçalar nelerdir?
Can you state the songs that make you feel happiest when you listen to?
5. Sizi en çok hüzünlendiren parçalar nelerdir?
Can you state the tunes that make you feel saddest when you listen to?
6. Bir hafta içerisinde ortalama ne kadar süre müzik dinlersiniz?
How much do you listen to music on the average in a week?
7. Milliyetinizi ya da etnik kimliğinizi nasıl tanımlarsınız?
How would you describe your national or ethnic identity?
8. Dini kimliğinizi nasıl tanımlarsınız?
How would you describe your religious identity?
9. Siyasi kimliğinizi nasıl tanımlarsınız?
How would you describe your political identity?
10. 2010 yılı içerisinde hiç köyünüzü ziyaret ettiniz mi?
Have you visited your village in 2010?
11. 2010 yılı içerisinde herhangi bir dini törende ya da dini mekanda bulunduysanız
belirtebirmisiniz?
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Have you ever attended any religious observation or visited any sacred place in 2010? If so
please state.
12. 2010 yılı içerisinde herhangi bir politik eyleme katıldıysanız belirtebirmisiniz?
Have you attended any political strike or demonstration in 2010? If so please state.
13. Müzik dinlemek için en çok kullandığınız medya nedir?
What media do you use most in order to listen to the music?

Question
1
2

Explanation
SAD-Musician
HAPPY-Musician

Participant #1
şiwan
kardeş türkiler

Participant #2
sivan perwer
yok

4

Pieces-HAPPY

hepsi (all)

5

SAD-Pieces
Average-MusicWEEK
Nationality/Ethnicit
y
Religious Identity
Political Identity
Visited Village in
2010?
Religious Event in
2010?
Political Event in
2010?
Media

xezal

yok
Ahmedo, Ez
Dilgese Cani

4-6 saat (hours)

1-2 saat

16-20 saat

kürt
alevi
sosyalist

Kurt
Alevi
Demokrat

kurt
ateist
sosyalist

Hayır (NO)

Hayır

Evet (YES)

cem

hayir

hayir

yürüyüş (protest)
Internet, CD

yok
Internet, Radyo

hayir
Internet

3+6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13

Participant #3
sivan perver
ahmet kaya
genelde özgün
muzik
gurbet turkuleri
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Question
1
2
4
5
3+6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13

Participant #4
mahsuni serif
yinede mahsuni ve siwan
perwer

Participant #5
Mahzuni Serif

Farid Farjad
F.Farjad'ın tüm keman
birak beni konusayim
(violin) dinletileri
dumanli dumanli oy bizim eller, "Çeşmi siyahım", Pir
dokunma keyfine yalan
Sultan Abdal deyiş, "Hasan
dunyanin
Dağı"
1-2 saat
10-15 saat
kurt
Kürt
Kizilbas
Alevi
demokrat
Marksist-Leninist
Evet
Hayır
hemitazi
Cem
Evet
TV, Kaset
Internet, CD

Question
Participant #6
Sivan Perwer
1

Participant #7
Dengbêj Sakiro

Evet, Sosyalist parti

Participant #8
Dayılarım Haydar
Aram Tigran, Dilşad
Said,Kayhan Kalhor
Daha çok enstrümantal
eserler (instrumental)
âyetler, beyitler,
deyişler ve ağıtlama
türküler
10-15 saat
Alevi Kürt
Kızılbaş Alevi
Demokrat
Evet
Hayir
Birçok konferans ve
panel

Internet, CD

CD, Kaset

2

Ozan Şêxo

Dengbêj

4

Şivan Perwer, Nizamettin Aric

Klasik Kürt müzigi
Necirvano, Lawikê
Metini, Xezal, Dewrêsê
Evdî
7-10 saat
Kürt
Alevi
Demokrat
Evet
Hayir

5
3+6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13

Halebce, Kirivê, Agiri, Gula
Ciyan
4-6 saat
Kürt
Kizilbas-Alevi
Demokrat
Evet
Yas töreni, Cem
hayir
Internet, Televizyon, Radyo,
CD
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Question
1
2
4
5
3+6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
Question
1
2
4
5
3+6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13

Participant #9
Murat Bay
Murat Bay
Grup SIR, Asi Kardelenim
Zemheri, Grup SIR, Welate
Xeribi, Murat Bay, Bejna Zirav,
Sexo
10-15 saat
Kurmanc
Hümanist
Demokrat, Sosyalist
Evet

Participant #10
Hacı Bayrak
sexo kartal

2-3 saat
türk
Hümanist
Sosyalist
Hayır

Tutusur Dizelerim
4-6 saat
kürt
alevi hümanist
sosyalist düsünce
Evet

Internet, CD

Internet, Televizyon,
CD

Yürüyüs
Internet, Televizyon, CD

Participant #11
Ahmet kaya
Sadik Gürbüz
icerik olarak hepsi
diyebilirim
(everything)

Participant #12
Ahmet Kaya, Fikret Kizilok
Emin Arbani, Sezen Aksu, Yeni
Türkü

Participant #13
kivircik ali

Participant #14
kivircik ali

Ali Baran

Günebakan, Ax le kinê, Cane cane
Büyüdün bebegim, Ba Rabu, Aci
ninni, Xerîbim, Eman Diyarbekir,
Sen benim sarkilarimsin
16-20 saat
Kürt
Hümanist
Pasifist
Hayır
Kilise ayini (Church)
Boykot (Strike)
CD, mp3 player

Rengen wêlat
hawar, hawar; Yeni
Mektup aldim; Te kinge
wara
1-2 saat
Kürt
Alevi
Sosyal Demokrat
Evet
Cem

grup seyran
hareketli kurtce
muzikler

Internet, Radyo

mahsuni serifin
tum parcalari
16-20 saat
kurt alevisi
alevi
sosyalist
Evet
cem evi
hicbiri (none)
CD
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Question
Participant #15
Ayse San
1
Sexo Kartal
2
Dar hecire, nizanim, cavrasemin, rindamin
4
Halepce, heseniko, daye, diyarbakir, Mem u
Zin, Bave Fahri, Ehmedo Roni, Mala bave
min
5
1 saatten az
3+6
kurd
7
Alevi
8
tarafsiz
9
Evet
10
bulunmadim
11
katilmadim
12
CD
13

Question Participant #17
grebete xaco
1
xidirko
2
4
5
3+6
7

1 saatten az
kurmanc

9
10
11

Ateist
Miliyetci
(nationalist)
Hayır
hayir

12

hayir

13

Internet, iphone

8

Participant #18
Hemê Hecî
Kamkars
Hewlêre, from
Kamkaran
Ahmedo, Bertê
4-6 saat
Hosgörülü
(Tolerant)
Liberal Demokrat
Evet
Cem
Irandaki idamlara
karsi yürüyüs
Internet, Radyo,
CD

Participant #16
Xerepetê Xaco
Sivan
Kani
Kilam1en Dengbêjan weki, Lêl ê
Dyikê, Bêrivanê, Saliho, Dêran, Têli
1 saatten az
Kürt
Demokrat
Hayır
Dindar degilim
Kürt konferansi, Newrozlar
CD

Participant #19
Sivan Perwer
Ciwan Haco
Aklima gelmiyor simdi
Helebce, Denge dile min (mehmet
Atli), Hew Yare (Welat Veda) Oy
oy Ate (serbülent Kanat), Ezi Kalim
7-10 saat
Kürt
Dinsiz (Atheist)
Humanist
Hayır
Cem
Kurt protestolari
Internet, CD
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Appendix C. Selected guitar chords/notations downloaded by musicians and music
students.
1. “Kafama Sıkar Giderim” by Ahmet Kaya
Em
Artık seninle duramam,
F
Bu akşam çıkar giderim.
Am
F
Hesabım kalsın mahşere,
Dm
Em
Elimi yıkar giderim.

Em
Kaybetsem bile herşeyi,
F
Bu aşkı yırtar giderim,
Am
F
Sinsice olmaz gidişim,
Dm
Em
Kapıyı çarpar giderim.

Em
Sen zahmet etme yerinden,
F
Gürültü yapmam derinden,
Am
F
Parmaklarımın üzerinden,
Dm
Em
Su gibi akar giderim.

Em
Sana yazdığım şarkıyı,
F
Sazımdan söker giderim,
Am
F
Ben ağlayamam bilirsin,
Dm
Em
Yüzümü döker giderim.

Em
Artık sürersin bir sefa,
F
Ne cismim kaldı ne cefa,
Am
F
Şikayet etmem bu defa,
Dm
Em
Dişimi sıkar giderim.

Em
Köpeklerimden kuşumdan,
F
Yavrumdan cayar giderim,
Am
F
Senden aldığım ne varsa,
Dm
Em
Yerine koyar giderim.

Em
Bozar mı sandın acılar,
F
Belaya atlar giderim,
Am
F
Kurşun gibi mavzer gibi,
Dm
Em
Dağ gibi patlar giderim.

Em
Ezdirmem sana kendimi,
F
Gövdemi yakar giderim,
Am
F
Beeddua etmem üzülme,
Dm
Em
Kafama sıkar giderim.
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2. “Dam Üstüne Çul Serer,” by Ali Kızıltuğ
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3. “Ağlama Bebeğim” by Ahmet Kaya.
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4. “Kadınlar”by Ahmet Kaya
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5. “Metrisin Önünde” by Ahmet Kaya
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6. “Olmasa Mektubun” by Yeni Türkü
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7. “Senden Oldu” by Ali Kızıltuğ
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Appendix D. Most frequently performed songs representing Alevi repertoire that were
featured at the Tune of the Millennium concert.
1. “Ötme Bülbül Ötme”
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2. “Güldür Gül”
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3. “Kısas Semahı”
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4. “Bugün Bize Pir Geldi”
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5. “Uzun İnce Bir Yoldayım” by Aşık Veysel
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6. “Ne Ağlarsın Benim Zülfü Siyahım” by Aşık Daimi
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7. “İşte Gidiyorum Çeşmi Siyahım” by Aşık Mahsuni.
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